City of Chicago v. Collins

• Citation: 51 N.E. 907,175 Ill. 445
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. COLLINS et al.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

175 Ill. 445

51 N.E. 907

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.COLLINS et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; Murray F. Tuley, Judge.

Bill by Lorin C. Collins, Jr., and others against the city of Chicago. There was a decree for complainants, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Charles S. Thornton, Corp. Counsel, Granville W. Browning, First Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Cora B. Hirtzel, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellant.

Collins & Fletcher, for appellees.

The appellees, 373 in number, residents and taxpayers of the city of Chicago, suing in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed a bill to enjoin the city from enforcing an ordinance providing that all vehicles used upon the streets of the city, including those for private use, for pleasure, etc., should pay an annual license fee, and that any person using any vehicle without first having obtained a license therefor, or failing to have said vehicle properly tagged, so that it would appear the license had been paid, should, on conviction, be fined a sum of not less than $10 nor more than $50 for each offense. The ordinance requires wagons, carriages, coaches, buggies, bicycles, and all other wheeled vehicles propelled by horse power or by the rider shall be so licensed. The ordinance also provides that all money received under or collected from the operation and enforcement of the ordinance should constitute a separate and distinct fund, to be known as the ‘Wheel-Tax Fund.’ The sole object and purpose for which said wheel-tax fund might be disbursed should be for repairing and keeping in good condition the streets of the city, and should, upon the recommendation of the council, be distributed in the 34 wards of the city of Chicago. At the time of the filing of the bill this ordinance was in full force and effect. It will be seen from an examination of such ordinance that it imposes a license fee or tax on all vehicles used on the streets of Chicago,-even those in private use, and not for let or bire. All of the appellees are owners of bicycles, and many of them of other wheeled vehicles propelled by horses. 300,000 bicycles and carriages in private use only are affected by the ordinance. The appellees use their bicycles, not for the purpose of traffic, nor for carrying merchandise or passengers for hire, upon the streets of Chicago, but solely for their private use, and as a means of locomotion from place to place, not letting or hiring either said bicycles or wheeled vehicles to any person or persons whomsoever; and 300,000 other vehicles in the city of Chicago, all of which are subjected to the license tax imposed by the ordinance, are similarly used. All the personal property of the appellees owned by them on May 1, 1897, subject to taxation, has been listed and assessed for taxation; and, inasmuch as the law is uniform, it is reasonable to conclude that all other personal property, including the 300,000 other vehicles affected by the ordinance, has been similarly listed and assessed. The fiscal year of the city of Chicago commenced on January 1, 1897, and long prior to the enactment of the ordinance in question the city of Chicago had passed the annual appropriation bill provided for by section 2 of article 7 of the general act relative to cities and villages, providing that within the first quarter of the fiscal year such appropriation bill shall be passed, by which the corporate authorities may appropriate such sum or sums of money as may be deemed necessary to defray all necessary expenses and liabilities of such corporation, and in such ordinance shall specify the objects and purposes for which such appropriations are made, and the amount appropriated for each object; and no further appropriation shall be made at any time within such fiscal year without the sanction of the majority of the legal voters of the municipality. The bicycles owned by the appellees range in value from $5 to $1,500, and the value of the other wheeled vehicles from $25 to $5,000, and it is not denied by the answer that every day the appellees use one or more of their vehicles; and that, inasmuch as they are confined, during the working hours of the day, very closely to their places of business, it is needful for their health and mental and bodily vigor that they take exercise in the streets, boulevards, and parks of the city; that many thousands of people in the city of Chicago are similarly situated; and that, unless they submit to the exaction of the illegal ordinance, they will be debarred of the privilege of so using the streets, and will be greatly injured in their physical health and enjoyment. It is contended that the ordinance is void, because the city has no power to require a license for private vehicles used on the streets of the city, nor to impose a tax by way of license; that a tax so imposed on vehicles, on account of their different values, would not be uniform; that great injury would result because of injury to health and because of interference with the right of complainants to use the streets, and consequent injury to business by the prevention of free locomotion from place to place, and by the citizens being harassed by arrests, etc. The bill prayed for an injunction perpetually enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance. The answer averred the right to enact and enforce the ordinance, and asserted complainants had a remedy at law if any existed. The cause was heard on a stipulation as to facts which embraced the facts as averred in complainants' bill. The stipulation showed the streets at night are full of passing vehicles; that the bicycle is almost noiseless, and chances of accident to persons using the streets have greatly increased because of its use; that the city has been obliged to enact rules regulating the use of the streets because of the changed conditions; that prior to the passage of this ordinance the city was obliged to impose rules requiring bicycles to carry lights after dark, limiting their speed, regulating the meeting and passing of other vehicles and persons, and otherwise regulating the use of the streets; that many vehicles, especially those used for pleasure, are now fitted with rubber tires, which causes them to move with but slight noise, so that persons using the streets have little warning of their approach.

PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts).

Two questions are presented by this record: Has a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance of a city? And has the city, under the express or implied powers conferred on it by the legislature, authority to adopt this ordinance? The enforcement of a void city ordinance may be enjoined in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, at the instance of any person whose interests are impaired by it. A court of equity, however, cannot determine whether the ordinance has been violated, but merely whether it is void. Where such court is resorted to on the ground of prevention of a multiplicity of suits, there must be a right affecting many persons. Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111, 13 N. E. 819;Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Ottawa, 148 Ill. 397, 36 N. E. 85. Pomeroy, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence (section 245), in treating of the jurisdiction of courts of equity on that ground, divides them into four classes, and in the third and fourth classes states the principle: ‘Third. Where a number of persons have separate and individual claims and rights of action against the same party, A., but all arise from some common cause, are governed by the same legal rule, and involve similar facts, and the whole matter might be settled in a single suit brought by all these persons uniting as co-plaintiffs, or one of the persons suing on behalf of the others, or even by one person suing for himself alone. The case of several owners of distinct parcels of land upon which the same illegal assessment or tax has been laid is an example of this class. Fourth. Where the same party, A., has or claims to have some common right against a number of persons, the establishment of which would regularly require a separate action brought by him against each of these persons, or brought by each of them against him, instead thereof he might procure the whole to be determined in one suit, brought by himself against all the adverse claimants as co-defendants.’ It is familiar that on this ground taxpayers of a town, city, or county, or other taxing district, may file a bill to restrain or set aside an illegal general tax, whether personal or made a lien upon their respective property. Allwood v. Cowen, 111 Ill. 481;Kimball v. Trust Co., 89 Ill. 611;Searing v. Heavysides, 106 Ill. 85.

The claim that the failure of complainants to pay this tax, and resort to legal actions to recover the amount, precludes equitable interference, cannot be sustained. Many cases undoubtedly exist where equity will interfere to protect an invasion of property rights where the remedy at law is not entirely adequate; and where peculiar difficulties intervene the jurisdiction will be upheld. In the present case 373 complainants have filed their bill for relief. Their grievance is precisely the same, and arises from the same cause. The various parties aggrieved, although not jointly interested, are allowed to sue together for the express purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and to have the controversy settled in one hearing. The municipality is charged with a public trust, and where it is about to commit an act clearly illegal, the necessary effect of which will be to impose heavy burdens upon the property of citizens and taxpayers, it becomes amenable to the jurisdiction of equity for a breach of trust, and such court may interfere by injunction for the preventionof such act. Where the controversy is between two parties only, or where but few persons are involved,...