City of Chicago v. Harmon

• Decision Date: 08 December 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 52433
• Citation: City of Chicago v. Harmon, 254 N.E.2d 573, 117 Ill.App.2d 361 (Ill. App. 1969)
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernadine HARMON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 573

254 N.E.2d 573

117 Ill.App.2d 361

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernadine HARMON, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 52433.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Dec. 8, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1970.

Ron W. Fritsch, Chicago, for appellant.

Raymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel, Chicago, Marvin E. Aspen, Edmund Hatfield, Chicago, of counsel, for appellee.

ADESKO, Presiding Justice.

This cause was transferred on November 22, 1967, to the Illinois Supreme Court on motion of the appellee due to the constitutional questions involved. After we granted the request, the Supreme Court reassigned the matter for our consideration on December 4, 1968.

The defendant has appealed the denial of her motion for a new trial after her conviction for violation of the disorderly conduct provision of the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, Chapter 193, Section 1. The facts show that on February 9, 1967, at 11:00 a.m., the defendant was arrested by police officers and taken to the Fillmore Street Police Station. She was in custody for about one hour at that location and was subsequently transported to the womens' lock-up at 11th and State Streets in Chicago. The defendant remained in custody until 2:00 p.m. on February 10, 1967, when she was brought to trial.

At the hearing on her motion for a new trial, the defendant claimed that on several occasions while at the Fillmore and Central Police stations she was denied a request to make a phone call while making said request to a number of police officials. When her case was called for trial in Women's Court, the defendant answered ready for trial, waived a jury, and conducted her own defense. The complainant and another witness testified for the City but the defendant did not cross-examine them. The defendant denied the charge and the court found her guilty. Miss Harmon then offered to prove that she was not at the scene of the alleged occurrence and stated that if given time she could prove that she was working at another location on the date and time in question. The court stated it was too late and imposed a fine of twenty-five dollars. Since defendant was without adequate funds, she was sentenced to the House of Correction to satisfy her fine at the rate of Five-Dollars a day. Defendant's relatives learned of her arrest, trial and detention on February 12, 1967, whereupon her uncle paid the remainder of her fine and defendant was released.

On this appeal, the defendant contends she was denied a fair trial and due process of law because of the period of detention, from arrest to trial, without being afforded the opportunity to communicate during this time. Defendant contends that this amounted to unreasonable incommunicado detention which unnecessarily restricted her right to prepare a defense. The appellant refers to Section 103--3 of the Criminal Code which provides that persons arrested have the right to communicate with an attorney and a member of one's family within a reasonable time after arrival at the first place of custody, with a renewal of this right if one is transferred to a new place of custody. Ch. 38, Sec. 103--3, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967). The defendant initially relies upon the above statutory expression but asserts that the right of one who is in custody to communicate is not based on the statute alone. Rather, the defendant asserts that the right is also guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions.

The City answers these contentions by citation to several cases which establish that several provisions of the Criminal Code are not applicable to proceedings for the enforcement of a violation of a municipal ordinance. Thus, in City of Chicago v. Joyce, 38 Ill.2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 289 (1967), the Supreme Court established that municipal code violations need not be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be required in criminal cases. Similarly, in Village of Park Forest v. Bragg, 38 Ill.2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868 (1967), it was held that a municipality could appeal an acquittal for a violation of a numicipal ordinance. Thus, the City argues that Section 103--3 of the Criminal Code was not available to this defendant because these proceedings were civil in nature.

We are of the opinion that...