City of Chicago v. Lord

• Decision Date: 05 April 1917
• Docket Number: No. 11037.,11037.
• Citation: 277 Ill. 397,115 N.E. 543
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. LORD et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

277 Ill. 397

115 N.E. 543

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.LORD et al.

No. 11037.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1917.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Theodore Brentano, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the City of Chicago against James F. Lord and others and Samuel H. Price and others. Judgment as prayed for in the petition, and Price and others appeal. Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.George A. Mason and William T. Hapeman, both of Chicago (Edwin L. Harpham, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Harry F. Atwood, Eugene H. Dupee, and Tolman, Redfield & Sexton, all of Chicago (Robert Redfield and Henry P. Chandler, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

This is a proceeding for the widening and improvement of Twelfth street from Michigan avenue to Ashland avenue-a distance of about two miles-in the city of Chicago, by condemning portions of lands and lots on the south side of the street, and for the levy of an assessment upon property found to be benefited by the improvement to pay the cost. The court overruled objections to the legality of the proceeding and by agreement heard the evidence as to compensation for property taken and damages and benefits to property not taken. After hearing the evidence and viewing the premises and reducing assessments as to some property and increasing the assessment against the city on account of public benefits, the court entered judgment as prayed for in the petition, and this appeal was prayed for by a number of the property owners and was allowed and perfected.

The notice of the public hearing stated that the board of local improvements had passed a resolution that Twelfth street be widened between South Michigan avenue and South Ashland avenue, in the city of Chicago, together with an estimate of the cost, omitting the land to be acquired. The statute requires the notice to contain the substance of the resolution adopted by the board of local improvements,and the first of the legal objections was that the notice was insufficient because it did not state on which side the addition to the width of the street was to be made nor describe the property to be condemned. Between Michigan avenue and the east line of State street Twelfth street is only 50 feet wide, and from the west line of State street to Canal street it is 66 feet wide. Those portions of the street are to be made 118 feet wide. Between Canal street and Ashland avenue the street is 66 feet wide and is to be made 108 feet wide. The parcels of lands and lots vary from 42 feet to 68 feet in width and are very numerous. The object of the statute is to enable persons to whom the notice is addressed to be heard by the board of local improvements, and it does not appear that any of the objectors were not present at the hearing on account of any failure to state just how the street was to be widened nor the particular pieces of property to be taken, and they are therefore not entitled to complain that the notice was not sufficient or that there was no notice at all. City of Mount Carmel v. Risley, 263 Ill. 299, 104 N. E. 1035. The substance of the resolution, however, was the widening of Twelfth street, which was to be considered at the public hearing, and the notice was sufficient.

It was next objected that the widening of the street was not a local improvement but was intended primarily for the benefit of the general public. That question was to be determined by the purpose and effect of the improvement. If the primary purpose and effect was to improve the locality, it was a ‘local improvement,’ although it might also benefit the general public. City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 Ill. 374, 101 N. E. 532,45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 538. The plan was to widen and improve this street, which was so narrow as to be quite inconvenient for street uses in connection with private property, and it is evident that it would be a particular and immediate advantage to the locality. City of Peoria v. Peoria Ry. Co., 274 Ill. 48, 113 N. E. 170. The plan provided for an upper roadway on a viaductthe full width of the street, with pavements and sidewalks, the viaduct to be of steel and reinforced concrete, and the street to be carried over the Chicago river by a new steel bridge, which would improve the street for public travel. The commissioners assessed against the city for public benefits one-half of the entire cost, but the fact that the improvement will be of advantage to the city does not change its character as a local improvement if primarily it is a material advantage to the adjacent property.

To establish the fact that the improvement was designed primarily to benefit the general public, the objectors proved that a commission of 328 citizens of Chicago, appointed by the city council in 1909 to study what was called the Chicago plan, had evolved a scientific scheme for the improvement of about 198 miles of streets in Chicago, including parks, boulevards, and other like improvements within the city and the acquisition of forest preserves outside the city, and an outer harbor. A witness testified that, if the scheme of this commission should ever be carried out, Twelfth street would become a part of a quadrangle constituting an artery for travel around the base of the city's heart. The commission was not a corporate authority of the city and had no power to adopt or enforce any scheme or plan. There was no evidence tending to show that it ever would be adopted for the purpose of rendering the city attractive of the use of its numerous streets more convenient. The greatest and primary advantage will be to the locality of the street where business is conducted and which is now obstructed and hampered by the condition of the street.

The condemnation ordinance provided for widening the street and the removal of all buildings or obstructions upon the land condemned and for putting the land to be condemned in a condition passable for public travel, but it did not provide for sidewalks, pavements, the viaduct or bridge, or the relocation of street car tracks. Those things were provided for by other ordinances and by agreements with railroad companies and the Sanitary District of Chicago, and these ordinances and agreements were offered in evidence and objected to. The sidewalk ordinances were objected to first on the ground that they did not designate an officer of the city to file the petition for the special assessment, as required by section 13 of the Local Improvement Act. (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 24, § 519). The provision was that the attorney for the board of local improvements should file the petition, and it is contended that he is not an officer but merely an employé of the board. Section 83 of the Local Improvement Act (section 589) provides that the board may appoint an attorney who shall have charge, under its direction and control, of all local matters pertaining to the board of local improvements, the confirmation of special assessments, and the collection of the same. It happened that the attorney appointed by the board of local improvements was the corporation counsel of the city, but in his character as attorney for the board his position was a public one created by law, of a permanent nature and with continuing duties, so that he was an officer and the statute was complied with. It was also objected that the ordinance for sidewalks and substructures was void because no notice was given of its passage, which is required where an ordinance provides only for the building or renewing of any sidewalk, but in this case the ordinance was not...