City of Chicago v. Ripley
Decision Date | 19 April 1911 |
Citation | 249 Ill. 466,94 N.E. 931 |
Parties | CITY OF CHICAGO v. RIPLEY. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; John C. Scovel, Judge.
Action by the City of Chicago against Herbert Ripley. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.George H. White, Henry M. Seligman, and John L. McInerney, for plaintiff in error.
This was an action of debt, commenced in the municipal court of Chicago by the city of Chicago against Herbert Ripley, to recover a penalty for the violation of section 655 of the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago, as amended, for filing lumber for the purpose of storage on a lot in the city of Chicago within 100 feet of a private residence, which ordinance reads as follows: ‘No lumber shall be piled for the purpose of storage, seasoning or drying the same, within fifty (50) feet of any planing mill or woodworking manufactory, nor within one hundred (100) feet of any private residence, unless the same has been erected since the establishment of such yard.’ The case was tried before the court without a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's case the court held as the law of the case the following proposition: ‘The court holds as a matter of law, under the evidence in this case, as shown by the stipulation of the parties hereto, that section 655 of the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago, as amended, is unreasonable, discriminatory, unconstitutional, and void’-and thereupon found the defendant not guilty, and entered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff duly excepted, and, the court having certified that the validity of the ordinance upon which the action was founded was involved, and that public interest required that it should be passed upon by the Supreme Court, a writ of error was sued out by the city from this court to review said judgment.
The case was tried upon the following stipulation of facts: (1) That the defendant, Herbert Ripley, prior to the commencement of the above-entitled cause, had piled lumber in an inclosed lot within 100 feet of a private residence, in the fire limits of the city of Chicago, for the purpose of storing the same; (2) that said lumber had been stored after the erection of said private residence, within said distance of 100 feet; (3) that said storage has been, and continues to be, without the consent and permission of the city of Chicago; (4) that there now exist and are maintained one or more lumber yards and places for the storage of lumber within three blocks of the place where defendant's lumber is stored; (5) that such other places for the storage of lumber have been established before the erection of any residences within 100 feet of such places of storage, but residences are now erected within such distance of such places of storage, and that such other places for the storage of lumber are being conducted and maintained under license from and with the permission of the city of Chicago; (6) that said defendant, Herbert Ripley, is the owner in fee simple of the land upon which the lumber in question is placed, and is also the owner of said lumber; (7) that said defendant, Herbert Ripley, has been prevented by the city of Chicago, through its police, from continuing the storage of lumber upon said premises in question; * * * (9) that the defendant, Herbert Ripley, is a citizen, resident, and taxpayer of Chicago, Cook county, Ill.; (10) that many of the residents and property owners living and owning property near said place where said lumber is stored...
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