City of Evanston v. Regional Transp. Authority

• Decision Date: 15 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-89-0545,1-89-0545
• Parties: , 147 Ill.Dec. 559 CITY OF EVANSTON, a municipal corporation, Joan W. Barr, Ann Rainey, and Norris Larson, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and Suburban Bus Division of the RTA ("Pace"), Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 899

559 N.E.2d 899

202 Ill.App.3d 265, 147 Ill.Dec. 559

CITY OF EVANSTON, a municipal corporation, Joan W. Barr, Ann Rainey, and Norris Larson, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and Suburban Bus Division of the RTA ("Pace"), Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

No. 1-89-0545.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Third Division.

Aug. 15, 1990.

Jack M. Siegel, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants and cross-appellees.

Burke, Bosselman and Weaver, Chicago, for defendants-appellees and cross-appellants.

Presiding Justice CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

At dispute in this appeal and cross-appeal is the proposed building of a bus garage and maintenance facility in the city of Evanston by the Regional Transportation Authority ("RTA") and its suburban bus division, PACE. Plaintiffs, Evanston, Joan W. Barr, Ann Rainey, and Norris Larson (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Evanston"), appeal from the granting of summary judgment on count I of RTA's and PACE's second amended counterclaim which asserted that they were exempt as regional transportation agencies from Evanston's zoning. Evanston also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting the second amended counterclaim to be amended to delete reference to the North Suburban Mass Transit District ("Nortran"), the agency that provided bus service on behalf of PACE in the northern suburbs and the proposed user of the facility, because Nortran was a necessary party. RTA and PACE cross-appeal from the dismissal of counts V through XI of their counterclaim which alleged a taking and damaging of their property in violation of the federal and state constitutions, a denial of substantive due process and equal protection, and violations of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)) based on this denial. RTA and PACE argue that the trial court erred in holding that, as political subdivisions, they lacked constitutional rights.

Evanston filed a complaint against RTA, PACE, National Steel Service Center, Inc. ("National"), and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration for injunctive relief against any federal financial assistance for the construction and operation of a bus maintenance facility in Evanston and against the consummation of the sale by National of property in Evanston to PACE. Plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to an Evanston zoning ordinance, such a facility located in zone M-4 required a special use permit. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.

RTA's and PACE's second amended counterclaim against Evanston alleged in count I that: RTA was a regional governmental body; PACE provided bus transportation for RTA and owned property in Evanston which was purchased for use as a bus storage and maintenance facility to house buses operated by Nortran; the property was located in M-4, Evanston's heaviest manufacturing classification; Evanston amended its zoning ordinance on March 10, 1986, to make bus storage and maintenance facilities prohibited without a special use permit; Evanston denied PACE a special use permit; PACE incurred damages because of its inability to use the property as planned; and RTA and PACE as regional governmental bodies and Nortran as a regional agency operating under an agreement with PACE were exempt from Evanston's zoning restrictions. RTA and PACE sought a declaratory judgment that they and Nortran could use the property for the proposed facility.

RTA and PACE alleged in counts III and IV that the rezoning ordinance and the denial of the permit, respectively, were arbitrary, capricious and invalid.

RTA and PACE alleged in count V that the following actions of Evanston were done for the illegal purpose of keeping the property on the city tax rolls and deprived PACE of its use of the property: passage of a resolution of condemnation; amendment of its zoning ordinance; filing of the federal suit; requirement that PACE file, and present evidence in support of, an application for a special use permit; and denial of the application for a special use permit. It was further alleged that PACE had not been able to use the facility and that the deprivation was a taking and damaging of its property in violation of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution and of section 2 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. PACE sought compensation for the taking and damaging.

RTA and PACE alleged in count VI that: the amendment of the zoning ordinance bore no rational relationship to any proper public purpose; the amendment was enacted to prevent PACE from using the property in order to keep the property on the city tax rolls; and therefore Evanston denied RTA and PACE substantive due process guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and by section 2 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

RTA and PACE alleged in count VII that: the amended zoning ordinance bore no rational relationship to any proper public purpose; there was no rational distinction between bus storage and maintenance facilities and other uses permitted in the M-4 zoning district; Evanston intentionally discriminated against owners of publicly owned bus storage and maintenance facilities by treating such facilities differently than other similarly situated and more detrimental uses in the M-4 zoning district; and therefore Evanston had intentionally denied RTA and PACE equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and by section 2 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. RTA and PACE sought a declaration that the zoning amendment was void and that PACE and RTA had the right to use the property as a bus facility.

RTA and PACE alleged in count VIII that: the denial of a special use permit bore no rational relationship to any proper public purpose; that Evanston intentionally discriminated against PACE by denying it a special use permit; and that Evanston had thereby intentionally denied RTA and PACE equal protection of the laws. They sought a declaration that the denial of a special use permit was void and that they had the right to use the property as a bus facility.

RTA and PACE alleged in count IX that: Evanston enacted the ordinance to prevent the use of the property as a bus facility so that the property would remain on the city tax rolls; RTA and PACE had a legitimate claim of entitlement to use the property as a bus facility; Evanston's intentional acts were conducted under the color of state law which authorized it to zone and classify uses; Evanston had a duty not to deprive RTA and PACE the right to use the property as a bus facility; Evanston's actions directly and proximately caused RTA and PACE's deprivation of their right to use the property as a bus facility; RTA and PACE suffered substantial damages as a result; and Evanston's actions violated RTA's and PACE's right to substantive due process preserved under the Civil Rights Act.

RTA and PACE alleged in count X that: Evanston enacted the ordinance to prevent the use of the property as a bus facility so that the property would remain on the city tax rolls; Evanston's intentional acts were conducted under the color of state law which authorized it to zone and classify uses; Evanston had the duty to treat RTA and PACE similarly and without unreasonable distinction from others similarly situated in the M-4 districts; Evanston's actions directly and proximately caused RTA's and PACE's deprivation of their right to equal protection; RTA and PACE suffered damage as a result; and Evanston's actions violated RTA's and PACE's rights to equal protection under the Civil Rights Act.

RTA and PACE alleged in count XI that: Evanston denied PACE a special use permit to prevent the use of the property as a bus facility so that the property would remain on the city tax rolls; Evanston's intentional acts were conducted under the color of state law which authorized it to zone and classify; Evanston had a duty to treat RTA and PACE similarly and without unreasonable distinction from others similarly situated in the M-4 district as well as from others operating similar facilities in Evanston; Evanston's actions directly and proximately caused RTA's and PACE's deprivation of their right to equal protection; RTA and PACE suffered damage as a result; and Evanston's actions violated RTA's and PACE's right to equal protection under the Civil Rights Act.

RTA and PACE moved for summary judgment on count I of the second amended counterclaim on the basis that as regional agencies they were not subject to Evanston's zoning ordinances. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the head of the PACE Operations Department who swore that the RTA was a regional governmental body created under and acting pursuant to the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 2/3, par. 701.01 et seq.) ("RTA Act") and that RTA oversaw and provided public transportation in Cook, Kane, Du Page, Will, Lake and McHenry counties and in hundreds of municipalities. She also swore that PACE was a regional governmental body created by and acting pursuant to the RTA Act which provided bus transportation on behalf of the RTA in these same counties. She also swore that the property purchased by PACE was located in the M-4 zoning classification which was Evanston's heaviest manufacturing classification, and that PACE and RTA had been prevented from using the property for its intended use by the amendment to the zoning ordinance.

RTA and PACE moved for leave to amend the second amended counterclaim by deleting reference to Nortran. They argued that Nortran would not necessarily be a user of the bus facility, that Nortran had no ownership or other interest in the property, and that Nortran's contract with PACE extended only until December 1989 at which time PACE could choose to provide bus service itself or to...