City of Dothan v. Brackin
| Decision Date | 08 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | 2050558. |
| Citation | 959 So.2d 678 |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF DOTHAN v. Mary Beth BRACKIN. |
F. Lenton White, city atty., Dothan, for appellant.
Ishmael Jaffree, Mobile, for appellee.
Mary Beth Brackin, a magistrate for the Dothan Municipal Court, was dismissed from her employment with the City of Dothan after having been found guilty of two major offenses under the City's Personnel Department Rules and Regulations ("the Personnel Rules"), namely: insubordination and negligence in carrying out assigned tasks, within 24 months of a previous major offense. Brackin appealed her dismissal to the City's Personnel Board, which affirmed the dismissal. Brackin then appealed the Personnel Board's affirmance of the dismissal to the Houston Circuit Court. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Personnel Board, and the City appealed to this court.
City of Mobile v. Robertson, 897 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence . . . that might be accepted by reasonable minds as adequate to support a conclusion." City of Mobile v. Trott, 596 So.2d 921, 922 (Ala. Civ.App.1991). In the administrative-law context, substantial evidence exists if there is "`a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'" City of Mobile v. Seals, 471 So.2d 431, 434 (Ala.Civ.App.1985)(quoting Ex parte Morris, 263 Ala. 664, 668, 83 So.2d 717, 720 (1955)). Thus, if the Personnel Board properly applied the law and there was substantial evidence to support its decision, the circuit court was bound to affirm its decision. City of Dothan Personnel Board v. Herring, 612 So.2d 1231, 1232-33 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). "`This court is likewise governed by the same standard as the [trial] court; if we conclude that substantial evidence existed to support the Board's decision, we must uphold it.'" City of Mobile v. Robertson, 897 So.2d at 1159 (quoting Creagh v. City of Mobile Police Dep't, 543 So.2d 698, 699 (Ala.Civ. App.1989)).
Brackin worked as a magistrate for the City from May 1992 until May 2005. During the time at issue in this case, Brackin's supervisor was Municipal Judge Rose Evans-Gordon. One of Brackin's job duties was to process uniform traffic tickets and complaints ("UTTCs") filed in the municipal court. Brackin administered oaths to police officers, received tickets filed by the police officers, and accounted for those tickets on UTTC transmittal forms.
On April 22, 2004, Brackin received a 10-day suspension and 2 years' probation for violating § 3-42(6) of the Personnel Rules — action(s) or lack of actions(s) that could cause undue financial loss to the City — and § 3-42(14) of the Personnel Rules — insubordination — both of which are designated as major offenses. Brackin testified that both charges were based on the fact that she had informed a citizen who believed that he had been falsely arrested that he could file a complaint in the City clerk's office. On cross-examination, Brackin was asked whether she had informed the citizen that the warrant for his arrest had been wrongly issued and that his arrest was, therefore, illegal. Brackin denied giving the citizen that information. Brackin did not appeal her suspension to the Personnel Board.
Sometime in early 2005, another city magistrate, Mary Turner, was placed on administrative leave pending a police department investigation of allegations that Turner had "fixed" a traffic ticket issued by Cpl. Eric Duhaime of the Dothan police department to Stephen Phelps on November 24, 2002.1 After Turner was placed on leave, Judge Evans-Gordon instructed all the other magistrates to cooperate fully with the investigation and "to strictly refrain from any contact with Ms. Turner." Brackin inquired whether the prohibition extended to after-hours contact with Turner because, she said, she and Turner attended the same church. The judge replied that the prohibition extended to any contact with Turner.
On April 29, 2005, Brackin was charged with two major offenses. The first was insubordination, based upon the allegation that Brackin had willfully disobeyed the judge's instruction to refrain from contact with Turner. Brackin acknowledged that she had contacted Turner. Brackin testified that, after Turner was placed on leave, she was assigned to take over Turner's job duties. Brackin explained that she had been unable to complete one of those duties without having access to a form for a letter that she was required to send to youthful offenders who had failed to appear in court. Brackin testified that she thought the form letter was on Turner's computer desktop, but, she said, all employees had been forbidden to go into Turner's office or to use Turner's computer, so Brackin telephoned Turner to inquire where she could find the form letter. On cross-examination, Brackin conceded that, after the judge's order, there were other occasions when she had conversations with Turner, but, she said, she did not recall the content of those conversations.
The second major offense with which Brackin was charged on April 29, 2005, was violating § 3-42(6) of the Personnel Rules — negligence in carrying out assigned duties by failing to account for a traffic ticket issued by a Dothan police officer. That charge arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts for which Turner had been placed on leave.
The evidence was undisputed that, on November 24, 2002, Cpl. Eric Duhaime issued a speeding ticket to Stephen Phelps. Cpl. Duhaime testified that, on December 4, 2002, he turned in that ticket and others he had recently issued, along with a UTTC transmittal form, to Brackin. Cpl. Duhaime acknowledged the tickets under oath before Brackin and left the magistrates' office. Later, Cpl. Duhaime said Turner contacted him, told him that she knew Stephen Phelps, and asked if Cpl. Duhaime would be willing to "void [the ticket] out." Duhaime agreed to void the ticket and asked Turner to return the copies of the ticket to him. Turner mailed all copies of the ticket to Cpl. Duhaime.
The record contains a UTTC transmittal form, dated December 4, 2002, and signed by Brackin. On the form, the space provided for the "court case number" with respect to the Phelps ticket is lined through and replaced with the word "VOID." Upon being shown the form, Brackin acknowledged that she had lined through the space for the court case number and had written the word "VOID," but, she said, she had no specific recollection of the Phelps ticket or why she wrote the word "VOID" on the form. In answer to a question by her attorney, she acknowledged that "[i]f the officer said that he gave the okay for the ticket to be retrieved, that [could have been] the basis for triggering [the] void." Brackin testified that, because the Phelps ticket was not with the UTTC transmittal form and the other tickets listed on the form, the Phelps ticket was "not in the system." She also stated that she was "not part of the process [that brought] the ticket out of the system." Brackin testified that she did not void the Phelps ticket; by writing the word "VOID" on the UTTC transmittal form, she merely reflected the reality that the ticket had already been voided.
Cpl. Duhaime testified that a police officer has unlimited discretion as to whether to issue a ticket to a motorist. He stated that sometimes, after an officer has issued a ticket, there is a valid reason to void the ticket. For example, Cpl. Duhaime said that if an officer writes a ticket for failure to have proof of insurance and, before the officer leaves the scene, the motorist finds his insurance card, the officer will void the ticket and write on the ticket the reason for voiding it. Cpl. Duhaime explained, however, that an officer has to account for all tickets, even those that have been voided. Cpl. Duhaime said that an officer is required to turn in all tickets to the magistrates' office and to provide a copy of a voided ticket to a superior officer.2
Judge Evans-Gordon testified that once a police officer has "sworn to" a ticket before a magistrate, the ticket becomes a "complaint" and neither the officer nor the magistrate can void the ticket. The ticket can be disposed of only by the court. The judge stated that, although the Dothan Municipal Court had no internal manual or memoranda that specifically addressed the instant situation, the magistrate's handbook "tells . . . how a UTTC is supposed to be handled." The record does not contain a copy of the magistrate's handbook. Cpl. Duhaime testified that, at the time he agreed to void the Phelps ticket, he was unaware that he did not have the discretion to void a ticket that had been "sworn to" before a magistrate. He stated that for his participation in voiding the Phelps ticket he was charged with a major offense and placed on two years' probation.
With respect to the charge that Brackin violated § 3-42(6) of the Personnel Rules by failing to account for a traffic ticket issued by a Dothan police officer, the circuit court's judgment reversing the Personnel Board's decision to uphold Brackin's dismissal states:
To continue reading
Request your trial