City of Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America

• Decision Date: 07 January 1952
• Docket Number: No. 46,46
• Citation: 332 Mich. 237,51 N.W.2d 228
• Parties: CITY OF DETROIT v. DIVISION 26 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY & MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 228

51 N.W.2d 228

332 Mich. 237

CITY OF DETROIT v. DIVISION 26 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY

& MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.

No. 46.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 7, 1952.

Paul T. Dwyer, Acting Corp. Counsel, Bert R. Sogge, Helen W. Miller, Walter E. Vashak, Asst. Corp. Counsel, and James S. Shields, Principal Atty. Dept. of Street Railways, Detroit, for plaintiffs, appellants and cross-appellees.

Edward N. Barnard, Detroit, for appellees and cross-appellants.

Rothe, Marston, Bohn & Mazey, Detroit, for intervening defendant and appellee, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, C.I.O.

Before the Entire Bench, except BUTZEL, J.

NORTH, Chief Justice.

This litigation was started by a bill in equity filed in the Wayne county circuit court by the city of Detroit acting through its board of street railway commissioners. Injunctive relief is prayed; also a ruling as to the constitutionality of the so-called Hutchinson Act, P.A.1947, No. 336, C.L. 1948, § 423.201, et seq.; Stat.Ann. § 17.455 (1), et seq. ¹ ; its application to Detroit's transportation system and the employees therein, and other related controverted issues. Issues were formed by the answer of the above named original defendants and their cross-bill, to which plaintiff answered; and by the answer to plaintiff's bill of complaint filed by United DSR Employees Local 312 C.I.O., one of the above named parties who were permitted to intervene as defendants. The real parties defendants in interest are the employees in Detroit's department of street railway system, owned by the city and operated by its board of street railway commissioners. Following a lengthy pretrial hearing, incident to which there was a stipulation of certain facts, testimony was taken in open court. From the decree entered plaintiff has appealed and the original defendants have cross-appealed.

Throughout the proceedings which culminated in this litigation, the Detroit street railway employees were represented by their bargaining agent, Division 26 of the Amalganated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America. The pending controversy primarily arose incident to the employees' demand for an increase in base pay. The immediately preceding contract between the city and these employees, by its terms, had expired. Following quite extended negotiations, and on April 17, 1951, the union took a vote of its membership on two questions, the first of which was: 'Do you favor a strike?' and the second was: 'Do you favor arbitration?' The vote resulted overwhelmingly in favor of the first question, namely to strike. While the foregoing vote is claimed by defendants to have been merely advisory, a strike was called which went into effect April 21, 1951. With minor exceptions, this strike caused complete cessation of the public transportation service theretofore rendered by plaintiff through its street railway department. This condition continued until the employees on June 18, 1951, returned to work under the terms of the circuit judge's opinion which was filed at the conclusion of the trial had in the interim. The decree was filed June 26, 1951.

The trial court decreed the Hutchinson Act constitutional and that it was applicable to 'plaintiff and all of its employes.' Defendants have appealed from these provisions in the decree. The issue of constitutionality of the Hutchinson Act, which is challenged by the defendants and cross-appellants, is of primary importance and is first considered herein.

In reaching decision in the instant case it is essential to keep in mind that the provisions of the Hutchinson Act apply only to 'public employees.' And also that, as hereinafter held, the persons engaged in operating Detroit's street railway system are employees of the city of Detroit and hence are 'public employees.' The act is designed, as a matter of public policy, to prevent strikes by public employees, Local Union No. 876, etc., v. State Labor Mediation Board, 294 Mich. 629, 293 N.W. 809, by providing that by striking such an employee 'shall thereby abandon and terminate his appointment or employment,' and by limiting or restricting the right of the public employer to re-employ a public employee who participated in a strike. It provides for substituting mediation in place of ordinary strike procedure, and that either party, by proper application, may obtain mediation.

A basic reason urged by crossappellants in challenging the constitutionality of the Hutchinson Act is that it contains no provision for judicial review of rights asserted by a discharged public employee, and hence they are deprived of due process of law. However, by section 6 of the act provision is made for such an employee to have a hearing before the officer or body having power to remove such employee, and for a right of review of a holding adverse to such employee before the labor mediation board. We have held that like provisions are quasi-judicial and afford to the discharged employee compliance with his constitutional rights. In Re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 263, 280 N.W. 464, 125 A.L.R. 259, a headnote reads: 'A decision of a municipal civil service commission upon a hearing to remove an employee of a fire department for cause, not being the result of judicial action, but being at most a quasi-judicial act of an administrative tribunal, is not subject to review by the courts on appeal and an attempt by the legislature to create a right of appeal would be unconstitutional as an endeavor to foist nonjudicial functions upon the courts.'

See also, Goodfellow v. Detroit Civil Service Commission, 312 Mich. 226, 20 N.W.2d 170; Local 170, Transport Workers Union v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W.2d 71.

Cross-appellants rather strenuously also contend that this statute is unconstitutional since it is in effect a bill of attainder. We cannot so hold. 'A bill of attainder is a ligislative act which inflicts punishment whthout a judicial trial.' United Steel Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 170 F.2d 247, 267, affirmed, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925. See, also, Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317. The Hutchinson Act provides certain limitations and regulations, but it 'inflicts' no punishment. It does not provide for fines or imprisonment, nor does it deprive a public employee, who has taken part in a strike, of any vested right.

We know of no constitutional provision which gives an individual the right to be employed in governmental service or to continue therein. If there is no such right then there is no constitutional inhibition of reasonable restrictions or limitations being applied thereto; and such restrictions or limitations could not be held to be in the nature of bills of attainder. See Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, 63, wherein the court said: 'But it has long been established that if the Government, in the exercise of a governmental power, injures an individual, that individual has no redress. * * * 'As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative', and the court (in Gregoire v. Biddle, 2 Cir., 177 F.2d 579) concluded that both upon authority and upon reason the rule laid down should be followed.'

There is ample authority to the effect that public employment does not vest in such employees any fixed or permanent rights of employment. As individuals or in groups public employees may discontinue their employment, but, having done so, such public employees have no vested right to insist upon their re-employment on terms or conditions agreeable to the employees, or even without compliance with such conditions. To hold otherwise would result in public agencies being powerless to render public service and to effectively administer public affairs; and the public would thereby be deprived of its right to efficient government. For example, if the members of a fire department or of a police department collectively refused to continue to serve except upon conditions insisted upon by them, unless their employer supinely yielded, the public, which by taxation pays therefor, would be deprived of fire or of police protection; and the right or power to exercise essential governmental affairs nullified. There seems to be ample reason and authority for holding that the right of public employees to collectively refuse to render the service for which they are employed differs in legal point of view from the right of private employees to strike, and hence the classification of 'public employees' for the purpose of applicable legislation is valid. 'The legislature may make classifications of persons, provided such classifications are based on substantial distinctions, are in accord with the aims sought to be achieved, and are not arbitrary or capricious but rest on reasonable and justifiable foundations.' People v. Chapman (syllabus), 301 Mich. 584, 585, 4 N.W.2d 18.

Among authorities with which we are in accord and which support our decision herein, are the following:

'The question is whether or not public employees do have the right to strike. Under the common law,--and there is no question about it as far as this Court is concerned,--there is no right to strike on behalf of public employees, for many reasons, some of which at least, might be paraphrased in the language of several of the decisions, that it is a menas of coercing the delegation of the discretion which a public Board of public Body must exercise in its fulfillment of its duties. * * * (Citing several cases.)

'It has been repeatedly stated that it is against public policy for public employees to strike. Many courts have held that a strike by public employees is against public policy, is unlawful, illegal and may be restrained and...