City of Chicago v. Lindley, s. 94-3506

• Decision Date: 22 November 1995
• Docket Number: 94-3844 and 94-3891,94-3507,Nos. 94-3506,s. 94-3506
• Citation: 66 F.3d 819
• Parties: The CITY OF CHICAGO and Donald R. Smith, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Chicago Department on Aging, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Maralee I. LINDLEY, in her official capacity as Director of the Illinois Department on Aging, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 819

66 F.3d 819

The CITY OF CHICAGO and Donald R. Smith, in his official

capacity as Commissioner of the Chicago Department

on Aging, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Maralee I. LINDLEY, in her official capacity as Director of

the Illinois Department on Aging,

Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 94-3506, 94-3507, 94-3844 and 94-3891.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 7, 1995.

Decided Sept. 8, 1995.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 22, 1995.

Susan R. Lichtenstein, Stuart D. Fullerton (argued), Andrew S. Mine, Susan S. Sher, Lawrence Rosenthal, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Benner R. Solomon, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, and Robert J. Smith, Jr., and Cacilia R. Masover, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs.

Jerald S. Post, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Wallace Solberg, and James E. Ryan, States Atty., Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

Robert J. Smith, Jr. and Cacilia R. Masover, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for amici curiae.

Before CUMMINGS, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

The Director of the Illinois Department on Aging appeals the decision of the district court, which determined that relevant provisions of the Older Americans Act (OAA), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3001-3058ee, were enforceable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and subsequently held that Illinois' formula for distributing funds to the State's older individuals violated the OAA. The City of Chicago cross appeals. It challenges the district court's determination that the state formula did not violate regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It also contends that the district court erred in holding that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment from ordering the State to disburse additional OAA funds to the City in the future to remedy the State's past violations. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's decision that a private cause of action exists under Sec. 1983 for enforcing the relevant provisions of the OAA, and remand with instructions that the district court dismiss the City's claim. We affirm the district court's decision that the formula does not violate regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI.

I BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Scheme

Under the Older Americans Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3001-3058ee, the federal government distributes funds to the states each year. The states use these funds to provide a wide Pursuant to 1992 amendments to the OAA, each state agency is required to submit its proposed distribution formula to the federal Administration on Aging (AoA) for "approval." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(D); see also 45 C.F.R. Secs. 1321.77-1321.83 (setting forth hearing procedures); prior versions of the statute required merely an opportunity for federal "review and comment." Under present law, however, the federal AoA may not approve a state plan unless it determines that the state agency's intrastate funding formula complies with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3024(c). Section 3025(a)(2)(C) requires that each state agency:

                range of services to their "older individuals," whom the statute defines as individuals "60 years of age or older."  42 U.S.C. Sec. 3002(38).  The OAA requires each state to designate an agency responsible for creating a formula to determine the intrastate distribution of OAA funds.  Id. Sec. 3025(a)(1)(A).  That state agency must, in turn, divide the state into subdivisions known as "planning and service areas," or "PSAs," and must designate an area agency on aging for each PSA.  Id. Sec. 3025(a)(1)(E). 1  In Illinois, the state agency is the Illinois Department on Aging (IDoA).  The State is divided into thirteen PSAs, one of which comprises the entire City of Chicago.  The area agency for the City of Chicago is known as the Chicago Department on Aging
                

in consultation with area agencies, in accordance with guidelines issued by the Commissioner, and using the best available data, develop and publish for review and comment a formula for distribution within the State of funds received under this title that takes into account--

(i) the geographical distribution of older individuals in the State; and

(ii) the distribution among planning and service areas of older individuals with greatest economic need and older individuals with greatest social need, with particular attention to low-income minority older individuals.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). The statute defines "greatest economic need" as "the need resulting from an income level at or below the poverty line." Id. Sec. 3002(29). "Greatest social need" is defined as

the need caused by noneconomic factors, which include--

(A) physical and mental disabilities;

(B) language barriers; and

(C) cultural, social, or geographical isolation, including isolation caused by racial or ethnic status, that--

(i) restricts the ability of an individual to perform normal daily tasks; or

(ii) threatens the capacity of the individual to live independently.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 3002(30).

B. Facts

In 1992, Maralee Lindley, Director of the IDoA, developed a distribution formula that allocated Illinois' OAA funds based upon a series of population factors. Pursuant to 89 Ill.Admin.Code Sec. 230.45(c), Lindley did not include any factors that failed to account for at least five percent of the State's older individuals. ² The State's final distribution formula relied upon six factors that were assigned various percentage weights:

See 89 Ill.Admin.Code Sec. 230.45(e)-(f). The percentage weights represented the amount of total OAA funds allocated to the particular factor in the formula. Each PSA, in turn, received funds in proportion to the percentage of Illinois' residents in each of the above categories who resided in the PSA. ³ Once the area agency on aging for a particular PSA received its money, however, it was free to spend it as it chose; nothing in the OAA requires the area agency on aging to adhere to the State formula's distribution percentages when it actually spends OAA funds.

C. Earlier Proceedings

Lindley submitted her formula to the federal Administration on Aging and obtained its approval. Subsequently, the City of Chicago (City) challenged Lindley's formula in this action in the district court. The City argued that Lindley's formula violated the OAA because it failed to consider factors relating to disability and language barriers. The City also alleged that the funding formula discriminated against minorities in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its implementing regulations. Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The district court ruled in the City's favor on its OAA claim. Initially, the court determined that the OAA was not too vague to create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ⁴ The district court focused upon the statutory language that required funding formulae to "take[ ] into account" the distribution of individuals with greatest social need, whom the statute defines as including those with "physical and mental disabilities" and "language barriers." In the district court's view, this language required funding formulae to include factors corresponding to older individuals with disabilities and language barriers. The court then reasoned that Congress did not intend to foreclose private enforcement of the OAA by requiring the federal AoA to approve all funding formulae.

The district court subsequently concluded that Lindley's formula did not "take into account" older individuals with disabilities or language barriers. It rejected Lindley's claim that the minority and 75+ factors already accounted for these individuals. Although it recognized that these factors did in fact distribute increased funds on the basis of disability and language barriers, the court reasoned that the minority factor overlooked residents of European descent who did not speak English well and that the 75+ factor was underinclusive of those with disabilities. It noted that census data identifying those with "mobility" or "self-care" limitations was more accurate than the 75+ proxy. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment to the City, and ordered Lindley to develop a new formula. The court rejected, however, the City's request for an order requiring Lindley to reallocate funds to remedy the harm caused by the underinclusive distribution formula. It reasoned that this claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and noted that, in any event, the City had not offered a concrete measure of damages.

The district court rejected the City's Title VI claims. It concluded that the City's intentional discrimination claim was without merit because the City had not shown that Lindley chose the rural and 75+ factors because they discriminated against minorities. With respect to the City's disparate impact claim, the district court stated that the City had not shown that Lindley's formula had a substantially disparate impact on

minorities. In the alternative, it held that Lindley had an important interest in employing the 75+ and rural criteria, namely, her desire to ensure that PSAs with greater demand for services received greater amounts of funds. ⁵

II DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 99 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In the course of our review, we turn first to the arguments at issue in Director Lindley's appeal.

A. Lindley's Appeal

Lindley submits that the OAA does not create rights privately enforceable under Sec. 1983. She contends specifically that the statutory command that funding formulae take factors "into account" is too ambiguous to be...