City of Edina, Etc. v. School Dist., Etc.

• Citation: 267 S.W. 112
• Decision Date: 25 November 1924
• Docket Number: No. 24239.,24239.
• Parties: CITY OF EDINA TO USE OF PIONEER TRUST CO. v. SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF EDINA et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

267 S.W. 112

CITY OF EDINA TO USE OF PIONEER TRUST CO. v. SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF EDINA et al.

No. 24239.

Supreme Court of Missouri, in Banc.

November 25, 1924.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County.

Suit by the City of Edina, to the use of the Pioneer Trust Company, against the School District of the City of Edina and Knox County. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals to the Court of Appeals, which certified the cause to the Supreme Court. Affirmed as to first-named defendant, and reversed and remanded as to second-named defendant.

C. S. Palmer, of Kansas City, and W. E. Cottey, of Edina, for appellant.

Claude M. Smith, of Edina, for respondent Edina School Dist.

R. J. Raleigh, of Edina, for respondent Knox County.

SMALL, C.

Appeal from the circuit court of Knox county. Suit on special tax bills for paving and curbing Main street in the city of Edina. The bills were for $2,140.33, payable in three annual installments. The petition is in the usual form in such cases, and alleges that defendants own or claim" to own The land described in the tax bills and sought to be charged with payment thereof or some estate or interest therein. The defendants each filed general demurrer to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained said demurrers, and the plaintiff appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which duly certified the cause to this court—the county being one of the defendants.

II. The reason urged in this court and the court below for sustaining said demurrers is that the tax bills are void because there is no statute authorizing the issue of tax bills against the property of a public school district. This is the first time the question is presented directly to this court, whether a tax bill for the improvement of a street adjoining public school property, upon which a public schoolhouse is located can be lawfully issued against such property. Edina is a city of the fourth class, and the statute, under which the tax bills were issued, provides as follows (section 8502, R. S. 1919):

"The cost of paving, macadamizing, guttering and curbing * * * all streets * * * or any part thereof or any connection therewith * * * shall be levied as a special assessment upon all lots and pieces of ground upon either side of such street * * abutting thereon, along the distance improved, in proportion to the front foot."

In St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468, this court, Napton, J., delivering the opinion, held that public school property was liable to be assessed under the charter of the city for the' construction of sewers, paving, streets, and sidewalks, and opening streets the same as private property. The school district claimed its property was exempt from special taxation under the Revised Statutes of 1845 (chapter 147, art. 1, § 2).

The court had previously construed said statute in the case of Lockwood v. City of St. Louis, in 24 Mo. 20, and held, Leonard, J., delivering the opinion, that, under said statute, church property was not exempt from special assessments for building sewers, under the charter of St. Louis of 1849, which provided that said city was authorized to levy and collect to pay for such sewers "a special tax on the real estate within the district." The ground of the decision was that the Acts of 1845 relied on only exempted church and public property from general taxation as distinguished from special assessments for public improvements, citing cases from New York and Pennsylvania, and stating that it was "a maxim that he who feels the benefit ought to feel the burden" which "was consistent with the interests and dictates of science and religion." Judge Napton's opinion in Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 470, is as follows:

"We have not been able to distinguish this case from the case of Lockwood, 24 Mo. 20. It has been suggested that the two corporations concerned in this suit—the city of St. Louis and the St. Louis public schools—are identical in interest, being composed of the same constituents, and therefore the local assessment levied and collected on the property of the public schools by the city authorities is merely transferring the burthen of the improvement from one branch to the treasury to another. But, although the citizens of St. Louis may be alike interested in both corporations, the management of each is distinct, invested in different bodies differently organized and governed by different rules and responsibilities. It is important to the interest of the people composing each corporation that these separate responsibilities should not be removed. The result of the contrary doctrine would be that every ordinance for paving a street, or making a sewer in a district of the city in which the public schools had property, would be virtually to tax the citizens of the district for an increase in the funds of the public schools, when it may be that this latter corporation has already ample means for its purposes. The judgment of the land court is affirmed, the other judges concurring."

The question of the validity of special tax bills against a courthouse square owned by the county, for paving the streets adjacent to said square, was before the court, in City of Clinton ex rel. v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 566, 22 S. W. 494, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415. In that case the court, opinion per Black, J., held that the tax bills were void because the courthouse was general public property and belonged to the sovereign, and was used by it in performing a vital governmental function, and it was a principle of the common law, well-established, "that the Crown is not bound by a statute, the words of which * * * restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests, unless he be specially named therein. 1 Bla. Com. 262. The same principle applies in favor of the states in this country. Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, § 161. * * * Hence it is that as a general rule, tax laws are understood and intended to apply to private and not to public property. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 163." The learned judge then cited Inhabitants v. Mayor, 116 Mass. 193, 17 Am. Rep. 159, which held that a county courthouse' was exempt from special taxes for building a sewer because it was "property of the commonwealth, and constituted one of the instrumentalities by which it performs one of its functions," although the same court had held that charitable and agricultural property was not exempt, but was subject to local taxation. Worchester Agricultural Soc. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Worchester, 116 Mass. 181-189.

Judge Black further held that it was against public policy to permit a courthouse to be sold in invitem, because that would "be the destruction of the means provided by law for carrying on the government," and because section 2344, R. S. 1879 (section 1612, R. S. 1919), provided that "all courthouses, jails, clerks' offices, and other buildings owned by any county or municipality, and the lots on which they stand, and all burial grounds, shall be exempt from attachment and execution." It was further ruled in that case that the statutory remedy for enforcing special tax bills, they being a creature of the statute, was exclusive, and that remedy being by special judgment and execution against the particular property, a general judgment against the county which was the remedy sought in that case could not be rendered. The court held the tax bills were void, both as against the county and the courthouse square.

As to the case decided by Judge Napton Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468, supra, Judge Black said (115 Mo. at pages 570, 571, 22 S. W. 496):

"The report of that case shows that the school corporation based its right to injunctive relief on the sole ground that the general revenue law exempted its property from local assessments as well as from taxation for general purposes. This court ruled that question then, as it would now, against the schools. No other question was presented or considered. It may be, the city charter made the vast amount of property held by the schools liable for assessments for street improvements; but that was not the question in dispute. * * * As to many of the other cases cited, * * * it may be observed that there is a wide difference between property held and used for strictly public uses * * * and * * * the property of railroads and cemetery companies. * * * The property here in question is strictly public property, and on well-settled principle of law cannot be held liable for these local improvement assessments until the Legislature so says in clear terms, and that it has not done by the statute relating to cities of the third class."

In St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 561, 56 S. W. 298, this court, per Valliant, J., following the Henry County Case, and for the reasons therein stated, held that the four courts, the jail, and old city hall still used for public offices of the city, were not chargeable with benefits in a condemnation proceeding to widen Twelfth street in that city under the general terms of the city charter.

In Mullins v. Cemetery Association, 239 Mo. 681, 44 S. W. 109, the question was whether a cemetery was subject to special taxation for constructing sewers without express words in the charter of Kansas City so providing. The court held that it was included in the general terms of the charter, and express words were not necessary, and the case was distinguished from Clinton v. Henry County, on the ground that a cemetery was not "strictly public" property, such as a county courthouse, passed on in the Henry County Case.

The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in Thogmartin v. Nevada School District, 189 Mo. App. 10, 176 S. W. 473, had before it the precise question and held that public school grounds were not included in the general language "all property" used in designating the property which should be charged with...