City of Clearwater v. BayEsplanade.com, LLC

• Decision Date: 22 June 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 2D17–2006
• Parties: CITY OF CLEARWATER, Appellant, v. BAYESPLANADE.COM, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

251 So.3d 249

CITY OF CLEARWATER, Appellant,

v.BAYESPLANADE.COM, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17–2006

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed June 22, 2018.

Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018

Paul Richard Hull, Assistant City Attorney, Clearwater, for Appellant.

Robert V. Potter and Sharon E. Krick of Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Clearwater, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

BayEsplanade.com, LLC, filed a complaint against the City of Clearwater to quiet title to 5.88 acres of submerged land below what is now known as Mandalay Channel, between Clearwater Beach and the islands that comprise Island Estates. BayEsplanade claimed title through a 1957 quitclaim deed. The City of Clearwater filed a counterclaim to quiet title, claiming title through a 1934 quitclaim deed. Following cross motions for summary judgment, final summary judgment quieting title was entered in favor of BayEsplanade. We reverse the judgment in favor of BayEsplanade and remand with instructions that judgment be entered quieting title in favor of the City of Clearwater. The language of the 1934 deed to the City of Clearwater is unambiguous, and the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence to construe it.

The issue presented in the motions for summary judgment concerns whether the 1934 quitclaim deed from the Clearwater Island Bridge Company (the Bridge Company) to the City of Clearwater unambiguously conveyed all lands—including submerged land—within the boundaries described in the deed. A brief deraignment of title to the submerged land in dispute is necessary.

Prior to 1926, title to the submerged land was held by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida. In 1926, the Trustees conveyed approximately thirty-five acres of submerged land to the Bridge Company, which included the submerged land at issue in this case (the TIIF deed). The TIIF deed described the eastern boundary of the conveyed submerged land as "the West side of [the] channel between Sand Key and Ragged Key."

In 1934, the Bridge Company executed a quitclaim deed and release to the City of Clearwater, conveying the lands described as follows:

[1] Beginning on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico at a point where the North line of the tract of land designated as "Clearwater City Park" on a plat of Clearwater Beach as the same is recorded in Plat Book 5, Page 2 of the Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida, if prolonged West would intersect said Gulf shore, thence run Southerly along said shore line Four Hundred (400) feet; thence East parallel to the North line of said "Clearwater City Park" to the waters of Clearwater Bay as of the 17th day of May, 1917; thence Northeasterly along Clearwater Bay to a point where said line would intersect the North line of said "Clearwater City Park" if prolonged East; thence West to the point of beginning; [2] together with all lands lying between the North and South lines of said tract extended Eastwardly to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor; [3] together with all riparian rights.

The 1934 deed clearly conveys three interests: (1) the upland parcel described as beginning on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico and extending to the waters of Clearwater Bay (Parcel 1); together with (2) the parcel described as "all lands lying between the North and South lines of [Parcel 1] extended Eastwardly to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor"; together with (3) all associated riparian rights. See, e.g., Thrasher v. Arida, 858 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (describing a deed as conveying two parcels where the deed conveyed one described area together with a second area). There are no reservations or exceptions in the deed.

The Bridge Company had previously conveyed Parcel 1 and the appurtenant riparian rights to the City of Clearwater in a May 17, 1917, deed. At the time of the 1917 deed, a bridge spanned the Channel of Clearwater Harbor,¹ connecting Clearwater Beach to the mainland. The description of Parcel 1 in the 1917 deed referenced the bridge:

Beginning on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico at a point where the North line of the tract of land designated as "Clearwater City Park" on a plat of Clearwater Beach as the same is recorded in the Land Records of Pinellas County Florida, if prolonged West would intersect said Gulf shore; thence run southerly along said shore line Four Hundred (400) feet; thence East parallel to the North line of said "Clearwater City Park" to the waters of Clearwater Bay; thence Northeasterly along Clearwater Bay to a point Twenty five (25) feet distant measured at right angle from the center of a bridge now located and constructed by the Clearwater Island Bridge Company; thence northwesterly along a curved line Twenty five (25) feet from the center of said bridge to a point on the North line of said "Clearwater City Park" extended eastwardly; thence West to the point of beginning. Together with all riparian rights.

The 1917 deed also contained restrictions on the use of Parcel 1, which were released in the 1934 deed. The bridge connecting Clearwater Beach to the mainland was destroyed in 1921 by a hurricane. Thus, the bridge is not referenced in the 1934 deed. Importantly, the 1917 deed does not convey any property east of the bridge and to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor.

In 1957, the Bridge Company conveyed by quitclaim deed to BayEsplanade's predecessor in interest, North Bay Company, a parcel bounded on the east by the "West side of [the] channel between Sand Key and Ragged Key" and on the west by the "average high water line on Sand Key," containing approximately thirty-five acres. North Bay Company quitclaimed the parcel to BayEsplanade in 2005.

In its motion for summary judgment, BayEsplanade sought a determination of whether the words used in the 1934 deed to the City of Clearwater "describe the Submerged Lands in Controversy or whether they describe other lands." BayEsplanade contended that the language of the deed conveying "all lands lying between the North and South lines of [Parcel 1] extended Eastwardly to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor" did not convey title to the submerged land lying within the described boundary. In its motion, BayEsplanade did not suggest what "other lands" the 1934 deed could be describing.

The City of Clearwater also filed a motion for summary judgment. The City contended that the 1934 deed was not ambiguous and not subject to attack by extrinsic or parol evidence. It argued that the deed conveyed all lands—whatever they might be—within the boundaries identified in the deed. The City further argued that its title was first in time and superior to any claim of title BayEsplanade may have.

In its order granting summary judgment and quieting title in favor of BayEsplanade, the trial court found that the language "together with all lands lying between the North and South lines of said tract extended Eastwardly to the Channel of Clearwater Harbor; together with all riparian rights" was either patently or latently ambiguous, such that consideration and examination of extrinsic evidence was warranted.² Upon its consideration of the extrinsic evidence, the court determined that submerged land was not conveyed to the City of Clearwater in the 1934 deed. Rather, the court found that the Bridge Company retained ownership of the submerged land until it was conveyed to BayEsplanade's predecessor in title in 1957. The court determined that all lands except submerged lands were conveyed in the 1934 deed.

Our review of an order granting final summary judgment is de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). In a quiet title action, "the complainant must show with clearness, accuracy, and certainty the validity of [its] own title"; it "must rest upon the strength of [its] own title, and not upon the lack of right in the opposing party." Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221, 229 (1919) (citing cases). As such, we review de novo whether a deed is ambiguous or unambiguous. Hastie v. Ekholm, 199 So.3d 461, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citing Am. Quick Sign, Inc. v. Reinhardt, 899 So.2d 461, 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ).

In our review of the language conveying "all lands" in the 1934 deed, we must "consider the language of the entire instrument in order to determine the intent of the grantor, both as to the character of estate and the property conveyed and to so construe the instrument as if legally possible to effectuate such intent." Thrasher, 858 So.2d at 1175 (quoting Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846, 851 (1927) ). "If there is no ambiguity in the language employed [in a deed] then the intention of the grantor must be ascertained from that language." Saltzman v. Ahern, 306 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). That is, "[w]hen the language of a deed is clear and certain in meaning and the grantor's intention is reflected by the language employed, there is no room for judicial construction of the language nor interpretation of the words used." Rogers v. United States, 184 So.3d 1087, 1095 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Saltzman, 306 So.2d at 539 ).

The 1934 deed conveyed three interests: Parcel 1; "all lands lying between the North and South lines of [Parcel 1] extended Eastwardly to the Channel"; and all associated riparian rights. Parcel 1 and the associated riparian rights are not at issue. Nor is there a dispute as to the boundaries described in the deed, including the boundaries of the conveyance of "all lands"; the east boundary of the conveyed "all lands" is clearly the Channel of Clearwater Harbor. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Walker Ranch Gen. P'ship., 496 So.2d 153, 156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) ("A deed conveys all within the boundaries, but does not convey the boundary itself .... Bounded by the navigable water, the lake, or the stream, the law extends the boundary to the edge of the channel." (quoting Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 17 So. 411, 413 (18...