City of Chicago v. Collin

• Decision Date: 06 April 1922
• Docket Number: 14088.,Nos. 14069,s. 14069
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. COLLIN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

302 Ill. 270

134 N.E. 751

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.COLLIN et al.

Nos. 14069, 14088.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 22, 1922.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 1922.

Condemnation proceeding by the City of Chicago against Guillaum Collin and others. Judgment of condemnation was entered, and J. Kent Greene and Anna M. Cann (now Anna M. Condon) filed petitions for portions of the fund, which were answered by Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos. From decree entered Anna M. Condon appeals, and Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos assigned cross-errors and also appeal, the appeals being consolidated.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Anton T. Zeman, judge.

J. Kent Greene, of Chicago (E. J. Price and E. H. Kubitz, both of Chicago, of counsel), for Anna M. Condon.

John R. O'Connor and Alben F. Bates, both of Chicago, for Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

On October 19, 1918, the city of Chicago filed in the circuit court of Cook county its petition praying the court to cause to be ascertained the compensation to be paid for a large number of lots in the city of Chicago described in the petition, to be appropriated to school purposes. While the suit was pending an act was passed which took effect July 1, 1919, amending section 224 of the Revenue Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1919, c. 120) so as to provide that any judgment or decree of court, in law or equity, setting aside any tax deed procured under the act or restoring the owner of the same to possession, should provide that the claimant should pay to the party holding such deed all taxes and legal costs, with interest, together with subsequent taxes and special assessments paid and the statutory fee and costs incurred and other specified items, and that no final judgment or decree of court in any case, either at law or in equity, or in proceedings under the Eminent Domain Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1919, c. 47) involving the title to or interest in any land in which such party holding such tax deed should have an interest, or setting aside any tax deed procured under the act, should be entered until the claimant should make reimbursement to the party holding such tax deed and payments as therein provided, in so far as it should appear that the holder of such deed or his assignors should have properly paid or be entitled to in procuring such deed. Laws of 1919, p. 762. Upon a trial a verdict was returned on February 17, 1920, finding the just compensation for certain lots to be $4,800 and for certain other lots $1,800. On March 15, 1920, judgment was entered on the verdict, and the petitioner was ordered to pay to the county transurer the compensation allowed for the several parcels, as provided by statute, for the parties entitled thereto. On April 8, 1920, J. Kent Greene and Anna M. Cann filed their petitions for portions of the fund, Greene alleging that he was the owner of the lots for which compensation of $1,800 had been allowed, and Anna M. Cann alleging that she was the owner of the lots for which compensation of $4,800 had been allowed, by deed from Oscar E. Leinen, one of the defendants in the condemnation suit. The city of Chicago answered the petitions, claiming portions of the fund by virtue of tax deeds under sales for installments of special assessments. It was stipulated that the property described in the two petitions had been sold at various times to the city of Chicago for delinquent special assessments, and that out of the funds deposited with the county treasurer there should be paid to the city $759.48, and Greene and Anna M. Cann (who had been married and whose name is now Anna M. Condon) agreed upon the portions chargeable to each. The petitions were also answered by Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos, claiming ownership of the fund by virtue of tax deeds. The petitions and answers were referred to a master in chancery, who took the evidence and reported that Greene and Anna M. Condon were the owners, respectively, of the lots claimed; that the tax deeds of Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos were void; that there was due to Greene $1,631.22 after allowing $171.78 to the city of Chicago; that there was due to Anna M. Condon $4,215.30 after allowing $587.70 to the city of Chicago; that Jacob Glos was entitled to $1,008.18 for reimbursement on his tax claims, and Lucy M. Glos was entitled to $579.48 on account of her tax claims. On a hearing on exceptions to the report the findings were approved, but one-half of the master's fees of $357.50 was taxed to Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos, to be paid out of the fund, leaving the net amount payable to Jacob Glos $894.68 and to Lucy M. Glos $514.23. It was stipulated that the charges for the tax claims were to be made against Anna M. Condon, and she appealed from the order. Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos assigned cross-errors, each one specifying 26 particulars in which it was alleged that the court erred. They also appealed, and the appeals have been consolidated, and all errors and cross-errors will be disposed of without particular reference to them.

[1] The validity of the act is questioned on the same ground as the act of 1861, which required a deposit of the redemption money and interest as a condition precedent to questioning the validity of a tax deed, which was held unconstitutional. Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 43;Reed v. Tyler, 56 Ill. 288. That act prohibited a resort to the courts to determine rights unless payment should be made before the right had been determined, which was said to be equivalent to compelling a party to buy justice and perhaps to prevent a poor person from obtaining an adjudication of his rights. The objection does not apply to the amendment, which does not limit the right to resort to the courts, and it is only upon a determination of the existence...