City of Chicago v. Cecola

Decision Date14 March 1979
Docket NumberNo. 50506,50506
Citation389 N.E.2d 526,27 Ill.Dec. 462,75 Ill.2d 423
Parties, 27 Ill.Dec. 462 The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant, v. Salvatore CECOLA et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

William R. Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Mary Denise Cahill, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Patrick A. Tuite, Chicago, for appellees.

GOLDENHERSH, Chief Justice:

Defendants, Salvatore Cecola, Juan Cruz, John Spadeas, Jeffrey C. Weiss and Norman McCray, doing business as Harem Leisure Spa, appealed from the order of the circuit court of Cook County permanently enjoining them from operating the business conducted at 839 North La Salle Street in Chicago. The appellate court reversed (56 Ill.App.3d 143, 13 Ill.Dec. 863, 371 N.E.2d 955), and we allowed the city's petition for leave to appeal.

The parties have stipulated that there is an establishment known as the Harem Leisure Spa located at 839 North La Salle Street owned by defendant Salvatore Cecola; that on September 3, 1974, Helena Roberts, a female employee of the Harem Leisure Spa, committed an act of prostitution there by offering to perform an act of oral copulation for money with Investigator Nicholas Ahrens of the Chicago Police Department, and that on September 29, 1974, the said Helena Roberts was convicted of an act of prostitution based on that conduct; that for money, in private cubicles, completely nude female employees of the Harem Leisure Spa on September 9, 1974, October 25, 1974, December 1, 1974, December 27, 1974, February 15, 1975, and on other occasions, had fondled and stroked the penises of investigators from the Chicago Police Department and customers of the Harem Leisure Spa; and that the foregoing conduct is a service offered by the Harem Leisure Spa to its customers upon payment of money.

The city alleged in its complaint that defendant Cecola was the owner of the Harem Leisure Spa, that defendants Cruz, Spadeas, Weiss and McCray were employed there; that the blatantly sexual conduct that occurred at defendants' "spa" was deleterious and a menace to the health, safety or general welfare of the community and constituted a public nuisance; that the plaintiff city had no adequate remedy at law as the numerous summonses issued to the defendants and the arrests of their employees had had no effect in eliminating or in any way retarding the illegal activity; and that the only remedy that would halt this activity would be a permanent injunction permanently and perpetually enjoining the defendants from operating their business. In their answer defendants pleaded as affirmative defenses that insofar as the municipal ordinance attempts to punish persons for being found in places where allegedly lewd activity is carried on, the ordinance violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because the word "lewdness" is so vague that a reasonable person cannot be expected to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and the court cannot be reasonably expected to interpret and apply the law; that the conduct of sexual stimulation of male genitals is an activity that is permitted by law and that is conducted in a private room out of sight of the general public and is in no way deleterious or a menace to the health, safety or general welfare of the community; and that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law in the prosecution of the defendants under the ordinance which provides for a fine after conviction.

Section 192-1 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides:

"Every house of ill-fame or house of assignation where men and women resort for the purpose of fornication, prostitution, or lewdness is hereby declared to be a nuisance."

Pursuant to section 192-19 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, a fine of $5 to $200 may be imposed for a violation of a provision of chapter 192. Section 192-1 of the Municipal Code is similar to section 1 of "An Act regarding places used for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution * * * " (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 100 1/2, par. 1), which in pertinent part provides:

"That all buildings and apartments, and all places, and the fixtures and movable contents thereof, used for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, are hereby declared to be public nuisances, and may be abated as hereinafter provided. The owners, agents, and occupants of any such building or apartment, or of any such place shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a public nuisance, and may be enjoined as hereinafter provided."

Section 2 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 100 1/2, par. 2) provides for injunctive relief perpetually enjoining all persons from maintaining or permitting the public nuisance to continue. Although this action was not brought pursuant to the Act, it is well settled that the statute was not intended to displace common law actions to abate public nuisances (People ex rel. Dyer v. Clark (1915),...

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13 cases
  • City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 29, 1980
    ...prosecution has proved ineffective or may in fact be ineffective, a court may enjoin the activity. (City of Chicago v. Cecola (1979), 75 Ill.2d 423, 27 Ill.Dec. 462, 389 N.E.2d 526; City of Chicago v. Geraci (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 699, 332 N.E.2d 487; and Toushin v. City of Chicago (1974), 2......
  • City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 18, 1982
    ...the definition of "prostitution" in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 11-14). City of Chicago v. Cecola (1979), 75 Ill.2d 423, 27 Ill.Dec. 462, 389 N.E.2d 526 (obscene massage, though not prostitution under criminal law, is prostitution for purposes of nuisance We d......
  • City of Chicago v. Beretta USA Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 18, 2004
    ...of public peace has been disrupted by disorderly houses, unruly taverns, and dance halls. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Cecola, 75 Ill.2d 423, 27 Ill.Dec. 462, 389 N.E.2d 526 (1979) (house of prostitution); City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N.E. 537 (1935) (disorderly house); Peop......
  • People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 31, 1986
    ...has recognized that the criminal law can be ineffective in preventing the continuance of a nuisance. (City of Chicago v. Cecola (1979), 75 Ill.2d 423, 27 Ill.Dec. 462, 389 N.E.2d 526 (maximum fine of $200 insufficient to deter defendants from maintaining establishments offering sexual massa......
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