City of Chicago v. Cotton
Decision Date | 28 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 1-03-2892.,1-03-2892. |
Citation | 292 Ill.Dec. 264,826 N.E.2d 405,356 Ill. App.3d 1 |
Parties | CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Viola COTTON, et al., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Mara S. Georges, CorporationCounsel of the City of Chicago, Lawrence Rosenthal, Deputy CorporationCounsel, Benna Ruth Solomon, Chief Assistant CorporationCounsel, Sara K. Hornstra, Assistant CorporationCounsel, for Appellant.
Plaintiff, City of Chicago(hereinafter City), appeals from the denial of its motion to reconsider the statutory damages imposed on defendant, Viola Cotton.The City contends that the circuit court acted without authority and entered a void judgment when, after finding liability against Cotton under an ordinance that set a range for monetary fines in the event of a violation, it imposed a fine below that range.We reverse and remand.
Cotton owned two rental properties on the south side of Chicago at 1739 East 78th Streetand at 7801 South Ridgeland Avenue, and was responsible for paying their gas bills.By the beginning of 2002, however, Cotton had fallen in arrears on such payments, creating an outstanding bill between $10,000 to $12,000.Hence, gas service was discontinued to those properties, depriving the tenants therein of heat and hot water.This condition persisted in the properties for 20 days, between January 8 and February 7, 2002.
In response to the condition of the properties, the City filed a complaint against Cotton, alleging violation of the sections of the Building Code(Code) requiring the maintenance of adequate heating facilities in residential buildings (Chicago Municipal Code§ 13-196-400(1988)), the provision of heat (Chicago Municipal Code§ 13-196-410(1988)), and the provision of hot water (Chicago Municipal Code§ 13-196-430(1988)).Among other remedies, including the appointment of a receiver to reestablish heat to the properties, the City sought the imposition of a penalty in the amount of $1,500 per day that the properties were in violation of the Code.The City calculated the $1,500 daily penalty as $500 for each Code section allegedly violated.
In its answer to the complaint, Cotton admitted her failure to comply with the cited provisions of the Building Code for the time period charged.Based on these admissions, the City moved for and was granted summary judgment.However, the circuit court only awarded damages in the amount of $2,000 based on a calculation of $100 per day for 20 days of noncompliance.
The City moved the circuit court to reconsider its judgment, arguing that the circuit court was required to impose a fine of at least $12,000, as the Code provided for a minimum fine of $200 per day per violation.The circuit court denied the motion, however, and the City now appeals.
We have been denied the benefit of an appellee's brief in this case.However, we will still address the merits as instructed by our supreme court in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.,63 Ill.2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495(1976)().
On appeal, the City argues that, as the Code's language is clear and fixes a minimum penalty, without investing any discretion in a court to deviate from the prescribed range of penalties, the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing a penalty below the minimum penalty fixed by the Code.Cotton, on the other hand, would appear to argue that the circuit court has an inherent power to craft a remedy appropriate to the circumstances that could not be fettered by a legislative body, at least in the context of civil, municipal ordinance violations.
At the motion hearing, the circuit court inquired Picking up on this question, Cotton argued:
Cotton also presented the circuit court with the appellate court's decision of Village of Glenview v. Ramaker,282 Ill. App.3d 368, 217 Ill.Dec. 921, 668 N.E.2d 106(1996), urging that, under Ramaker, when a defendant later comes into compliance with a statute, and is otherwise cooperative with authorities, a court may impose a penalty beneath that specified in the statute.
After hearing these arguments, the circuit court concluded:
We disagree with Cotton and the circuit court, and agree with the City.
It is axiomatic that, "[w]here a statute is clear and unambiguous,""[t]he statute must be enforced as written, and a court may not depart from its plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature."Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc.,197 Ill.2d 1, 10, 257 Ill.Dec. 676, 754 N.E.2d 334, 339(2001);see alsoIn re D.L.,191 Ill.2d 1, 9, 245 Ill.Dec. 256, 727 N.E.2d 990, 994(2000)();County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C.,188 Ill.2d 546, 556, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256, 263(1999)();People ex rel. Baumgardner v. Shultz,298 Ill. 125, 128, 131 N.E. 279, 280(1921)();McGann v. People ex rel. Simpson,227 Ill. 567, 570, 81 N.E. 702, 703(1907)();Rucker v. Fuller,11 Ill. 223, 229, 1849 WL 4280(1849)().
This principle is equally applicable in civil cases as in criminal cases, as demonstrated by the fact that all the cases just cited were, in fact, civil disputes.SeeLawrence,197 Ill.2d 1,257 Ill.Dec. 676,754 N.E.2d 334( );In re D.L.,191 Ill.2d 1, 245 Ill.Dec. 256, 727 N.E.2d 990( );Highlands,188 Ill.2d 546,243 Ill.Dec. 224,723 N.E.2d 256( );Shultz,298 Ill. 125, 131 N.E. 279( );McGann,227 Ill. 567, 81 N.E. 702( );Rucker,11 Ill. 223( ).
A related and also well-established corollary to the principle that courts will adhere to and enforce the legislature's clearly expressed will is that, when a statute provides for certain penalties, without providing for additional judicial discretion, the courts will impose only those penalties provided.See generallyPeople v. Wade,116 Ill.2d 1, 6, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954, 956(1987)();People v. DeRosa,362 Ill. 161, 163, 199 N.E. 267, 268(1935)(...
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