City of Gainesville v. Dodd

• Citation: 275 Ga. 834,573 S.E.2d 369
• Decision Date: 25 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. S01G1717.,S01G1717.
• Parties: CITY OF GAINESVILLE v. DODD et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

573 S.E.2d 369

275 Ga. 834

CITY OF GAINESVILLE v. DODD et al.

No. S01G1717.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

November 25, 2002.

Reconsideration Denied December 13, 2002.

Freeman Mathis & Gary, Benton J. Mathis Jr., Mary A. Ackourey, Atlanta, for appellant.

Jack E. Dodd, Richard C. Bellows, Gainesville, for appellees. HINES, Justice.

In Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 250 Ga. App. 722, 551 S.E.2d 62 (2001), the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant City of Gainesville. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to address arguments that the City asserted warranted the grant of summary judgment, but that had not been addressed by the trial court. Finding that the Court of Appeals did not err, we affirm.

Jack Dodd retired from the City's police department in June, 1995, and began to receive a retirement pension. Three years later, the City notified Dodd that he was only entitled to receive a lower pension payment and that his monthly benefits would be reduced. The City also notified Dodd that he should repay the City for the overpaid benefits.

Dodd sued the City, asserting contract and tort claims. He contended that the City informed him that he would receive the higher payment and that he had relied on that representation in deciding to retire. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that: (1) the City could not be held liable in tort for the miscalculation of retirement benefits inasmuch as Dodd had the same chance as the City to calculate the retirement benefits; and (2) the City could not be liable to Dodd for breach of contract because he was an at-will employee.

Dodd appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether Dodd had an equal opportunity to determine the proper retirement benefits. Dodd, supra at 722-723(1), 551 S.E.2d 62. The Court of Appeals also stated that the at-will employee doctrine did not bar Dodd's breach of contract claim because Dodd's claim was based on a contract to pay retirement benefits, not current employment, and thus the trial court's rationale for granting summary judgment was erroneous. Id. at 723-724(2), 551 S.E.2d 62. The City asserted in its motion for reconsideration, as it had in its appellee's brief, that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was nonetheless the correct disposition of the case, based upon several other grounds raised in its motion for summary judgment, but not ruled on by the trial court, and that the Court of Appeals should address these grounds under the "right for any reason" rule.¹ The Court of Appeals refused to address these grounds because they were not addressed below, and stated that the "right for any reason" rule does not apply when it is apparent that the trial court's ruling is based on an incorrect legal theory. Id. at 724(3), 551 S.E.2d 62. The trial court detailed its reasons for granting summary judgment, and there is no question that its legal analysis was erroneous.

Under the "right for any reason" rule, an appellate court will affirm a judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason is different than the reason upon which the trial court relied. See Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gwinnett I Ltd. Partnership, 265 Ga. 645, 458 S.E.2d 632 (1995). In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals stated that "a trial court's grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if it is right for any reason, [but] this is true only if it is not apparent that the trial court relied on an erroneous legal theory." Dodd, supra at 724(3), 551 S.E.2d 62. Dodd contends that this is a correct statement of the law and that there is, in effect, an "erroneous legal theory" exception to the "right for any reason" rule. The City of Gainesville, however, contends that there is no exception to the rule and that a trial court's ruling on summary judgment should be affirmed if it is correct, even when the trial court relied upon incorrect reasoning or theory of law.

At first glance, this Court's statements on this issue appear to be inconsistent. In Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652(3), 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997), we stated that "[i]f it is not apparent that the trial court relied on an erroneous legal theory, its grant of summary judgment is to be affirmed if it is right for any reason." See also Russ v. Russ, 272 Ga. 438, 440(1), 530 S.E.2d 469 (2000) ("The trial court did not base its decision upon any deficiency in the evidence of earning capacity, but rather upon the erroneous legal theory that there was no basis to authorize an award of child support. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error, and this Court cannot affirm the judgment by application of the `right for any reason' rule."); Gwinnett County v. Davis, 268 Ga. 653, 655, 492 S.E.2d 523 (1997) ("The judgment of the trial court is based on an erroneous legal conclusion.... Where it is apparent that a trial court's judgment rests on an erroneous legal theory, an appellate court cannot affirm.").

Yet in Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 565(3)(c), 554 S.E.2d 465 (2001), we stated that "[t]his Court will affirm the judgment of a lower court so long as it is right for any reason, even if it is based upon erroneous reasoning." See also Abellera v. Williamson, 274 Ga. 324, 326-327(2), 553 S.E.2d 806 (2001) (holding that the Court of Appeals should have applied the "right for any reason" rule, even though the trial court had made an error of law and did not address other asserted bases for summary judgment.).

Both the "right for any reason" rule and the "erroneous legal theory" exception to that rule have been applied for a considerable number of years. This Court stated in 1871, "[t]here will be no reversal of a judgment, if it was right, upon any ground apparent from the record." L.J. Glenn & Son v. Shearer, 44 Ga. 16(2) (1871). And it would appear that through its history, the rule has been phrased so as to lead to the conclusion that it is applied even when the trial court's ruling is based on a legal error. See Coker v. Atlanta, 186 Ga. 473, 475, 198 S.E. 74 (1938) ("`It is a principle ... ancient and well settled that a correct decision of a trial court will not be reversed,' regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of the reasons given therefor."); State of Ga. v. Johnson, 214 Ga. 607, 611, 106 S.E.2d 353 (1958) ("A correct judgment is not erroneous because the judge may have entered it for reasons other than those which required the judgment."); Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 267(3), 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968) ("A judgment right for any reason will be affirmed by the appellate courts."); Turner v. Baggett Transp., 128 Ga.App. 801, 806(4), 198 S.E.2d 412 (1973) ("[W]here the judgment of the trial court is proper and legal for any reason it will be affirmed, regardless of the reason assigned.").

Similarly, cases stating that the trial court will be reversed when it relied on an erroneous legal theory or applied incorrect reasoning appear throughout the history of the appellate courts. See, e.g., Carter v. State of Ga., 93 Ga.App. 12, 21(7), 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955) (The trial court, "acting upon an erroneous concept of the law, binding him, as he thinks, upon a single point, and so acting fails to determine the questions of fact involved in the controversy, the case will be reversed by this court and remanded with direction that the trial court again review the evidence in the record and from it determine the issue of fact."); Watson v. Elberton-Elbert County Hosp. Auth., 229 Ga. 26, 27, 189 S.E.2d 66 (1972) ("[As] the judgment rendered is based upon an erroneous view of the law which would preclude the exercise of a discretion, a new trial results."); Ayers v. Yancey Bros. Co., 141 Ga.App. 358, 361(2), 233 S.E.2d 471 (1977) ("`Ordinarily, a judgment right for any reason must be affirmed, but where it is apparent that the court rests its judgment on reasons which are erroneous or upon an erroneous legal theory, it commits reversible error.'"); Meyers v. Glover, 152 Ga.App. 679, 683(3), 263 S.E.2d 539 (1979), overruled on other grounds, McCord v. Jones, 168 Ga.App. 891, 893, 311 S.E.2d 209 (1983) ("[J]udgments based on erroneous theories of law are generally reversed in the appellate courts."); Derbyshire v. United Bldrs. Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 843(1), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990) ("The right for any reason principle does not rise to save the day because a judgment based on an erroneous legal conclusion or theory is reversible error."); Sumner v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Ga.App. 91, 93-94(2), 483 S.E.2d 602 (1997) ("While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason [cite.], it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial court rested its judgment upon an erroneous legal theory; in such instances the trial court commits reversible error.")

These statements, repeated in many other cases as well, appear to give inconsistent guidance to the appellate courts as to the proper course to follow when the trial courts make legal errors. However, the two different approaches reflect that the appellate courts often must exercise discretion in determining what is the best course to pursue in any given case. Two competing principles are at the heart of these cases. One, that when reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, the appellate court conducts a de novo review: "`On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.'" Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 274 Ga. 801, 804(2), 560 S.E.2d 650 (2002), quoting ...