City of Erie v. WCAB (ANNUNZIATA)

• Decision Date: 04 June 2002
• Citation: 799 A.2d 946
• Parties: CITY OF ERIE, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (ANNUNZIATA), Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

799 A.2d 946

CITY OF ERIE, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (ANNUNZIATA), Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs March 8, 2002.

Decided June 4, 2002.

Richard E. Bordonaro, Erie, for petitioner.

Michael A. Agresti, Erie, for respondent.

BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and COHN, J., and MIRARCHI, Jr., Senior Judge. OPINION BY Senior Judge MIRARCHI

The City of Erie (City) appeals from an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that reversed the decision of the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) denying the claim petition filed by Jeffrey Annunziata (Claimant), the City police officer. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether Claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for loss of earnings from his concurrent employment for the period of his disability caused by the injury sustained while performing the duties of his primary employment, in addition to benefits received pursuant to Section 1(a) of the Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, commonly known as the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 637(a); and (2) if so, whether the City may set off Claimant's benefits for loss of earnings from his concurrent employment against the full salary of the primary employment paid pursuant to the Heart and Lung Act.

The relevant facts are undisputed in this matter. Claimant sustained a fracture of his right tibial plateau on April 22, 1998 while performing his duties as the City police officer, when his motorcycle was struck by a vehicle. At the time of the injury, Claimant was also employed by Holiday Inn Downtown (Holiday Inn) as a part-time security guard and by Great Lakes Armored, Inc. (Great Lakes) as a part-time automatic teller machine maintenance person. Following the injury, the City issued a notice of compensation payable accepting its liability for workers' compensation benefits. The City further stated in the notice that Claimant would continue to receive his full salary in lieu of workers' compensation. As a self-insured employer, the City was responsible for paying workers' compensation benefits from its own fund.

The City thereafter began paying Claimant his full weekly salary of $777.81 without deduction of taxes, as mandated by Section 1(a) of the Heart and Lung Act, which provides in relevant part:

[A]ny policeman ... of any county, city, borough, town or township, who is injured in the performance of his duties... and by reason thereof is temporarily incapacitated from performing his duties, shall be paid ... by the county, township or municipality, by which he is employed, his full rate of salary, as fixed by ordinance or resolution, until the disability arising therefrom has ceased. All medical and hospital bills, incurred in connection with any such injury, shall be paid ... by such county, township or municipality.

Upon receiving the record of Claimant's wages earned from his concurrent employment with Holiday Inn and Great Lakes, the City subsequently revised the notice of compensation payable to recalculate his average weekly wage and workers' compensation benefits based on the wages he earned from the primary and concurrent employment. Claimant's recalculated average weekly wage was $988.37, which entitled him to receive weekly wage loss benefits of $561. On August 5, 1998, Claimant returned to his pre-injury police officer position and concurrent positions without loss of earnings. Claimant's workers' compensation benefits were then suspended pursuant to a supplemental agreement dated August 12, 1998. On November 4, 1999, Claimant filed the claim petition against the City seeking workers' compensation benefits for loss of earnings from the concurrent employment with Holiday Inn and Great Lakes for the period of his disability from April 22 to August 5, 1998. The City in its answer denied its obligation to pay Claimant workers' compensation benefits, asserting that it had already paid him his full weekly salary of $777.81 during the same period of his temporary disability pursuant to the Heart and Lung Act, which is more than his weekly workers' compensation rate of $561 calculated based on the average weekly wages of the primary and concurrent employment.

Agreeing with the City's position, the WCJ denied Claimant's claim petition. On appeal, the Board reversed the WCJ's decision. The Board concluded that Claimant is permitted to simultaneously receive benefits under the Heart and Lung Act and the Workers' Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2626, and that Claimant was not required to reimburse the City for benefits to be received under the Workers' Compensation Act for his loss of earnings from the concurrent employment.¹

The City contends that Claimant was precluded from receiving benefits for loss of earnings from the concurrent employment under the Workers' Compensation Act after receiving his full salary from the City for the same period of disability under the Heart and Lung Act, and that even if he is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, he was required to turn over the amount of such benefits to the City pursuant to Section 1(a) of the Heart and Lung Act, which further provides in relevant part:

During the time salary for temporary incapacity shall be paid ... by the county, city, borough, town or township, any workmen's compensation received or collected by any such employe for such period, shall be turned over ... to such county, city, borough, town or township, and paid into the treasury thereof, and if such payment shall not be so made by the employe the amount so due ... the county, city, borough, town or township shall be deducted from any salary then or thereafter becoming due and owing. (Emphasis added.)

The City asserts that the term "any" workers' compensation in Section 1(a) should be construed to require the claimant to turn over benefits for loss of earnings from not only the primary employment but also the concurrent employment.

The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). Because statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things, they must be construed together as one statute, if possible. Section 1932 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932; Fairview Township v. Fairview Township Police Ass'n, 795 A.2d 463 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002).

To resolve the issues raised by the City, it is therefore necessary to examine the legislative objectives of the Heart and Lung Act and the Workers' Compensation Act and the compensation scheme set forth therein.

The Heart and Lung Act was enacted to provide limited classes of public safety personnel with full compensation during a period of temporary disability due to an injury sustained while performing job duties. City of Pittsburgh v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Wiefling), 790 A.2d 1062 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). The Heart and Lung Act, however, is not a compensation statute in a broad sense because the primary consideration in enacting the Act was the best interest of the municipalities, not the disabled employees. Iben v. Borough of Monaca, 158 Pa.Super. 46, 43 A.2d 425 (1945). As the Court stated in Iben:

Efficient firemen and police officers must take chances; the performance of their duties are hazardous. The prospect of uninterrupted income during periods of disability well may attract qualified persons to those vocations and proper medical attention assures a reasonably speedy return of a temporarily disabled policemen and firemen to service essential to the community.

Id. at 427.

To achieve such statutory goal, the Heart and Lung Act generously awards a full salary to injured workers during their temporary disability. Brandt v. Pennsylvania State Police, 159 Pa. Cmwlth. 66, 632 A.2d 986 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 668, 644 A.2d 1204 (1994). In addition, the period of the injured employee's allowed sick leave is not reduced by the period of absence due to the injury. Section 2 of the Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 638. Finally, the disabled employees receiving benefits under the Heart and Lung Act may still pursue further remedies under common law. Iben.

In contrast, the Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to achieve a different legislative objective of serving the humanitarian purposes for injured employees. Griffin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 756 A.2d 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth.2000), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 652, 781 A.2d 149 (2001). The Act substitutes a method of accident insurance in place of rights and liabilities of the injured employees under common law. Colyer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 41, 644 A.2d 230 (1994).

Unlike the Heart and Lung Act mandating payment of benefits only for the period of temporary disability, the Workers' Compensation Act provides for benefits whether the disability is temporary or permanent. Griffin. Moreover, the Workers' Compensation Act grants more extensive benefits than the Heart and Lung Act, such as earning loss benefits for total and partial disability, specific loss benefits, death benefits, medical benefits, and minor's benefits. Colyer. However, the weekly compensation rate for loss of earnings is two thirds of the average weekly wage, not the full salary as in the Heart and Lung Act. Section 306(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 511. Finally, the Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian objective, unlike the Heart and Lung Act which is strictly construed. U.S. Airways v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Dixon), 764 A.2d 635 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 753, 788 A.2d 382 (2001); McCommons v. Pennsylvania State Police, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 280, 645 A.2d 333 (1994), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 671, 652 A.2d 841 (1994).

...