City of Colorado Springs v. Conners

Decision Date07 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98SC137.,98SC137.
Citation993 P.2d 1167
PartiesCITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Petitioner, v. Kathleen F. CONNERS, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Patricia K. Kelly, City Attorney, Stacy L. Rouse, Assistant City Attorney-Employment, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

John L. Maska, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorney for Respondent.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McLachlan, Solicitor General, Garth C. Lucero, Deputy Attorney General, Civil Litigation Section, Tort Litigation Unit, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Colorado.

Thomas A. Feldman, Roseman & Kazierski, LLC, Barry D. Roseman, Elena J. Eisenberg, Michael P. Cerbo, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association and the Colorado Association of Public Employees.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, we address the question of whether claims for non-compensatory equitable relief under the Colorado Civil Rights Act (CRA) are claims for "injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort" for the purposes of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) and thus whether such claims are either barred by or subject to the notice provisions of the CGIA. Petitioner, the City of Colorado Springs, appeals a decision by the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of a complaint by Kathleen F. Conners, respondent, against the City. See Conners v. City of Colorado Springs, 962 P.2d 294, 299 (Colo.App.1997)

. Conners sued the City claiming that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge in violation of the CRA. Conners also filed common-law claims for invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct, and she later sought to add a federal Title VII claim against the City.

The trial court dismissed Conners's claims, ruling that the CGIA barred the claims because Conners did not comply with the notice requirements of the CGIA. The trial court denied as untimely Conners's request to add the Title VII claim. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that a claim brought under the CRA "is not a claim that lies in tort or could lie in tort," and thus Conners's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the CGIA did not bar her CRA-based claims. Conners, 962 P.2d at 298. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that Conners's common-law claims were barred by the CGIA. See id. at 299.

We hold that claims for non-compensatory equitable relief based on violations of civil rights statutes such as the CRA are not claims for "injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort" for the purposes of the CGIA. Accordingly, actions under the CRA that are equitable and non-compensatory in nature are not claims for which the CGIA provides public entities immunity from suit. Therefore, these claims do not have to comply with the notice provisions of the CGIA. Hence, we affirm the result reached by the court of appeals and remand the case with instructions to return it to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Conners worked for the City of Colorado Springs from May 1990, until February 1993. She alleges that in November of 1992, she made informal complaints that another employee harassed her by using vulgar and profane language of a sexually suggestive nature. Conners also alleges that she was discriminated against in work assignments and other conditions of her employment because of her sex and because she had complained of sexual harassment.

In February of 1993, the City fired Conners, purportedly for a lack of work. Conners claims that her job duties "were taken over by other employees" and that "other employees were hired" to perform jobs that she could have performed. Conners asserts that the City fired her because she filed sexual harassment complaints and because she claimed to be a victim of sexual discrimination.

Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the CRA for discriminatory employment claims, Conners filed an administrative complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD) in July of 1993.1 The CCRD found that her claim lacked probable cause in January, 1994.2 Conners appealed this decision to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which upheld the CCRD's decision and issued Conners a right-to-sue letter in February 1994.3 Under the CRA's statutory mandate, Conners had to exhaust these administrative remedies as a condition precedent to filing suit in district court.4

Two months after receiving the right-to-sue letter from the Commission and approximately thirteen months after her discharge, Conners filed suit in district court against the City for "unfair or unlawful employment practices" under the CRA, alleging a hostile work environment, discrimination because of her sex, and retaliatory termination. Conners amended her complaint to include common-law claims for invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct. She later sought to amend her complaint a second time and add a claim under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).

In her initial complaint, Conners requested relief in the form of "an order compelling her reinstatement to the same or similar position, an award of back pay, attorneys fees, and such other relief as may be granted by law." When Conners amended her complaint to include common-law claims against the City, she also revised her request for relief and specifically asked for "money damages" for the invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct claims. When Conners amended her complaint a second time seeking to add a Title VII claim, she maintained her request for both equitable relief and money damages as remedies for her various injuries.

The City moved to dismiss, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the CGIA barred the actions against the City. The City argued that because Conners failed to give the City sufficient notice within 180 days of her injury—as required by the CGIA—the CGIA barred the claims of retaliatory discharge and hostile work environment under the CRA.5 The City also contended that the CGIA barred Conners's common-law claims.

The trial court agreed with the City and ruled that the CGIA's 180-day notice requirement applied to Conners's CRA and common-law claims. The court found that Conners failed to give the City notice within 180 days of her injury even though Conners filed her complaint with the CCRD and appealed the CCRD's decision to the Civil Rights Commission as required by the CRA. As a result of this failure, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Conners's state claims and thus dismissed the claims. The trial court rejected as untimely Conners's request to add the Title VII claim.

The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that that the CGIA does not apply to Conners's CRA claims against the City, and affirmed in part, ruling that the CGIA bars her common-law claims. See Conners, 962 P.2d at 299

. Whether a legal action brought pursuant to another statute is subject to the CGIA, the court of appeals ruled, must be determined by deciding whether the action lies or could lie in tort. See id. at 296. The court of appeals reasoned that an action brought under the CRA "is not a claim which lies in tort or could lie in tort," and therefore is not subject to the CGIA. The court based this determination on three considerations: (1) the primary purpose of the CRA is to effectuate the important public policy of eliminating workplace discrimination, not to provide relief to individuals; (2) the CRA contains its own notice provisions and authorizes an action by a public employee only after the exhaustion of specified administrative procedures; and (3) the limited nature of the relief authorized by the CRA, which is equitable in nature. See id. at 297-99.

The court thus viewed a CRA claim as similar to other actions authorized against the government that are neither contractual nor tortious in nature and that are not subject to the notice provisions of the CGIA, such as inverse condemnation actions6 or actions for "unfair labor practices" under the Labor Peace Act.7 See id. at 296. The court held, however, that Conners's common-law claims were for injuries which lie in tort and were thus barred by the CGIA. See id. at 299. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of the common-law claims, remanded the CRA claims to the trial court, and advised the trial court to reconsider its refusal to add Conners's Title VII claim. See id. at 299-300.

III. DISCUSSION

We granted certiorari to consider a single issue: whether the court of appeals erred in finding that claims brought pursuant to the CRA are not subject to the notice provisions of the CGIA. We substantially follow the court of appeals' reasoning in this case, and we agree with the result reached by that court. Initially, we review the nature and scope of the government's immunity from actions for injuries which lie in tort under the CGIA. Then we discuss whether a claim for non-compensatory equitable relief under the CRA is a claim barred by the CGIA. Because we conclude that it is not, we hold that the CGIA does not provide the government immunity from Conners's claims for reinstatement and back pay under the CRA, nor are these claims barred as a result of Conners's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the CGIA.

A. Standard of Review

We begin by addressing the standard of review that we apply to the trial court's decision in this case. Because the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Conners's claim is a matter of statutory construction, we are not bound by the lower court's determinations. See Swieckowski ex rel. Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Colo.1997)

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