City of Chicago v. Pridmore

Decision Date20 November 1957
Docket NumberNo. 34441,34441
Citation147 N.E.2d 54,12 Ill.2d 447
PartiesCITY OF CHICAGO in Trust for the Use of Schools, Appellee, v. William T. PRIDMORE et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Marion G. McClelland, Chicago (William T. Pridmore, Chicago, pro se, of counsel), for appellants.

Frank R. Schneberger, and Frank S. Righeimer, Chicago (Robert E. Wiss, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

HERSHEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a condemnation judgment of the superior court of Cook County which was entered upon a jury verdict awarding the appellants, as owners and parties interested in the real estate, $25,000 as just compensation for the property in question.

The appellants not only challenged the adequacy of the award, but asked that the judgment be reversed and a new trial ordered for errors committed in the trial of the case.

Appellants contend (1) that they were denied the right to introduce in evidence a contract involving the sale of what they contend to be comparable property; (2) that the petitioner's closing argument was prejudicial error as to the defendants; (3) that the court erred in denying leave to amend defendants' post-trial motion and, by reason thereof, defendants question the constitutionality of section 68.1 of the Civil Practice Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 110, par. 68.1.

The property here condemned was for school purposes and consisted of a 5-acre tract located within the city of Chicago. The evidence shows that the tract in question was surrounded by subdivided property, that to the immediate west of the property was Indiana Avenue, that Prairie Avenue would extend through if the property were subdivided, and that Eighty-eighth Street would have to be extended westwardly through said property. The evidence showed that Indiana Avenue was paved and 100 feet wide with curbing, sewer and water, but no sidewalk. The parcel in question was 661.64 feet east and west and 329.22 feet north and south. There are no sewers, water, streets, sidewalks, curbing, or other improvements on this acreage tract except those on Indiana Avenue. The property is zoned for single-family residences and was subject to the municipal code of the city of Chicago relating to zoning and streets.

Both parties agreed that the highest and best use of the property as of the date of the filing of the condemnation petition on July 13, 1956, was for subdivision purposes to be developed for single-family residences. The petitioner called three witnesses on valuation, namely, Harry L. Shlaes, Grover C. Elmore, and Ernest H. Lyons, all of whom testified that the fair cash market value of said property for subdivision purposes was $25,000. There was no question raised as to the competency of these witnesses, nor as to their testimony.

Defendants called two witnesses on valuation, namely, James A. Riggs, who stated in his opinion the tract was worth $56,000, and Bolin V. Bland, who stated in his opinion that the property was worth $60,000.

We consider the appellants' contentions raised in this cause. First, was it error not to admit defendants' exhibits 2 and 3 in evidence?

Defendants' exhibit 2 was a contract for the sale of a tract abutting the northeast corner of the tract in question. Defendants' exhibit 3 was a rider attached to and made a part of the said contract. Defendants contend that the contract and rider were for the sale of a like or similar tract of four acres for a purchase price of $60,000. The court held that the contract was not for the sale of raw land, such as the tract in question, but was for platted land and contemplated the subdivision of the property and included some of the costs of subdivision. Hence the court held the contract and rider were not for the sale of similarly conditioned property and were not admissible. The contract was for the sale of 28 lots, and provided that before closing a plat of the subdivision would be properly approved and recorded, and a Chicago Title and Trust Company report of title would show the property subdivided into 28 lots available for use as building sites. It is obvious that defendants' exhibits 2 and 3 related to the sale of subdivided lots and the property is not comparable to five raw unsubdivided acres. This court has consistently held that property which has been subdivided into lots is not similar to or similarly conditioned as unsubdivided or acre property. Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Wallace, 299 Ill. 476, 132 N.E. 444; Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Chilvers, 344 Ill. 573, 176 N.E. 720; Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Eckhoff, 372 Ill. 391, 24 N.E.2d 52.

As to the constitutionality of section 68.1 of the Civil Practice Act the court finds no merit in the contention. The purpose of the act was to consolidate into one motion all requests for post-trial relief, and makes no substantial change in the basic policy of procedure as it existed before. The post-trial motion was in effect a motion for a new trial. The affidavit attached to the motion for new trial did not contain any competent evidence not already produced, or which was not either known to counsel or discoverable upon the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to or during trial. It was therefore properly stricken. Forest Preserve District v. Folta, 377 Ill. 158, 36 N.E.2d 264. The court finds no error in the trial court's ruling in striking the said affidavit and in refusing defendants' motion to strike certain portions of the trial court's order.

Appellants contend that the court erred in giving plaintiff's instruction No. 3 because it does not apply to land situated as is the tract in question. An issue in this case was the best way the tract could be subdivided. Said instruction No. 3 is...

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24 cases
  • State v. Donesay, 77558
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 29 Mayo 1998
    ...its own motion (Cf. People v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580; People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214; City of Chicago v. Pridmore, 12 Ill.2d 447, 147 N.E.2d 54.) It is always the duty of a trial court to control proceedings to insure that an accused receives a fair and imparti......
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    ...they arose in the trial court, but contends that they are, nevertheless, subject to review on the authority of City of Chicago v. Pridmore, 12 Ill.2d 447, 453, 147 N.E.2d 54, and City of Quincy v. V. E. Best Plumbing and Heating Supply Co., 17 Ill.2d 570, 577, 162 N.E.2d Without determining......
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