City of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858, Iaff

• Decision Date: 03 March 2014
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC736
• Citation: 320 P.3d 354
• Parties: CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, and Alex J. Martinez, in his official capacity as Manager of Safety for the City and County of Denver, Petitioners v. DENVER FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL NO. 858, IAFF, AFL–CIO, Respondent
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

320 P.3d 354

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, and Alex J. Martinez, in his official capacity as Manager of Safety for the City and County of Denver, Petitioners

v.DENVER FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL NO. 858, IAFF, AFL–CIO, Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC736

Supreme Court of Colorado.

March 3, 2014

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA1770

Attorneys for Petitioners: Douglas J. Friednash, City Attorney, City and County of Denver, Robert D. Nespor, Assistant City Attorney, Franklin A. Nachman, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Buescher, Kelman, & Perera, P.C., Thomas B. Buescher, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We granted certiorari to consider an issue of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system is subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver (“Charter”).¹SeeDenver, Colo., Code of Ordinances tit. I, subtit. B (2013). Construing the plain language of the Charter to create a harmonious and sensible whole, we hold that the City and County of Denver has authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules and that this authority is not limited by the Denver firefighters' right to engage in collective bargaining. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals because the court of appeals erroneously concluded that discipline is a term and condition of employment under the Charter and therefore subject to collective bargaining. See Denver Firefighters Local No. 858 v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2012 COA 138, ¶¶ 22–24, 292 P.3d 1101. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 Respondent Denver Firefighters Local No. 858, IAFF, AFL–CIO (“Firefighters”), is the exclusive bargaining agent for firefighters who are employed by Petitioner City and County of Denver and supervised by Petitioner Manager of Safety (collectively “City”). The Firefighters and the City have had a collective bargaining agreement in place since 1971,² when an amendment to the Charter first granted firefighters the right to collectively bargain over working conditions. In 2010, the City unilaterally (i.e., without bargaining) attempted to change the Charter's existing disciplinary system governing firefighter conduct. Specifically, the City sought to create and implement a discipline matrix, which lists prohibited conduct along with corresponding disciplinary sanctions that are progressively harsher based on the severity and frequency of the misconduct.

¶ 3 Following multiple unsuccessful attempts to engage the City in bargaining over the proposed discipline matrix, the Firefighters filed suit in Denver District Court. The Firefighters alleged that the City violated the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (“Agreement”) then in effect ³ when it unilaterally decided to create the discipline matrix. In order to preserve their rights until a trial on the merits, the Firefighters sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the City from moving forward with its plan to add the discipline matrix to the Charter.

¶ 4 The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the Firefighters could establish their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. It ultimately issued the injunction, finding, among other things, that the Firefighters had demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits.⁴ Although the trial court acknowledged that the City had a right to implement disciplinary rules under the Charter, it concluded that the discipline matrix was subject to collective bargaining because the City did not have a right to unilaterally draft disciplinary rules under the Charter.

¶ 5 The City appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the Firefighters had demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits. According to the City, the Firefighters' claim that the discipline matrix was subject to collective bargaining failed as a matter of law because the Charter expressly vests the City with authority to unilaterally draft disciplinary rules. The court of appeals disagreed with the City and affirmed the trial court's preliminary injunction ruling. Denver Firefighters, ¶¶ 22, 53–54.

¶ 6 The City appealed again, and we granted certiorari review.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 7 The court of appeals' determination that the discipline matrix is a term and condition of employment that is subject to collective bargaining hinges on the court of appeals' interpretations of the Charter and the parties' Agreement. Because municipal ordinance interpretation and contract interpretation present questions of law, seeMDC Holdings, Inc. v. Town of Parker, 223 P.3d 710, 717 (Colo.2010); Agritrack, Inc. v. DeJohn Housemoving, Inc., 25 P.3d 1187, 1192 (Colo.2001), we review the judgment of the court of appeals de novo, see Lucero v. People, 2012 CO 7, ¶ 19, 272 P.3d 1063 (“We review questions of law de novo.”).

III. Analysis

¶ 8 Resolution of this case turns on the parties' respective rights under the Charter, which supersede contrary terms in the Agreement in all respects. See Agreement, art. 1, § 1 (“This Agreement shall in all respects ... be subject and subordinate to the provisions of the [Charter].”). The City argues that the discipline matrix is not subject to collective bargaining because the Charter vests the City with authority to unilaterally draft and implement disciplinary rules. In contrast, the Firefighters argue that the discipline matrix is subject to collective bargaining because discipline is a term and condition of employment and the Charter grants firefighters the right to bargain over terms and conditions of employment.

¶ 9 To evaluate the merits of these arguments, we start by determining whether the City possesses authority to unilaterally draft disciplinary rules. In order to decipher the extent of the City's authority over discipline, we focus on section 9.4.13—the only Charter provision that affirmatively addresses the fire department's rules of conduct. Because we conclude that section 9.4.13 vests the City with authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, we next determine whether the Firefighters' right to engage in collective bargaining curbs the City's authority by looking to section 9.7.3—which establishes the Firefighters' right to collectively bargain and the scope of that right. Because section 9.7.3 does not explicitly bring the topic of discipline within the ambit of collective bargaining, we conclude that the Firefighters' right to bargain does not limit the City's express authority to draft and implement disciplinary rules under the Charter. Finally, we look to the terms of the Agreement as an auxiliary source of evidence that firefighter discipline is not subject to collective bargaining.

¶ 10 We employ the rules of statutory construction to guide our interpretation of the Charter. SeeCook v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 68 P.3d 586, 588 (Colo.App.2003) (“The general rules of statutory construction apply to municipal charters.”). Because charters “confer only the powers expressed or necessarily implied,” we strictly construe charter language. Id. “When a charter is unambiguous, we will not alter the plain meaning.” Id. Just as we favor interpretations that give harmonious and sensible effect to all parts of a charter, we avoid interpretations that yield absurd or unreasonable results. Seeid.; see alsoPeople v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986) (“If separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one construction but would conflict under a different interpretation, the construction which results in harmony rather than inconsistency should be adopted.”); AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo.1998) (“[A] statutory interpretation that ... leads to an absurd result will not be followed.”).

A. The City Has Authority to Both Draft and Implement Disciplinary Rules

¶ 11 Turning first to section 9.4.13 of the Charter to determine the extent of the City's authority with regard to disciplinary rules, we begin our analysis by reading words and phrases in context, section 2–4–101, C.R.S. (2013), and according them their plain and ordinary meanings, Bertrand v. Bd. of Cnty. Commr's, 872 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo.1994). Section 9.4.13—the only Charter provision that addresses the Fire Department's rules of conduct—provides that:

The rules governing the conduct of members of the Classified Service in the Fire and Police Departments shall be set forth as written rules and regulations by the Chief of each of the respective departments with the approval of the Manager of Safety, provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not contain any politicalor religious qualifications or disqualifications. Any member of the Classified Service shall be subject to reprimand, discharge, reduction in grade, fine and/or suspension for a violation of such rules and regulations.

(Departmental rules of conduct) (emphasis added). As the unambiguous language of the first sentence makes clear, the Fire Chief ⁵ has authority to “set forth written rules and regulations” relating to discipline. Importantly, the Fire Chief's authority is subject to two explicit constraints: (1) the Manager of Safety's approval, and (2) a prohibition against rules that contain “political or religious qualifications or disqualifications.” Considering these constraints against the backdrop of authority conferred by the “set forth” language, we conclude that the phrase “set forth” in section 9.4.13 gives the Fire Chief authority to both draft new disciplinary rules and implement existing disciplinary rules.

¶ 12 The first constraint supports our conclusion that the Charter vests the Fire Chief with authority to substantively manipulate the rules of conduct because mandatory oversight by the Manager...