City of Chicago v. McKinley

• Decision Date: 04 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20500.,20500.
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. McKINLEY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

344 Ill. 297

176 N.E. 261

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.McKINLEY.

No. 20500.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1931.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1931.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; W. W. Damron, Judge.

William McKinley was convicted of violating a traffic ordinance which prohibited parking in the loop area of Chicago, and he brings error.

Affirmed.Paul E. Price and Dent, Dobyns & Freeman, all of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, Edward C. Higgins, John G. Drennan, and Samuel L. Golan, all of Chicago, for defendant in error.

DUNN, C. J.

William McKinley, the plaintiff in error, was found guilty in the municipal court of Chicago of a violation of section 3855 of the Chicago municipal code of 1922 by permitting an automobile to stand for a period of time longer than was necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading or unloading of passengers and for a greater length of time than three minutes, in front of 167 West Quincy street, within the area of restricted parking established by the ordinance. It was shown that he drove his car, a passenger sedan, in Quincy street and stopped at No. 175, between Wells and La Salle streets, about 2:10 p. m., and went into the building, leaving the car standing there until 2:40 p. m. The ordinance is in the following language:

‘An Ordinance amending Section 3855 of the Chicago Municipal Code of 1922 as amended.

‘Be it ordained by the city council of the city of Chicago, section 1. That section 3855 of the Chicago municipal code of 1922 as amended by ordinance entitled ‘An ordinance amending section 3855 and repealing section 3856 of the Chicago municipal code of 1922,’ passed December 14, 1927, be and the same is hereby amended to real as follows:

‘3855. Parking Prohibited on Certain Streets During Certain Hours.-On and after March 28, 1929, no person, firm or corporation owning, controlling, driving or operating any passenger vehicle shall cause or permit such vehicle to stand for a period of time longer than is necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading or unloading of passengers, provided such loading or unloading shall not consume more than three minutes; or to stand any commercial vehicle for a period of time longer than is necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading, unloading and delivery or pick-up of materials, provided such loading, unloading and delivery or pick-up shall not consume more than thirty minutes, on any public street or alley in the city of Chicago within the district bounded on the north by the south line of Wacker drive, on the east by the west line of Michigan boulevard, on the south by the south line of Harrison street, on the west by the east line of Market street, nor upon the upper level of Michigan avenue between the north line of Randolph street and the south line of Wacker drive, during the hours from 7:00 o'clock A.M. to 6:00 o'clock P. M. of any day except Sundays, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day, and except on Saturdays when the restriction within the above designated area shall be in force from 7:00 o'clock A. M. to 3:00 o'clock P. M.; provided that this section shall not apply to any duly licensed taxicab when standing in any cabstand fixed by ordinance; provided, further, that it shall not apply to any ambulance nor to any emergency vehicle of the city of Chicago,Federal government, the county of Cook, or to the vehicle of any public utility while the operator of any such vehicle is engaged in the necessary performance of emergency duties; and further provided, that this section shall not apply to any vehicle brought to a stop to avoid collision, or standing in compliance with the orders of any public officer or the direction of any traffic control signal. Any person, firm or corporation that shall violate or fail to comply with the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than $1 nor more than $25 for each offense.’

The defense was that the ordinance is unreasonable, and that it is void upon the ground that it is an amendment of a void ordinance.

As appears from the ordinance set out above, it is an amendment of section 3855 of the Chicago municipal code of 1922 as amended, which was the ordinance held unreasonable, and therefore invalid, in Haggenjos v. City of Chicago, 336 Ill. 573, 168 N. E. 661, the opinion in which was filed October 19, 1929. The ordinance which was the basis of the prosecution in that case provided that no person, firm, or corporation, owning, controlling, driving, or operating any vehicle propelled either by animal or other power, shall cause or permit such vehicle to stand on any public street or alley in Chicago within the district and during the periods of time covered by the ordinance. The provision of the present ordinance, passed March 18, 1929, is, that no person, firm, or corporation, owning, controlling, driving, or operating any passenger vehicle, shall cause or permit such vehicle to stand for a period longer than is necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading or unloading of passengers, provided such loading or unloading shall not consume more than three minutes; or to stand any commercial vehicle for a period of time longer than necessary for the reasonablyexpeditious loading or unloading and delivery or pick-up of materials, provided such loading, unloading, and delivery or pick-up shall not consume more than thirty minutes. The amending ordinance also contained a proviso not found in the former ordinance that the ‘section shall not apply to any vehicle brought to a stop to avoid collision, or standing in compliance with the orders of any public officer or the direction of any traffic control signal.’ In all other respects, so far as this case is concerned, the ordinance is the same as that held invalid in the Haggenjos Case, and the only question presented is whether the vice of the former ordinance is corrected by the substitution for the words of prohibition in it, ‘no person, firm or corporation owning, controlling, driving or operating any vehicle, propelled either by animal or other power, shall cause or permit any vehicle to stand on any public street or alley’ within the boundaries and during the time stated in the ordinance, the words of prohibition in the amended ordinance that ‘no person, firm or corporation owning, controlling, driving or operating any passenger vehicle shall cause or permit such vehicle to stand for a period of time longer than is necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading or unloading of passengers, provided such loading or unloading shall not consume more than three minutes; or to stand any commercial vehicle for a period of time longer than is necessary for the reasonably expeditious loading, unloading and delivery or pick-up of materials, provided such loading, unloading and delivery or pickup shall not consume more than thirty minutes.’ The territory covered by the two ordinances is the same and the hours are the same, except that 6 p. m. in the new ordinance is substituted for 6:30 p. m. in the old.

The violation of the ordinance occurred between Wells and La Salle streets. The building of the Central Trust Company occupies the entire south side of Quincy street in that block. It is twenty-two stories high, and there is considerable traffic of patrons of the bank stopping there and of Brinks express wagons taking money to and from the Federal Reserve Bank on the opposite side of the street. Big trucks also unload coal on the north side of the street. On the northwest corner of La Salle and Quincy streets is the Federal Reserve Bank building, extending west on Quincy street about 100 feet, and immediately west of it is the Old Colony Life building, occupying the remainder of the block-about 200 feet. The Federal Reserve Bank building is occupied in part by the Federal Reserve Bank and on several of its floors are private offices. The Old Colony Life building has fifteen stories, the lower four occupied by the offices of the Old Colony Life Insurance Company and the upper eleven stories used for offices. The street is 45 feet wide. La Salle and Wells streets where they intersect Quincy are busy streets. Wells is a through street, on which are both surface and elevated railway lines.

The plaintiff in error argues that an ordinance prohibiting all passenger vehicles from standing for any length of time except the time required to load or unload passengers, not exceeding three minutes, during an entire business day over an area of seventy-two city blocks, is unreasonable and void, and that this case is controlled by the Haggenjos Case, notwithstanding the amendments to the ordinance. The amendments were passed before the decision in the Haggenjos Case was...