City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Local 268

• Decision Date: 30 March 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 64464,64483,s. 64464
• Citation: 119 Ill.Dec. 360,122 Ill.2d 353,522 N.E.2d 1219
• Parties: , 119 Ill.Dec. 360, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3221 The CITY OF DECATUR, Appellee, v. The AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 268, Appellant. The CITY Of DECATUR, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1219

522 N.E.2d 1219

122 Ill.2d 353, 119 Ill.Dec. 360, 134

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3221

The CITY OF DECATUR, Appellee, v. The AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL

EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 268, Appellant.

The CITY Of DECATUR, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant.

Nos. 64464, 64483.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 30, 1988.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 1988.

J. Dale Berry, Cornfield and Feldman, Chicago, for appellant AFSCME local 268.

Donald W. Anderson, for Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Ass'n; Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather, Chicago, of counsel.

John W. Couter, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Decatur, for appellee City of Decatur, Ill.

Lester Asher, Joel A. D'Alba, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus. Organizations; Asher, Pavalon, Gittler and Greenfield, Ltd., Chicago, of counsel.

Sherman Carmell, Chicago, for amicus curiae Chicago Federation of Labor and Indus. Union Council; Carmell Charone Widmer & Mathews Ltd., Chicago, of counsel.

Thomas F. Sonneborn, Wayne M. Klocke, Springfield, for amicus curiae The Associated Fire Fighters of Illinois, and The Illinois Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council Program.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, Chicago, for Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., Imelda R. Terrazino, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacalyn J. Zimmerman, General Counsel, Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., Chicago, of counsel.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a complaint by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 268, alleging the commission of an unfair labor practice by the City of Decatur, the Illinois State Labor Relations Board entered an order directing the city to bargain over a proposal by the union that would permit employees to submit disciplinary grievances to arbitration. On administrative review, the appellate court reversed the State Board's order and held that the city could not be required to bargain over the union's proposal. (149 Ill.App.3d 319, 102 Ill.Dec. 680, 500 N.E.2d 573.) We allowed the petitions for leave to appeal filed by Local 268 and the State Board (see 107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), consolidated the appeals for purposes of argument and disposition, and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

The dispute in this case concerns the scope of bargaining required by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, pars. 1601 through 1627) (the Act). On June 11, 1985, Local 268 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) filed a charge with the Illinois State Labor Relations Board alleging that the City of Decatur was guilty of committing an unfair labor practice under sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, pars. 1610(a)(1), (a)(4)). The city had previously recognized Local 268 as the exclusive bargaining representative of a certain unit of employees, and, at the time the controversy arose, the parties were negotiating the terms of a new collective-bargaining agreement, their old agreement having expired on April 30, 1985. It is undisputed that the city is a public employer within the meaning of section 3(h) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1603(h)) and that the charging party, AFSCME, Local 268, is a labor organization within the meaning of section 3(i) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1603(i)). The basis for the unfair labor practice charge was the city's refusal to bargain over a union proposal that would permit employees to submit disciplinary grievances to arbitration. The voters of the city had previously adopted, by referendum, a civil service commission under article 10, division 1, of the Illinois Municipal Code (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 24, pars. 10-1-1 through 10-1-48), and it was the city's view that there was no duty to bargain over disciplinary matters that fell within the scope of the municipal civil service system.

The State Board issued a formal complaint on the matter. Following a hearing, the hearing officer rendered a recommended decision and order on December 2, 1985, concluding that the city was required to bargain over the union's proposal. The State Board adopted the hearing officer's recommendation and ordered the city to bargain with Local 268 over the matter at issue.

The city sought review of the State Board's decision, and the appeal was taken to the appellate court, as provided under the Act. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1611(c).) The appellate court reversed the State Board's order, holding that the city was not required to bargain over the union's proposal for arbitration of disciplinary matters. In this court, a number of organizations have appeared as amici curiae and have submitted briefs in support of and opposition to the decisions below.

The Act imposes on a public employer the duty to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative designated for an appropriate bargaining unit of public employees. "Collective bargaining" is defined in the Act as "bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, including hours, wages and other conditions of employment, as detailed in Section 7 and which are not excluded by Section 4." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1603(b).) Section 4 of the Act contains a management rights provision; it excludes from the bargaining duty "matters of inherent managerial policy, which shall include such areas of discretion or policy as the functions of the employer, standards of services, its overall budget, the organizational structure and selection of new employees, examination techniques and direction of employees." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1604.) The dispute in this case centers on section 7 of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:

"A public employer and the exclusive representative have the authority and the duty to bargain collectively set forth in this Section.

For the purposes of this Act, 'to bargain collectively' means the performance of the mutual obligation of the public employer or his designated representative and the representative of the public employees to meet at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the budget-making process, and to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, not excluded by Section 4 of this Act, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.

The duty 'to bargain collectively' shall also include an obligation to negotiate over any matter with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law. If any other law pertains, in part, to a matter affecting the wages, hours and other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be construed as limiting the duty 'to bargain collectively' and to enter into collective bargaining agreements containing clauses which either supplement, implement, or relate to the effect of such provisions in other laws." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1607.

The parties here agree that the union's proposal is not excluded from bargaining under the management rights provision of the Act. Moreover, the city acknowledges that the proposal would constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining were it not for the accommodation provision and the city's earlier adoption of the civil service provisions in article 10, division 1, of the Municipal Code. It has been the city's position throughout these proceedings that the scope of its duty to bargain is limited by the language in the third paragraph of section 7: "The duty 'to bargain collectively' shall also include an obligation to negotiate over any matter with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 1607.) The city contends that the union's proposal for final and binding arbitration of disciplinary grievances would supplant certain of the statutory civil service provisions adopted by the city and therefore would constitute a matter that is "specifically provided for" in another law. The city concludes that it has no duty to bargain over the union's proposal.

This argument was rejected by the hearing officer in her recommended decision and order. There the hearing officer said:

"Respondent's [i.e., the city's] refusal to bargain is based on language in Section 7 of the Act, which states that the duty to bargain only applies to 'wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided for in any other law * * *.' Respondent's reliance on this section is incorrect, however. Reading further, Section 7 says that 'if any other law pertains, in part, to a matter affecting the wages, hours and other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be construed as limiting the duty to bargain collectively * * *.' To adopt Respondent's position is to allow exactly that which Section 7 prohibits. To allow the adoption of a civil service system to eliminate an employer's obligation to bargain over disciplinary matters would clearly limit an employer's duty to bargain collectively. Section 7 specifically prohibits such a finding."

Following the submission of the city's exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended decision and order, and of the union's response to the exceptions, the State Board concluded "that the Hearing Officer properly analyzed all issues presented and that the exceptions are without merit. The Board therefore adopts the Hearing Officer's...