City of Chicago v. United States City of Chicago v. United States, Nos. 101 and 102

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DOUGLAS
• Citation: 24 L.Ed.2d 340,396 U.S. 162,90 S.Ct. 309
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES et al. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES et al
• Docket Number: Nos. 101 and 102
• Decision Date: 09 December 1969

396 U.S. 162 90 S.Ct. 309 24 L.Ed.2d 340 CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES et al. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES et al.

Nos. 101 and 102. Argued Nov. 20, 1969. Decided Dec. 9, 1969.

Gordon P. MacDougall and Howard E. Shapiro, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

James W. Hoeland, Louisville, Ky., for appellees.

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Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in these cases is whether orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission discontinuing investigations respecting the notice of rail carriers to terminate or change the operation or services of interstate passenger trains are judicially reviewable on the complaint of aggrieved persons.

Section 13a(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1), provides, with details not important here, that a rail carrier may file notice of such discontinuance or change with the Commission and that within 30 days the Commission may make an investigation of the proposed discontinuance or change. Apart from interim relief, the Commission may order continuance of the operation and service for a period not to exceed one year. ¹ One of the present cases involves two interstate passenger trains between Chicago and Evansville, Indiana, discontinued by the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 331 I.C.C. 447, and the other involves two interstate passenger trains between New Orleans and Cincinnati discontinued by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 333 I.C.C. 720.

In each case the Commission, addressing itself to the standards in § 13a(1), found that continued operation of the trains was not required by public convenience and necessity and that continued operation would unduly burden interstate commerce. It thereupon entered in each case an order terminating its investigation of the proposed discontinuance.

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Appellants in each case—cities, state regulatory agencies, and other interested parties—brought these suits before the same three-judge court to review the Commission's decisions. It is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a):

'Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.'

The District Court held that decisions terminating investigations under § 13a(1) are not 'orders' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a).² 294 F.Supp. 1103, 1106. The cases are here on direct appeal, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2325, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 395 U.S. 957, 89 S.Ct. 2103, 23 L.Ed.2d 744.

As stated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that Congress had no such purpose. Certainly under § 13a(1) the carrier, if overruled by the Commission, could obtain review. We can find no talismanic sign indicating that Congress desired to deny review to opponents of interstate discontinuances alone.

Section 13a in its present form came into the Act in 1958 and was designed to supersede the prior confused and time-consuming procedure under which the States

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supervised the discontinuance of passenger trains. Accordingly, Congress provided a uniform federal scheme to take the place of the former procedure.³ A single federal standard was to govern train discontinuances whether interstate or intrastate, though the procedure of § 13a(1) for discontinuance of an interstate train was made somewhat different from the procedure for discontinuance of intrastate trains.⁴ But the Commission is to have the final say in each case and 'precisely the same substantive standard' now governs discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate...