City of Crown Point v. Knesek, 45S04-8611-CV-950

Decision Date06 November 1986
Docket NumberNo. 45S04-8611-CV-950,45S04-8611-CV-950
Citation499 N.E.2d 261
PartiesCITY OF CROWN POINT, Indiana, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Garret J. KNESEK, William A. Bish, Jerry Baldwin, and John E. Knox, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

SHEPARD, Justice.

This case presents a question upon which the districts of the Court of Appeals have issued conflicting decisions, namely, whether due process required judicial review of minor discipline imposed by a city government upon a police officer. To resolve the existing conflict, we grant transfer and hold that it does not.

Appellees Garret Knesek, William Bish, Jerry Baldwin, and John Knox, four officers of the Crown Point police department, were disciplined by the board of public works and safety after the chief of police brought charges alleging that each had observed illegal gambling without taking any action. Baldwin and Knesek were reprimanded; Bish was suspended for one week; Knox was suspended for two weeks.

The officers filed a complaint in the Lake Circuit Court seeking review of the board's action. The court found that the board's decision was "arbitrary and capricious and not supported by the evidence" and set it aside. The Court of Appeals held that the board's decision concerning Knox was supported by substantial evidence. It held that the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the other penalties. The judgment of the trial court was reversed. City of Crown Point v. Knesek (1986), Ind. App., 489 N.E.2d 114.

It is this latter question which has been a matter of conflict between different districts of the Court of Appeals. The Third District has held that due process does not require judicial review of agency action when the right to further employment exists only by statute. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Cross (1980), Ind. App., 403 N.E.2d 885. The Fourth District has held that due process requires judicial review even when the legislature has failed to provide for it. Gerhardt v. City of Evansville (1980), Ind. App., 408 N.E.2d 1308.

We have visited this question before. When the General Assembly reorganized the municipal government of Indianapolis, this Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of the so-called "Uni-Gov" statute. Among the claims presented by the plaintiffs in that action was the assertion that the statute denied due process to members of the police force because it provided that disciplinary penalties of ten days or less were not subject to judicial review. This Court specifically rejected that claim, saying: "It is our considered opinion that the disciplinary procedures provided for by the Act respecting the discipline of members of the consolidated police force are eminently reasonable and beyond constitutional attack." Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 580, 266 N.E.2d 25, 46.

While due process limits the power of the legislative branch to shield action from judicial review, due process does not require that every single question be open to appeal. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 110, 26 N.E.2d 399, 406. To assert that the judicial branch is authorized under the constitution to demand that every action be justified to us would present a considerable intrusion into matters assigned to the executive and legislative departments.

The limitation on the ability of the courts to review and revise actions of the kind taken against Knesek, Bish and Baldwin has already been determined constitutional by this Court. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly decided the case at bar and overrule Gerhardt v. City of Evansville, 408 N.E.2d 1308.

Lieutenant Knox was entitled to judicial review of his two-week suspension under Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(e) (Burns 1981 Repl.). The trial court found that the board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not based on sufficient evidence.

The chief of police charged Knox with violation of various department rules requiring that officers take notice of criminal activity and act to arrest those involved. The charge specified that on December 16, 1983, Knox had witnessed individuals who were playing a poker machine in the Pizza Maker restaurant...

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2 cases
  • Bailey v. Canan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • January 25, 2000
    ...require that every single question be open to appeal.'" Defs.' Br. In Supp. Of Mot. For Summ.J. at 36 (quoting City of Crown Point v. Knesek, 499 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Ind. 1986) and citing Dortch v. Lugar, 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25, 46 (1971)). The Court does not agree with the Defendants' Th......
  • Pepple v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 10, 1987
    ...conclude from a reading of Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940) 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399, and its progeny. See City of Crown Point v. Knesek (1986) Ind., 499 N.E.2d 261. Nevertheless, I do not perceive that our system of jurisprudence permits insulation of administrative decisions, such......

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