City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 9889

• Decision Date: 25 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 9889,9889
• Citation: 307 N.W.2d 572
• Parties: CITY OF GRAND FORKS, a municipal corporation, Petitioner, Appellant and Cross- Appellee, v. GRAND FORKS HERALD, INC., Respondent and Appellee, S. D. Knutson, Respondent, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 572

307 N.W.2d 572

27 A.L.R.4th 667

CITY OF GRAND FORKS, a municipal corporation, Petitioner Appellant and Cross- Appellee, v. GRAND FORKS HERALD, INC., Respondent and Appellee S. D. Knutson, Respondent, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Civ. No. 9889.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

June 25, 1981.

Jay H. Fiedler, Asst. City Atty., Grand Forks, for petitioner, appellant and cross-appellee City of Grand Forks.

Thomas John Kuchera, Grand Forks for respondent and appellee Grand Forks Herald, Inc.

Mack, Moosbrugger, Ohlsen, Dvorak, Grand Forks, for respondent, appellee and cross appellant S. D. Knutson; John H. Moosbrugger, Grand Forks, on brief.

PAULSON, Justice.

The City of Grand Forks appeals from a judgment entered against it by the District Court of Grand Forks County on October 29, 1980. The judgment decreed that the Grand Forks Herald had a right to inspect the personnel file of S. D. Knutson, the former chief of police for the City of Grand Forks, because the personnel file maintained by the city's personnel director constituted a "public record" within the meaning of Article XI, § 6 of the North Dakota Constitution and § 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code. We affirm.

Knutson was employed by the City as chief of police until August 20, 1973, when he resigned from such position. In 1980 Knutson was a candidate for the office of county commissioner of Grand Forks County. On August 18, 1980, a reporter for the Grand Forks Herald appeared in the office of Jason Graba, the personnel director for the City, and requested an opportunity to inspect the City's records relating to Knutson's employment and the terms and conditions of a negotiated settlement of resignation between the City and Knutson. Graba refused to allow the reporter to inspect the records.

The City commenced this action on August 25, 1980. In its complaint, the City stated that the documents in the personnel file of Knutson are not subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the provisions of § 44-04-18, N.D.C.C. In its prayer for relief, the City requested a declaratory judgment determining the rights and liabilities of the parties and also determining whether or not personnel files are public records subject to public inspection. The Grand Forks Herald sought a writ of mandamus, but its request was denied. The Herald submitted its answer on September 15, 1980, and asserted that the City did not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment under § 32-23-02, N.D.C.C.; that the City's complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted; and that the City's claim was frivolous. Knutson submitted his answer on September 15, 1980, and asserted that the Herald had no legitimate reason for inspecting the contents of his personnel file because he was no longer involved in politics. The North Dakota Newspaper Association, an organization composed of the State's daily and weekly newspapers, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

A hearing was held on September 17, 1980, in which Graba testified as to particular items generally found in personnel files maintained by the City. Graba did not testify as to which documents were specifically contained in the Knutson file but he testified that the personnel files maintained by the City generally contained the following documents: work evaluations, salary changes, IRS forms, insurance matters, retirement matters, union dues, medical insurance coverage, credit reports, and reports relating to mental illness or alcoholism. The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment on October 20, 1980. The district court determined that the City had a right to declaratory relief under Chapter 32-23, N.D.C.C.; and that the personnel file maintained by the City was a public record within the meaning of Article XI, § 6 of the North Dakota Constitution, and § 44-04-18, N.D.C.C. The district court did not open or review the contents of Knutson's personnel file. Judgment was entered against the City on October 29, 1980.

The City filed its notice of appeal on October 29, 1980, and on November 4, 1980, the City presented a motion to the district court for an order staying the enforcement of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal. The district court issued an order which stayed the enforcement of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal on November 4, 1980.

Knutson presented a motion for a new trial and an alternative motion to amend the judgment on November 7, 1980. Knutson also submitted to the district court a petition for supplemental relief. He requested that the district court make an in camera inspection of his personnel file to determine if any of the contents of the file did not constitute a public record. This court issued an order on January 9, 1981, which remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The district court issued an order on January 28, 1981, in which the court not only denied Knutson's request for supplemental relief, but also his motions for a new trial and for an amended judgment. The district court did not conduct an in camera inspection of Knutson's personnel file. Knutson filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and from the January 28, 1981, order issued by the district court.

The parties to this appeal present three issues for our consideration:

1. Whether or not Knutson's right to due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, § 1 of the North Dakota Constitution was violated by the procedures used by the district court in the case.

2. Whether or not municipal personnel files are public records subject to disclosure pursuant to § 44-04-18, N.D.C.C.

3. Whether or not the disclosure of the contents of his personnel file would constitute an impermissible invasion of Knutson's privacy.

I

The first issue concerns whether or not Knutson's right to due process and equal protection was violated by the procedures used by the district court. Knutson contends that the rapid scheduling of the trial did not allow him any time to prepare for trial or to conduct discovery proceedings. Trial was scheduled two days after Knutson submitted his answer. In addition, Knutson contends that the failure of the City to give notice of entry of judgment was a defect which renders the notice of appeal defective.

Knutson contends that his rights to due process were violated in three areas. First, he contends that he did not have time to prepare for trial and therefore did not have adequate representation of counsel. Second, Knutson contends that any information contained in his personnel file is not subject to inspection because disclosure would violate his right to pursue an occupation and protect his reputation under Article I, § 1 of the North Dakota Constitution. Finally, Knutson contends that he was never given notice of the items contained in his personnel file, nor was he given the opportunity to review its contents.

Rule 57 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

"RULE 57 DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

"The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to chapter 32-23, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar."

The procedure in actions for a declaratory judgment is similar to that in an ordinary civil action. However, Rule 57, N.D.R.Civ.P., also contains a provision which allows the court to order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and the court may also advance the case on the calendar. A similar provision is contained in Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Implicit in Rule 57 is the assumption that prior to the order for a speedy hearing, the matter at issue will have been joined by the filing of a responsive pleading. Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F.Supp. 853 (D.Mass.1973), affirmed without opinion 502 F.2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973).

The purpose of the provision is to enable the court to expedite adjudication in a proper case in order to prevent the accrual of damages or to further the early adjudication of a controversy. 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 57.29; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2751 and § 2768. The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 20 L.Ed. 80 (1870). However, the nature of procedural due process is such that the procedures used are not inflexible. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). The procedure authorized by Rule 57 for a speedy hearing in an action for a declaratory judgment does not violate due process because it advances many worthy objectives with a minimal degree of interference with personal rights. In addition, Rule 57 must be liberally construed to attain the objectives of the declaratory remedy, that is, § 32-23-12, N.D.C.C. Knutson's contentions are more properly the bases for determining whether or not the district court abused its discretion by imposing a limitation upon the period within which Knutson could conduct discovery proceedings and otherwise prepare for the trial. Because Knutson contends that the district court's actions were detrimental to him, he must establish that the district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. Wall v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W.2d 208, 218 (1979). Abuse of discretion by the trial court is never assumed and must be affirmatively established. Davis v. Davis, 268 N.W.2d 769 (N.D.1978). Knutson has failed to establish how the district court's...