City of Eureka v. Wilson

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BARTCH, J.:
• Citation: City of Eureka v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 41 (Utah 1897)
• Decision Date: 11 February 1897
• Docket Number: 776
• Parties: EUREKA CITY, RESPONDENT, v. R. G. WILSON, APPELLANT

48 P. 41

15 Utah 53

EUREKA CITY, RESPONDENT, v. R. G. WILSON, APPELLANT

No. 776

Supreme Court of Utah

February 11, 1897

Appeal from the Fifth district court, Juab county. Hon. E. V Higgins, Judge.

R. G Wilson was convicted originally in a justice's court for moving a building onto the street in violation of an ordinance of Eureka City, and appeals.

Affirmed.

J. W N. Whitecotton, for appellant.

That such an ordinance is invalid and unconstitutional, see: Frazee's Case, (Mich.) 6 Am. St. Rep. 310; In re Garrabad, (Wis.) 36 Id. 948; City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430; Anderson v. City of Wellington, (Kan.) 10 Am. St. Rep. 175; McCrowell v. Bristol, (Virginia) 20 L. R. A. 653; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N.Y. 92; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N.Y. 73; Macon v. Patty, (Miss.) 34 Am. Rep. 451; Davis v. Read, 65 N.Y. 566; Bryan v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 507; Baltimore v. Radecke, (Md.) 33 Am. Rep. 239; City of St. Louis v. Russell, (Mo.) 20 L. R. A. 721; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 433; East. St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 Ill. 28; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 Ill. 462; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; State v. Kantler, (Minn.) 21 N.W. 856; People v. Haug, (Mich.) 37 Id. 21; Minneapolis Gas Light Co. v. City of Minneapolis, (Minn.) 30 N.W. 450; Zabel v. Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home, 13 L. R. A. 668; Hydes & Goose v. Joyes, (Ky.) 96 Am. Dec. 311.

B. N. C. Scott and Williams, Van Cott & Sutherland, for respondent.

BARTCH, J. ZANE, C. J., and MINER, J., concur.

OPINION

BARTCH, J.:

The defendant in this case was originally prosecuted before a justice of the peace, under a municipal ordinance of Eureka City, for the offense of obstructing the free passage of Main street, in said city, by moving into and upon the street a frame building without having obtained permission as provided by the ordinance. Upon conviction he appealed to the district court, and after conviction there, and sentence to pay a fine, to this court.

The first question which we will consider is whether we have jurisdiction on appeal in a case like this, where the first appeal was from the judgment of a justice of the peace, and where the validity of a city ordinance, and not of a statute, is assailed. Counsel for the respondent insist that the decision of the district court in such a case is final, and not subject to review here. In support of this contention they cite section 9 of article 8 of the constitution, which section, so far as material here, provides as follows: "Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district courts on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the district court on such appeals shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." This provision grants an appeal from the final judgments of justices of the peace to the district courts, and declares that the decision of those courts on such appeals shall be final, except in cases where the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. The effect of this exception is to allow an appeal to this court in every case which originates in a justice's court, and in which the validity or constitutionality of a statute is drawn in question, made an issue, and decided by the district court on appeal. In all other cases brought before justices of the peace, and transferred to the district courts by appeal, the final judgment of those courts is conclusive. But does the exception include a case so brought and transferred, where the validity or constitutionality of a city ordinance was litigated, and decided by the district court? We are of the opinion that it does; for, while an ordinance is an enactment of a municipal government, and its application is local, still, when valid, it has the force and effect, in favor of the municipality and against persons bound thereby, of a legislative enactment, and acts done in contravention thereof become unlawful, the same as when done in contravention of a statute. An ordinance, which can only be passed in pursuance of some legislative enactment, may, like a statute, affect property rights and individual liberty; and the framers of the constitution evidently intended, by the use of the word "statutes" to include "ordinance," and that the appellate court should have power to determine the validity of any law, whether of local or general application, and whether enacted directly by the lawmaking power, or by a municipality through a delegation of power by the legislature. While the lawmaking power of the state is vested in the legislature, yet it is competent for the legislature to delegate power to municipal corporations to pass ordinances which shall have the same force, within the municipality, as a statute, to control its municipal affairs. Hence reasons which exist for the review of statutes by appeal exist for the review of ordinances. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 308; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 747; City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & B. I. Ry. Co., 95 Mich. 456, 54 N.W. 958; Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun 620, 4 N.Y.S. 112; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208, 24 P. 747.

Having concluded that we have jurisdiction to review the question of the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance in a case like the one at bar, it becomes important to inquire whether it is the duty of this court, in this class of cases, to determine questions presented in the record other than those relating to such validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute. Counsel for the appellant insists that this court, on appeal, in this class of cases, is not limited to questions of the validity of a statute, but has power to review all the questions presented. We do not agree with counsel as to this proposition, because such does not appear to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provision of the constitution already quoted, especially when they are viewed in the light of the history of the former practice in the late territory of Utah. Under the territorial form of government, appeals were allowed from all final decisions of the district courts to the supreme court, and questions of both law and fact were reviewed; and whether a case was originally brought before a justice of the peace, or in the district court, was immaterial. 1 Comp. Laws Utah, p. 57. This practice made it possible to appeal any case, no matter how insignificant the amount of the judgment or how totally without merit the appeal or the cause of the appellant. It had a tendency to encourage profitless litigation, and consume the time of the appellate court without just cause. Such practice was in vogue when the constitution was framed, and we must assume that the framers of that instrument were familiar with current history, and that they had knowledge of the practice and its effect. When, therefore, contrary to the former practice, the framers of the constitution provided that "the decision of the district courts" on appeals from judgments of justices of the peace "shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," their evident object and intention were to obviate the evil to which the practice then existing was subject, and yet provide a way by which statutory and constitutional questions which might arise in such cases could be reviewed by the appellate court. This object could be but very imperfectly attained, if, when this court assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only determine the statutory or constitutional question, but also inquire into and determine every other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would restore the former practice, against the express provision of the constitution, because it would render it possible to bring every such case here for re-examination. All that would be necessary would be to raise same statutory or constitutional question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and re-examination of the case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor is it manifest from the language employed in the provision above quoted, nor can it be made possible by judicial interpretation, without violating familiar rules of construction. In harmony with the plain meaning and intent of the constitution, we hold: (1) That it is essential to the jurisdiction of this court over judgments of the district courts, in cases which originated in and were appealed from justices of the peace, that it shall appear that a statutory question was raised and presented to the district court. (2) That such question was decided by the district court, or that its decision was necessary to the judgment rendered in the case. (3) That, if these things appear, then this court has jurisdiction, and must examine the judgment so far as to enable it to determine whether the statutory question and claim of right were correctly adjudged; and, if they were, the judgment must be affirmed. (4) That, if the statutory question was erroneously decided, then this court must further inquire whether, notwithstanding the error in deciding that question, there was any other matter or issue, not affected by the statutory question, decided, which in itself is sufficient to sustain the judgment; and, if such be the case, then the judgment must be affirmed, without determining whether the adjudication on such other matter or issue be correct. (5) That if it be found that the statutory question is of such force as to render a correct decision thereof necessary to a final adjudication, or that there has been no decision of any other matter or issue, not affected by the statutory question, sufficient to sustain the judgment of the...