City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 82288-3.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Writing for the Court: Owens
• Citation: 167 Wn.2d 341,217 P.3d 1172
• Parties: CITY OF FEDERAL WAY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent, v. David KOENIG, a Washington State resident, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 82288-3.,82288-3.
• Decision Date: 15 October 2009

217 P.3d 1172 167 Wn.2d 341 CITY OF FEDERAL WAY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent,
v.
David KOENIG, a Washington State resident, Appellant. No. 82288-3. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. Argued June 9, 2009. Decided October 15, 2009.

William John Crittenden, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Ramsey E. Ramerman, Kirkland, WA, P. Stephen Dijulio, Foster Pepper PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.

James Kendrick Pharris, Attorney at Law, Alan D. Copsey, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Attorney General.

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 Washington's Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, gives the public access to the public records of state and local agencies, with the laudable goals of governmental transparency and accountability. This case requires us to consider the extent to which the PRA applies to the judiciary and judicial records. We previously considered this issue in Nast v. Michels, 107 Wash.2d 300, 730 P.2d 54 (1986), where we held that the PRA does not apply to court case files because the judiciary is not included in the PRA's definition of "agency." Id. at 305-06, 730 P.2d 54. We conclude that Nast continues to stand for the principle that the PRA does not apply to the judiciary and that the appellant has not demonstrated a compelling reason to overturn Nast. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we will overturn precedent only if it is incorrect and harmful and appellant has failed to demonstrate either. Thus,

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this court affirms the trial court and holds that the PRA does not apply to the judiciary.

FACTS

¶ 2 In February 2008, David Koenig requested all public records related to the resignation of Federal Way Municipal Court Judge Colleen Hartl, including all correspondence to and from presiding Federal Way Municipal Court Judge Michael Morgan. In response, the city of Federal Way (City) provided 183 pages of documents but it refused to provide correspondence to and from Judge Morgan, asserting that the court was not subject to the PRA under Nast. Koenig persisted in his requests, arguing that Nast was wrongly decided and did not apply in this case. In June 2008, the City filed for an injunction affirming that the municipal court was not subject to the PRA. Koenig filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the trial court to find that the PRA did apply to the municipal court and that the City had violated the PRA by not releasing the requested documents.

¶ 3 In August 2008, Koenig made an additional public records request for a number of records, including documents related to job-related exemptions from jury duty and the appointment of pro tempore judges. Again, the City provided a number of responsive documents but withheld those documents it classified as court documents and therefore not subject to the PRA. In September 2008, the trial court granted the City's motion and held that the municipal court is not subject to the PRA under Nast. Koenig appealed that decision directly to this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4 We review issues of statutory meaning de novo. State v. Schultz, 146 Wash.2d 540, 544, 48 P.3d 301 (2002). We also review challenges to agency actions under the PRA de novo. Soter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 162 Wash.2d 716, 731, 174 P.3d 60 (2007). The PRA must be "liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed" to ensure that the public's interest is protected. RCW 42.56.030; Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash.2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055 (2008).

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 The PRA "is a strongly-worded mandate for open government" that provides the public with access to public records. Rental Hous. Ass'n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wash.2d 525, 527, 199 P.3d 393 (2009); RCW 42.56.070. In Nast, this court held that the PRA did not apply to court case files. 107 Wash.2d at 305-06, 730 P.2d 54. In light of Nast, we must now determine whether the PRA applies to the requested judicial records in this case. We first examine the scope of the holding in Nast and then consider Koenig's argument that we should overrule Nast entirely.

I. Does Nast Apply to the Requested Judicial Records

¶ 6 In Nast, an attorney challenged a new King County court rule that required one-day notice to access court case files, alleging it violated the PRA.¹ 107 Wash.2d at 301-02, 730 P.2d 54. This court held that the PRA did not apply to the case files, giving three reasons: (1) the common law already provided a common law right of access to the files, (2) the PRA did not provide for exceptions to public disclosure requirements developed in the common law, and (3) the PRA did not specifically include courts or court case files. Id. at 307, 730 P.2d 54. Two subsequent Court of Appeals decisions have interpreted Nast to hold that the judiciary and judicial records are not subject to the PRA. Spokane & E. Lawyer v. Tompkins, 136 Wash.App. 616, 621-22, 150 P.3d 158 (upholding denial of public records request for correspondence from county judges to the bar association regarding local lawyers), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1004, 175 P.3d 1092 (2007); Beuhler v. Small, 115 Wash.App. 914, 918, 64 P.3d 78 (2003) (upholding denial of public records request for a computer file containing a

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judge's notes on prior sentences he had imposed).

¶ 7 Koenig argues that the Nast holding should be limited to court case files accessible through the common law, but this interpretation has no basis in the Nast opinion. In Nast, this court looked to the language in the PRA to determine whether the court case files were considered "public records." 107 Wash.2d at 304-05, 730 P.2d 54. The PRA defines a "`[p]ublic record'" as a "writing containing information relating to the conduct of government . . . [that is] prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency." RCW 42.56.010(2). "`State agency'" is defined as a "state office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or other state agency." RCW 42.56.010(1). "`Local agency'" is defined as a "county, city, town, municipal corporation, quasi-municipal corporation, or special purpose district, or any office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or agency thereof, or other local public agency." Id.

¶ 8 The records in Nast and the records at issue here clearly meet the first part of the PRA's definition of public records — both sets of records are writings that contain information relating to the conduct of government. The only question is whether the entity that created the records (here, the judiciary) is a "state or local agency." The Nast court resolved this question, holding that the PRA definitions do not include "either courts or case files." 107 Wash.2d at 306, 730 P.2d 54. Because the records met the other elements of the PRA's definition of public records, Nast necessarily held that the judiciary is not a "state or local agency." We find it unreasonable to now twist this holding to sometimes include the courts in the definition of agency. Either the entity maintaining a record is an agency under the PRA or it is not. Under Nast, the courts are not included in the definition of agency, and thus, the PRA does not apply to the judiciary. As a result, the court records requested by Koenig are not subject to disclosure under the PRA.

II. The Nast Decision

¶ 9 Koenig contends that this court should reconsider Nast entirely because its analysis was erroneous and because a recent amendment to the PRA has incorporated common law exceptions to public disclosure requirements. The principle of stare decisis "`requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.'" Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)). This respect for precedent "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

¶ 10 Koenig argues that the Nast analysis erred because it failed to liberally construe the terms "agency" and "public records." First, this argument was considered by the court in Nast, as evidenced by Justice Durham's dissent on this very issue. Nast, 107 Wash.2d at 311-12, 730 P.2d 54 (Durham, J., dissenting). Making the same arguments that the original court thoroughly considered and decided does not constitute a showing of "incorrect and harmful." Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wash.2d 664, 682, 193 P.3d 110 (2008). Second, the Nast court considered the full definition of agency and found that the judiciary was not included. Nast, 107 Wash.2d at 305, 730 P.2d 54. Indeed, the PRA definition of agency does not include any language referring to courts or the judiciary. The Nast court reasonably concluded that the legislature did not intend to include the judiciary, basing its ruling on a "reading of the entire public records section of the [PRA]." Id. at 306, 730 P.2d 54. Koenig has failed to demonstrate that this holding was incorrect and harmful. Without such a showing, we will not overturn precedent.

¶ 11 Koenig also points out that the third basis for Nast (that the PRA did not include the statutory exemptions honed under the common law right of access to court files) no longer applies because the PRA now incorporates

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such statutory exemptions. See RCW 42.56.070(1). While Koenig is correct that the third basis for Nast no longer applies, the broader holding remains. As noted above, the fundamental basis for Nast — that the PRA's definition of agency does not include the judiciary — is sufficient to support Nast's holding. The fact that the third basis no longer applies is not enough to overturn Nast.

¶ 12 More notably, the legislature has declined to modify...