City of Glasgow v. Duncan

Citation437 S.W.2d 199
PartiesCITY OF GLASGOW, Kentucky, Appellant, v. Robert Clifton DUNCAN, Appellee.
Decision Date07 February 1969
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Joe L. Travis, Glasgow, for appellant.

Robert M. Alexander, Glasgow, for appellee.

HERMAN G. JORRIS, Special Commissioner.

This appeal is from an order of the Barren Circuit Court setting aside a decision of the common council of the City of Glasgow, a third-class city, wherein Robert Clifton Duncan was discharged as a sergeant of the Glasgow police force. The trial court ordered that Duncan be reinstated.

Robert Clifton Duncan, a police officer of the City of Glasgow for six years, was discharged by the common council for conduct unbecoming a police officer, on being found guilty of two of four specific charges, three of which were heard by the trial court on appeal and will be mentioned here.

The first charge concerned the alteration of an accident report involving a police cruiser in which Duncan was riding and was injured. Duncan admits he changed the report to indicate his injury but did not do so with any attempt to deceive or to receive any gain therefrom, nor does the record indicate otherwise.

The second charge against Duncan was that he accepted employment as a guard from Gibson Discount Store in violation of KRS 61.310, and that during his employment a valuable watch was stolen. There is not one iota of evidence in the record by which Duncan could be connected with the disappearance of the watch; and each witness for the appellant in that regard testified that they had no reason to suspect him. Further, the evidence clearly shows that Duncan complied with the city's rules regarding outside employment and his employment with Gibson Discount Store was approved by his superior, the chief of police.

Thirdly, Duncan was charged with transporting a large quantity of alcoholic beverages from the 31--W Liquor Store in Bowling Green to Glasgow, Kentucky. Duncan was found innocent on this charge by the council but the same evidence was heard by the trial court in the de novo hearing and nothing appears in the record which convinced the trial court otherwise.

The city council occupies the same role here as did the school board in Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of Education, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607; therefore, the trial de novo required by KRS 95.460 was properly conducted.

Appellant argues that the evidence produced before the trial court did not preponderate against the findings and action of the city.

The court...

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3 cases
  • Fournier v. City of Lawrenceburg, No. 2007-CA-000490-MR (Ky. App. 4/11/2008)
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2008
    ...argues that the council is not a necessary party to his appeal because the council was not named as a party in City of Glasgow v. Duncan, 437 S.W.2d 199 (Ky. 1969), City of Owensboro v. Noffsinger, 280 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1955), City of Richmond v. Howell, 448 S.W.2d 662 (Ky. 1969), Stallins v.......
  • City of Richmond v. Howell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • December 12, 1969
    ...that by judicial construction, the judicial review provided by the statute is something less than purely de novo. In City of Glasgow v. Duncan, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 199, there is dictum to the effect that at the circuit court hearing level the evidence must be reasonably sufficient to warrant re......
  • Brady v. Pettit
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • July 3, 1979
    ... ...         Harrell v. City of Middlesboro, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 614, 615 (1956), without referring to Grady, eroded the classic de ... No reference is made to Kilburn or Harrell ...         City of Glasgow v. Duncan, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 199 (1969), involved the dismissal of a police officer. The opinion ... ...

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