City of Elizabeth v. State
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | JONES, Judge |
| Citation | City of Elizabeth v. State, 237 Ariz. 360, 351 P.3d 367, 714 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 17 (Ariz. App. 2015) |
| Decision Date | 04 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA–CV 14–0282.,1 CA–CV 14–0282. |
| Parties | CITY OF TEMPE, a municipal corporation; Elizabeth Chavez, Tempe Housing Services Manager, Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona, a body politic, and Mark Brnovich,in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Defendants/Respondents/Appellees. |
Tempe City Attorney's Office By Judith R. Baumann, Tempe, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Petitioners/Appellants.
Arizona Attorney General's Office By Ann R. Hobart, Phoenix, Counsel for Defendants/Respondents/Appellees.
OPINION
¶ 1 In this case, the City of Tempe (Tempe) challenges the authority of the Arizona Attorney General (AAG) to investigate a complaint alleging discriminatory housing practices against a municipal corporation. Because a municipal corporation is a “person” subject to the Arizona Fair Housing Act (AFHA), Ariz.Rev.Stat. (A.R.S.) §§ 41–14912 to –1491. 37, the AAG can investigate a complaint against Tempe alleging housing discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and the AAG and the award of fees under A.R.S. § 12–348.01.
¶ 2 Tempe is a municipal corporation that, inter alia, operates Tempe Housing Services (THS), a public housing agency. THS administers the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP) through which the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides rental subsidies to eligible families and individuals living in approved housing units. As required by federal statute, Tempe adopted a plan for administering the voucher program, which provides that THS shall “comply fully with all Federal, State, and local nondiscrimination laws ... from the time a prospective tenant first applies [to the voucher program] through a voucher being given.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (); 24 C.F.R. § 982.53 ().
¶ 3 The Arizona legislature adopted the AFHA in 1991 and tasked the AAG with investigating and enforcing complaints brought thereunder.4 A.R.S. §§ 41–1491.09, –1491.22(A), –1491.24, and –1491.34. Additionally, through a Memorandum of Understanding, HUD declared the AFHA to be “substantially equivalent” to the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3631. As a result, HUD may refer local FHA complaints to the AAG for investigation. See A.R.S. § 41–1491.24(A).
¶ 4 In June 2012, Ron Bircher filed a fair housing complaint against Tempe with the AAG; Tempe then dual-filed the complaint with HUD. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, HUD referred Bircher's complaint under the FHA to the AAG for investigation. Bircher later amended his complaint to provide additional details in support of his allegation that his application for a housing voucher was denied based upon an alleged disability, and to add Elizabeth Chavez, a THS manager, as an additional respondent.
¶ 5 Upon receiving Bircher's complaint, the AAG sent Tempe and Chavez a “Notice of Charge of Discrimination” and requested Tempe provide it with a position statement. Tempe resisted the investigation and ultimately filed a complaint in the superior court seeking declaratory and special action relief, asserting the AFHA did not authorize the AAG to investigate a complaint made against a municipal corporation.5
¶ 6 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, disputing three issues: (1) whether Tempe and Chavez are “persons” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 41–1491(9) ; (2) whether Tempe engages in conduct that could constitute a discriminatory housing practice under the AFHA; and (3) whether the AAG abused its discretion in refusing to summarily dismiss Bircher's complaint.
¶ 7 After oral argument on the cross-motions, the trial court found: (1) municipal corporations are subject to the requirements of the AFHA, (2) Tempe, a municipal corporation, engages in conduct regulated by the AFHA, and (3) the AAG did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily and capriciously by declining to dismiss Bircher's complaint without an investigation. The court also made specific findings that the AAG is mandated to conduct an investigation, and “Tempe thwarted the investigation,” such that it could not “now complain that the [AAG] abused his discretion by not dismissing the complaint when the investigation [was] not complete.” Accordingly, the court granted the State's summary judgment motion and dismissed Tempe's complaint. The State then applied for its attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12–348.01, which the court granted in the amount of $108,090. Tempe timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21(A)(1) and –2101(A)(1).
¶ 8 Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 14, 180 P.3d 977, 980 (App.2008). Even where the facts are not disputed, as here, summary judgment is improper “if the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 224 Ariz. 289, 291, ¶ 12, 229 P.3d 1031, 1033 (App.2010). We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 211 Ariz. 427, 432, ¶ 13, 122 P.3d 6, 11 (App.2005).
¶ 9 The AFHA provides “[a] person may not discriminate in the sale or rental or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a disability.” A.R.S. § 41–1491.19. The legislature adopted the AFHA with the intent to “undertake vigorous steps to provide equal opportunity in housing; ... and obtain substantial equivalency with the federal government's housing discrimination enforcement efforts.” 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 181, § 1. Therefore, The AFHA defines “person” as “one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, receivers, fiduciaries, banks, credit unions and financial institutions A.R.S. § 41–1491(9). Tempe argues that, as a municipal corporation, it is not a “person” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 41–1491(9), and therefore is not subject to the AFHA. We review de novo issues of statutory construction. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 7, 340 P.3d 1071, 1073 (2015).
¶ 10 When interpreting a statute, we initially look to the language of the statute itself as the most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003) ; Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 209, 786 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1989). And, “when the language is clear and unambiguous, and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning, we apply the language without using other means of statutory construction.” Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383, ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013).
¶ 11 The AFHA expressly defines “person” to include “corporations.” A.R.S. § 41–1491(9). Although a municipal corporation is not specifically included as a “person,” the term “corporation” is commonly understood to include municipal corporations. See Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 323, 327, ¶ 14, 266 P.3d 349, 353 (2011) (); Sumid v. City of Prescott, 27 Ariz. 111, 114–16, 230 P. 1103 (1924) (). Therefore, the plain language of the statute includes Tempe as a “person” intended to be regulated under the AFHA.
¶ 12 We are further persuaded in this regard by federal law indicating a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the AFHA. See Canady v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 204 Ariz. 91, 93 n. 3, ¶ 9, 60 P.3d 231, 233 n. 3 (App.2002) () (citations omitted); see also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 172 Ariz. 564, 568, 838 P.2d 1325, 1329 (App.1992) () (citing SCA Constr. Supply v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 157 Ariz. 64, 66, 754 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1988) ).6 When the AFHA was enacted, it was well-established under federal case law that municipalities are included in the FHA definition of “person.” Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482 (9th Cir.1988) (); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 571–72 (6th Cir.1981) (); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183–84 (8th Cir.1974) (same); see also Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1020 n. 8 (7th Cir.1978) (), abrogated on other grounds, Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir.1990).
¶ 13 Tempe contends, however, that the legislature can differentiate between public and private entities in statutes, and because it did not specifically include both, the legislature intended to exclude municipalities from the definition of “person” under the...
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