City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros

• Decision Date: 07 October 1914
• Docket Number: No. 9153.,9153.
• Citation: 106 N.E. 181,264 Ill. 206
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. MANDEL BROS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

264 Ill. 206

106 N.E. 181

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.MANDEL BROS.

No. 9153.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1914.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1914.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; John R. Caverly, Judge.

Mandel Bros. were charged with violating an ordinance of the City of Chicago, and there was a judgment adjudging the ordinance invalid, and the City brings error. Reversed and remanded.William H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, and James S. McInerney, Pros. Atty., both of Chicago (J. Henry Kraft, Leon Hornstein, and Charles M. Haft, all of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Tolman & Redifield, Howard W. Hayes, and Henry P. Chandler, all of Chicago, for defendant in error.

DUNN, J.

In an action for the violation of an ordinance of the city of Chicago the municipal court held invalid the following provisions, being paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 480 of the ordinances of the city:

‘(b) Not more than one floor of any basement or cellar shall be used for the retail sale of goods. Such floor shall be the floor nearest to the inside street grade. Such floor used for the retail sale of goods shall not be more than twenty feet below the inside street grade.

‘(c) No sub-basement, cellar or part of a basement below such floor shall be used for the sale of any goods in any manner, but locker and dressing rooms may be placed in the sub-basement, provided the space thus occupied be separated from the remainder of the basement by fireproof partitions, and that there be at least two flights of stairs, placed as far apart as practicable, leading therefrom to the first floor, inclosed in fireproof partitions. Such stairs from such locker or dressing rooms shall be in addition to other stairways required by this chapter for such buildings, and at least one of such stairways shall open directly on a street, alley or court opening on a street or alley, or on a fireproof passage leading to the street, alley or such court. Where more than five lockers are in one room such lockers shall be of incombustible material.’

The city sued out a writ of error from this court; the trial judge having certified the public interest so required.

The defendant in error violated the ordinance, and the only question presented it its validity. The defendant in error contends that the ordinance is void, both because the city had no power to pass any ordinance of the kind, and because this particular ordinance is unreasonable.

[1][2][3] It is argued that the city council has no power to enact an ordinance regulating the retail sale of goods; but it seems reasonably apparent that this is not such an ordinance, but is a police ordinance, having for its object the protection of the public against danger from fire in places where people are likely to assemble in great numbers. Evidence in regard to the ventilation and sanitary condition of the basement and sub-basement was not material, for the ordinance was not aimed at those conditions. The authorityof the city council to pass any ordinance must be found in some act of the Legislature. Such authority is always strictly construed, and any reasonable doubt of its existence must be solved against the right of the municipality to its exercise. City of Chicago v. Ross, 257 Ill. 76, 100 N. E. 159,43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205. The Legislature has conferred upon city councils power to regulate the construction and use of private buildings, to guard against the calamities of fire, and to provide protection against dangerous conditions in respect to fires. The provisions conferring such power are found in clauses 61 to 65 of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 24, § 62). While they do not, in terms, confer express authority to enact the ordinance in question, they do impose upon the council a duty in the protection of the public from the danger of fires in private buildings growing out of the manner of construction and use of such buildings. The protection of the public against such danger is a subject thus delegated to the municipality. Clause 66 gives the council authority ‘to regulate the notice of the city or village and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances.’ We have held that this clause is not a delegation of all the police powers of the state, and that municipalities, in the exercise of the police power, must be confined within the scope of municipal functions and to the subjects designated in their charters. City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753. Within such limitations regulations necessary to the health and...