City of Chicago v. Clark

• Decision Date: 15 February 1935
• Docket Number: No. 22382.,22382.
• Citation: 359 Ill. 374,194 N.E. 537
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. CLARK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

359 Ill. 374

194 N.E. 537

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.CLARK.

No. 22382.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 15, 1935.

Action by the City of Chicago against Hawthorne Clark. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; Leon Edelman, Judge.

Ellis & Westbrooks, of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

William H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, and Michael L. Rosinia, both of Chicago (Mark J. McNamara, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

HERRICK, Justice.

The appellant (hereinafter called the defendant) was charged in the municipal court of the city of Chicago with the violation of section 4215 of the Revised Chicago Code of 1931. That section provides as follows: ‘Every common, ill-governed or disorderly house, room or other premises, kept for the encouragement of idleness, gaming, drinking, fornication or other misbehavior, is hereby declared to be a public nuisance, and the keeper and all persons connected with the maintenance thereof, and all persons patronizing or frequenting the same, shall be fined not exceeding $200 for each offense.’ The defendant waived a jury and was tried by the court. The court found him guilty of being the keeper of a disorderly house, and imposed a fine of $200 and costs. From that judgment an appeal has been prosecuted directly to this court; the trial court certifying that the validity of an ordinance was involvedand that the public interest required a direct appeal to this court.

The city is not limited in its power to pass the ordinance upon the subject of disorderly houses to any one section of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 24, § 65 et seq.), but can consistently derive its authority from two or more sections. Consumers' Co. v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill. 408, 145 N. E. 114;City of Chicago v. Arbuckle Bros., 344 Ill. 597, 176 N. E. 761. A municipality has the power to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances. Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 66, Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 24, § 65.65, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, par. 65(66), p. 327. Moreover, the city council, in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit those things that are hurtful to the health, safety, and morals of society. Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 Ill. 122, 104 N.E. 1104, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 67. Such power extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, comfort, and quiet of all persons within the city. Consumers' Co. v. City of Chicago, supra. By section 45 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 24, § 65.44, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, par. 65(45), p. 326), municipalities were expressly given the right to pass ordinances to suppress bawdy and disorderly houses. By section 102 of article 5 (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 24, § 65.101, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, par. 65(102), p. 329, cities and villages were granted the power to pass all ordinances proper or necessary to carry into effect the powers granted to cities and villages and to impose such fines or penalties thereby as the legislative bodies of the municipality should deem proper, provided no fine or penalty should exceed $200 and no imprisonment should exceed six months for one offense.

Where the Legislature has committed to municipalities the power to legislate upon a certain subject-matter, the councils of such municipalities have full authority to pass ordinances pertinent to such subject-matter, restrained only by the condition that such ordinance must be reasonable. City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 22 N. E. 791,6 L. R. A. 268;Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N. E. 182; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 589. The issue of the reasonableness ableness of an ordinance is a question of law. In deciding that issue the court will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances, the evil sought to be remedied, the purpose to be accomplished, and the necessity for legislation on the subject. City of Lake View v. Tate, supra. The presumption is in favor of the validity of an ordinance. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 290 Ill. 142, 124 N. E. 842;People v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 232 Ill. 292, 83 N. E. 839. One attacking an ordinance on the ground that it is unreasonable must show affirmatively wherein the ordinance is unreasonable. Swift v. Klein, 163 Ill. 269, 45 N. E. 219;People v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28 N. E. 812. It was held in Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718, that an ordinance that fairly tends to serve or promote the public health or safety is reasonable. The same reasoning applies to ordinances that tend to suppress immorality and to protect the peace and quiet of a neighborhood. It is argued that the ordinance is void under the rule announced in People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A. L. R. 1223. The ordinance does not authorize a conviction on proof of reputation, nor does it delegate to administrative officers the power to determine what the law shall be nor to determine what acts are necessary to effectuate the law. The city council had the lawful right to pass the ordinance in question, and the ordinance is not unreasonable.

It is earnestly urged that because the Legislature has passed a statute upon the subject of disorderly houses and provided for a fine or imprisonment, or both, for the violation of such statute, the city is without authority to legislate upon the same subject-matter. This court has expressly held to the contrary. A municipal ordinance is not void by reason of prohibiting and penalizing acts already prohibited by the statute. City of Decatur v. Schlick, 269 Ill. 181, 109 N. E. 737;City of Litchfield v. Thorworth, 337 Ill. 469, 169 N. E. 265. A party may be punished both for the violation of a statute and a city ordinance which cover the same...