City of Fort Wayne v. Pierce Mfg., Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 90A02-0512-CV-1155.,90A02-0512-CV-1155. |
| Citation | 853 N.E.2d 508 |
| Parties | CITY OF FORT WAYNE, Appellant-Defendant, v. PIERCE MANUFACTURING, INC., Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
R. Mark Keaton, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
James P. Fenton, Eilbacher Fletcher, LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
The City of Fort Wayne ("City") appeals the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment filed by Pierce Manufacturing, Inc., ("Pierce") and the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment filed by the City. The City raises two issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as whether the trial court erred by denying the City's motion to dismiss based upon Pierce's lack of standing to contest the City's award of a contract to another bidder.1 We reverse.2
The relevant facts follow. In 2004, the City wanted to purchase fourteen fire trucks and decided to award the contract through the use of a request for proposal ("RFP"). The RFP was issued on March 14, 2004, and provided, in part:
Section 4.0 Evaluation
4.1 The following criteria will be evaluated when reviewing the proposals:
a. Technical Criteria: Proposals will be evaluated according to completeness, content, degree to which matches the specifications, etc.
b. Past Experience. Proposals will be evaluated according to completeness, content, and evidence of reliability with other Governmental entities.
c. Financial Criteria: All relevant cost factors and possible financing for this proposal.
Although three proposals were submitted, one was deemed not responsive. The remaining two responsive bids were made by Pierce and American LaFrance Corporation ("ALF"). Pierce and ALF were then invited to attend in-person negotiations at the City's offices in Fort Wayne. Prior to the negotiations, the City prepared a detailed matrix to evaluate the bids. The matrix contained eleven factors and the relative weight to be accorded to each factor in evaluating the bids. The factors and their relative weights were as follows:
Adherence to Specs 20%
Cost 24%
Warranty 10%
Delivery 13%
OEM P/N Disclosure 5%
Pre-Positioned Spare Parts 5%
Technical Support 5%
Training 5%
End User Experience 8%
References 2%
Litigation and Financial Issues 3%
____________________________________
Total 100%
Id. at 82. However, the bidders were not provided with this matrix prior to the negotiations.
Although the RFP called for independent front suspension systems in the fire trucks, the City allowed ALF to substitute an air ride system as a functional equivalent. Additionally, at the start of the negotiations, Pierce's bid was approximately $344,635 lower than ALF's price. A City representative then told ALF that its price was "not competitive" or that its price was "[n]ot competitive with the target pricing" prepared by the City. Appellee's Appendix at 36; Appellant's Appendix at 68. No such statement was made to Pierce. In the next round of negotiations, ALF reduced its price by more than $344,635. After the negotiations, the matrix resulted in a score of 43.3 points to ALF out of a possible score of 50 points and a score of 42.4 points to Pierce. The City awarded the contract to ALF.
Pierce filed a complaint against the City and alleged that the City violated the Public Purchasing Act, Ind.Code §§ 5-22. Specifically, Pierce alleged that the City violated: (1) Ind.Code § 5-22-9-2 by failing to include a statement concerning the relative importance of price and other evaluative factors in the RFP; (2) Ind. Code § 5-22-9-7 by taking into consideration factors not specified in the RFP; (3) Ind.Code § 5-22-9-10 by using factors and criteria in its evaluations other than those specified in the RFP; and (4) Ind. Code § 5-22-9-9 by failing to accord Pierce "fair and equal treatment with respect to any opportunity for discussion and revision of proposals." Appellant's Appendix at 9. Pierce asked that the award of the contract to ALF be set aside and that the City be compelled to reissue a lawful RFP and comply with the statutory procedures.
Pierce filed a motion for summary judgment, and the City filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a cross motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the City's motion to dismiss, granting Pierce's motion for summary judgment, and denying the City's motion for summary judgment. The trial court ordered that the City's "determination to award the Contract, pursuant to Request for Proposal #2073, to [ALF], is hereby SET ASIDE" and remanded the case to the City "with instructions to conduct further proceedings in strict conformity with Indiana statute." Appellant's Appendix at 4.
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the City's motion to dismiss based upon Pierce's lack of standing to contest the City's award of a contract to another bidder. Although the City apparently filed its motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, motions to dismiss for lack of standing are properly brought under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim. Huffman v. Office of Envtl. Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ind.2004). Therefore, we will determine whether the trial court's denial of the City's motion to dismiss is sustainable under that rule. When reviewing a ruling on an Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, we must take as true all allegations upon the face of the complaint. Id. at 814. We may dismiss only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any set of facts admissible under the allegations of the complaint. Id. Upon review, we view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw every reasonable inference in favor of that party. Id.
The City argues that the trial court should have granted its motion to dismiss because an unsuccessful bidder lacks standing to sue based upon 100 years of Indiana jurisprudence. On the other hand, Pierce argues that the trial court properly denied the City's motion to dismiss based upon the language of the Public Purchasing Act, Ind.Code § 5-22.
Resolution of this issue requires that we interpret the Public Purchasing Act. When interpreting a statute, we independently review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case under review. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.2002). Thus, we need not defer to a trial court's interpretation of the statute's meaning. Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind.2001). "The first step in interpreting any Indiana statute is to determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question." St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Center, Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 703-704 (Ind.2002). If a statute is unambiguous, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning. Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 204. A statute is unambiguous if it is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. Elmer Buchta Trucking, 744 N.E.2d at 942. However, if a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations we must try to ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent. Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 204. We presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results. Id.
Pierce brought its claims against the City under Indiana's Public Purchasing Statute, Ind.Code § 5-22. The Public Purchasing Statute was enacted in 1997 and, in general, governs "every expenditure of public funds by a governmental body" subject to certain exceptions and limitations. Ind.Code §§ 5-22-1-1, 5-22-1-2, 5-22-1-3. For example, the Public Purchasing Statute does not apply to public works projects. I.C. § 5-22-1-3(a). Among other things, the statutes provide guidance on competitive bidding procedures, online reverse auctions, and requests for proposals.
The Public Purchasing Statute also contains a chapter dealing with judicial review of "determinations."3 Ind.Code § 5-22-9. Ind.Code § 5-22-9-1 provides: "The determinations required by this article are final and conclusive, and subject to judicial review under section 2 of this chapter." Section two of the chapter provides:
(a) A person aggrieved by a determination under this article may file a petition for judicial review of that determination in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced by a determination that is any of the following:
(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
(2) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.
(3) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.
(4) Without observance of procedure required by law.
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence.
Ind.Code § 5-22-9-2. Further,
(a) If the court finds that a person has been substantially prejudiced by a determination, the court may set aside the determination. The court may remand the case to the governmental body for further proceedings and compel an action by the governmental body that has been unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld.
(b) A court may not award damages in an action under this chapter.
Ind.Code § 5-22-19-5. The chapter also notes that "[a]n Indiana taxpayer has standing to":
(1) challenge a determination made under IC 5-22-15-25(d); and
(2) enforce a contract provision required by IC 5-22-17-14 if the contract is...
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