City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Co.

Decision Date20 May 1955
Citation279 S.W.2d 746
PartiesThe CITY OF COVINGTON, Kentucky, Appellant, v. SOHIO PETROLEUM COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Rodney S. Bryson, Ralph P. Rich, Covington, for appellant.

Hughes, Clark & Lee, Covington, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY, Judge.

This action, brought by appellee, Sohio Petroleum Company, Incorporated, sought a declaration on the right of the appellant, City of Covington, Kentucky, to establish water rates for consumers located outside the corporate limits of said city. The judgment appealed from held appellee to be a nonresident consumer of water and appellant's ordinances to be ineffective insofar as they sought to establish water rates for nonresident consumers. The case was tried on an agreed statement of fact.

Three questions were presented:

(1) Was the refinery operated by appellee a nonresident water consumer of the City of Covington?

(2) Were the rates and services of said city for water sold to consumers outside its corporate limits subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission under KRS Chapter 278?

(3) Was a justiciable issue presented as to the right of the city to discontinue water service to the refinery as a nonresident water consumer?

Appellee is an Ohio corporation with its home office in Cleveland, Ohio. Appellant is a city of the second class under the statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. One phase of appellee's operations is conducted at a refinery located outside and adjacent to the corporate limits of appellant. Appellee is a taxpayer of appellant and owns other real estate lying within the boundary of the city. Water is carried from a point adjacent to the property owned by appellee in the city through a line into the refinery of appellee. The line which serves the refinery was installed at the cost of the city. At the request of appellant, the water meters for their protection were located within the manufacturing area of appellee and outside the city. Appellant's water plant is large and modern, with a daily capacity of 30 million gallons. It produces about 12 million gallons per day, of which one-half is sold to customers outside the city.

For many years past, appellee has been purchasing water in substantial quantities from appellant. At first, the water was sold under a contract at an industrial rate lower than the rate later set out by ordinance. This contract expired in 1948. The rates to be charged customers located both inside and outside the corporate limits of the city were fixed successively by three amendatory ordinances numbered: 0-11-46, passed March 21, 1946; 0-17-48, passed August 12, 1948; and 0-38-52, effective November 1, 1952. Under ordinance number 0-11-46, appellee would have been charged the same water rates as paid by resident customers except for the contract that expired in 1948. After expiration of the contract, appellee was charged at the nonresident consumer rate for water but refused to pay this charge and continued to pay at the same rate applicable to residents of the city. The difference in the amount of billings by appellant and payments made by appellee was $44,949.81 when appellant's answer and counterclaim were filed in this action.

It is necessary to construe the pertinent ordinances to determine whether appellee is a nonresident consumer of water. In construing a city ordinance, the court will look to the ordinances as a whole to ascertain the intention of the lawmaking body and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. Weyman v. City of Newport, 153 Ky. 487, 156 S.W. 109; Polsgrove v. Moss, 154 Ky. 408, 157 S.W. 1133; City of Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5, 127 S.W.2d 847; 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, Section 187, Page 826.

Ordinance number 0-38-52, under which it is sought to charge appellee, uses this language:

'Any consumer, whether individual or corporate, located outside of the corporate limits of the City of Covington, to whom is supplied water by the City * * * shall be known and designated as a 'non-resident' Bulk user * * *.'

Section 4 of this ordinance provides:

'There shall be charged for water supplied to consumers located outside of the corporate limits of the City of Covington to whom is supplied water * * *.'

This is the part of the ordinance under which appellant is charging appellee for water. Similar language is used in the previous ordinances.

In Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164, 171, consumer was defined as: "one who uses economic goods and so diminishes or destroys their utilities; opposed to producer; and 'consume' means to use up, expend, waste, devour, with synonyms destroy, swallow up, engulf, absorb, waste, exhaust, spend, expend, squander, lavish, dissipate, burn up." This definition was approved in St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State, 40 Wash.2d 347, 243 P.2d 474.

The water used and consumed by the refinery was taken from the city main at a point inside the corporate limits of the city in an area owned by appellee. The water meters were located in the manufacturing area of the refinery outside the city. Appellee argued that the point of consumption was where the water was taken from the water main in the city in order to entitle it to the lower rate as a resident of the city.

A consumer's meter outlet has been defined as the point where the consumer received gas after it had passed through a meter. United Natural Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 153 Pa.Super. 252, 33 A.2d 752.

In this instance, the water meters were located in the refinery admittedly outside the corporate limits of the city. The water was the economic goods used and its utility was diminished or destroyed by its use in the refinery after passing through the meter. Its utility remained the same from the time it entered the pipe on appellee's property inside the city until it passed through the meter outside the city and was then used or consumed.

We agree with the Chancellor that it was the intention of the lawmaking body of appellant to draw a geographical line of demarcation so that one who used water within the city limits would be a resident consumer of water to be charged a fixed rate, and one who used water outside the city limits would be a nonresident consumer to be charged a different rate. The judgment was correct in holding appellee to be a nonresident water consumer of appellant.

Having so determined the status of appellee, appellant was without authority to fix rates for furnishing water to appellee in the absence of compliance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 278. The establishment of utility rates for nonresident consumers of a municipally owned utility is within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. City of Olive Hill v. Public Service Commission, 305 Ky. 249, 203 S.W.2d 68; Louisville Water Company, v. Preston Street Road Water District No. 1, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 26. By its judgment, the lower court did not fix the water rates to be charged appellee but determined the method or means and the authority to do so. The ordinance was held to be ineffective only insofar as it sought to fix the rates for furnishing water to nonresident consumers of the City of Covington. Appellee's motion to amend the judgment herein to conform to the lower court's opinion is overruled.

It is urged by appellant that the enactment in 1954, by c. 18, of KRS Chapter 106 entitled 'An Act...

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12 cases
  • Kentucky Indus. Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., s. 97-SC-1091-D
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • December 17, 1998
    ...Dist. v. Shelton, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 934 (1969); Davis v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., Ky., 284 S.W.2d 809 (1955); City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Co., Ky., 279 S.W.2d 746 (1955); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Madisonville Recapping, Ky.App., 793 S.W.2d 849 There is simply no evidence of......
  • Heleringer v. Brown
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 7, 2003
    ...Bond Co., 174 Ky. 284, 192 S.W. 35; Western Kentucky Coal Company v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 14 S.W.2d 400; City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Company, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 746. The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning. Louisville Country Club, In......
  • Gateway Const. Co. v. Wallbaum
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • February 9, 1962
    ...Bond Co., 174 Ky. 284, 192 S.W. 35; Western Kentucky Coal Company v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 14 S.W.2d 400; City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Company, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 746. The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning. Louisville Country Club, In......
  • Heleringer v. Brown III
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 19, 2003
    ...Bond Co., 174 Ky. 284, 192 S.W. 35; Western Kentucky Coal Company v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 14 S.W.2d 400; City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Company, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 746. The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning. Louisville Country Club, In......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Coming to terms with strict and liberal construction.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 64 No. 1, September 2000
    • September 22, 2000
    ...271, 273 (Alaska 1981) (stating that an ambiguous statute should be read to avoid injustice); City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 279 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Ky. 1955) (construing a statute to make it equitable where the intent has conflicting (226) For an example of such a litany, consider ......

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