City of Fargo v. Stutlien
Citation | 505 N.W.2d 738 |
Decision Date | 08 September 1993 |
Docket Number | Nos. 930026,s. 930026 |
Parties | CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sally A. STUTLIEN, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Christopher Michael FRANEK, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles BOMMERSBACH, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Timothy Duane DORNHEIM, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Noble THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael John SYVERTSON, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey Merlin MADISON, Defendant and Appellee. CITY OF FARGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clair Luverne HOWARD, Defendant and Appellee. Crim.to 930033. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Thomas J. Gaughan, Asst. City Atty., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant.
Brian W. Nelson, Fargo, for defendants and appellees.
These are consolidated appeals by the City of Fargo from a county court order dismissing driving while under the influence charges against Sally Stutlien, Christopher Franek, Charles Bommersbach, Timothy Dornheim, William Thompson, Michael Syvertson, Jeffrey Madison, and Clair Howard (collectively referred to as defendants). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On December 10, 1990, Fargo Municipal Court Judge Thomas Davies issued a "release from custody" order establishing "minimum periods of detention" for individuals arrested in Fargo for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor:
On July 29, 1992, the district court, the Honorable Lawrence A. Leclerc, orally granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus by Eric Johnson, a DUI arrestee who was scheduled to be detained for twelve hours after arrest. On August 11, 1992, Judge Leclerc confirmed his oral order with a written decision, concluding that the "release from custody" order violated Johnson's state constitutional right to bail. 1 On September 15, 1992, the district court, the Honorable Norman J. Backes, granted a writ of habeas corpus to temporarily release one of the defendants in this case, Dornheim, a DUI arrestee who was also scheduled to be detained for twelve hours after arrest. After a subsequent hearing, Judge Backes also concluded that the municipal court's "release from custody" order violated Dornheim's right to bail. 2
Meanwhile, between April 19, 1992 and September 16, 1992, the other defendants in these cases were arrested in Fargo for DUI. After posting bail, they were held for the scheduled "minimum periods of detention" ranging from eight hours forty minutes to twelve hours. All of the defendants, except Franek, requested a jury trial and their cases were transferred to county court under N.D.C.C. Sec. 40-18-15.1. Franek was tried and convicted in municipal court, and he appealed to county court for trial anew under N.D.C.C. Sec. 40-18-19.
Stutlien, Franek, and Bommersbach moved to dismiss the charges, alleging they had been unlawfully detained under the municipal court's "release from custody" order and were precluded from gathering exculpatory evidence. The remaining defendants joined their motion.
Like the two district court judges in the habeas corpus proceedings, the county court also concluded that the municipal court's "release from custody" order violated the defendants' constitutional right to bail. The county court further concluded the order deprived the defendants of their right to gather exculpatory evidence and witnesses and to obtain an additional, independent blood alcohol test. The court determined that, as a result, the defendants were unable to obtain a fair trial and dismissed the charges against them. The City appealed.
The City argues that, under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits law enforcement officials to detain all warrantless, misdemeanor arrestees for up to 48 hours before a probable cause determination by a magistrate. Therefore, the City argues the municipal court's "release from custody" order is constitutional because it does not require an arrestee to be detained for more than 48 hours.
In Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-114, 95 S.Ct. at 862-63, the United States Supreme Court said a neutral and detached magistrate should, whenever possible, determine whether probable cause exists prior to an arrest. The Court said, however, it had never invalidated a warrantless arrest supported by probable cause, because the policemen's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provided legal justification for the arrest and for a brief period of detention for administrative steps incident to the arrest. The Court held the Fourth Amendment requires a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 125, 95 S.Ct. at 863, 869.
In County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d at 63, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of "prompt":
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gerstein and County of Riverside allow a flexible procedure under the Fourth Amendment to combine post-arrest probable cause determinations with other pretrial procedures, such as an arraignment, and to minimize the time that presumptively innocent individuals spend in jail after the completion of the administrative steps incident to a warrantless arrest. Although those decisions allow detention for completion of the administrative steps incident to a warrantless arrest, they do not involve blanket "minimum periods of detention" and specifically disapprove "delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." County of Riverside, at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d at 63. The City's reliance on Gerstein and County of Riverside is misplaced, because those decisions do not involve an expedited procedure for release on bail in traffic cases, and blanket "minimum periods of detention, prior to release pending trial" for all DUI arrestees.
The City nevertheless argues that N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-08-02 authorizes the municipal court's order. 3 The defendants respond that the municipal court's order violates their constitutional right to be released after they have posted bail. They argue that N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-08-02 dispenses with the requirement for a bail hearing and does not authorize detention of a DUI arrestee after bail has been posted.
Because we refrain from deciding constitutional issues if we can decide the case on appropriate, alternative grounds, Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1986), we first consider whether N.D.C.C. Sec. 29-08-02 authorizes the municipal court's "release from custody" order. Because we conclude it does not, we need not reach the constitutional issues. 4
In construing statutes, our duty is to ascertain the legislature's intent. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985). We construe statutes on similar subjects to harmonize...
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...and appellant. Robin L. Olson, of Nelson Law Office, Fargo, for defendants and appellees. SANDSTROM, Justice. In City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 N.W.2d 738 (N.D.1993), we held illegal a court-ordered procedure for mandatory minimum periods of detention for all driving under the influence and......
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