City of Greenville v. Second Injury Fund, No. 3115.
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | HUFF. |
Citation | 528 S.E.2d 91,339 S.C. 141 |
Parties | CITY OF GREENVILLE, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA SECOND INJURY FUND, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 07 February 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 3115. |
339 S.C. 141
528 S.E.2d 91
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA SECOND INJURY FUND, Respondent
No. 3115.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard December 7, 1999.
Decided February 7, 2000.
Chief Counsel Brooks Shealy, of South Carolina Second Injury Fund, of Columbia, for respondent.
HUFF, Judge:
In this Worker's Compensation case, the City of Greenville (City) appeals from a circuit court order affirming the Full Commission's finding the City was not entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for substantially increased medical or compensation expenses paid to John Gilstrap. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 27, 1991, John Gilstrap, a sergeant with the City of Greenville Police Department, fell thirty to forty feet while repelling during a department training exercise. As a result of the fall, Gilstrap sustained severe injuries including: a burst fracture at L1; a sacral fracture; a pelvic fracture; foot strain; symphysial diastasis with bladder herniating between the diastasis; and a neurogenic bladder. Gilstrap
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The City of Greenville contended Gilstrap's preexisting degenerative disk disease combined with his injuries to cause substantially greater disability and medical costs than would have resulted from the injuries alone. To obtain reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, the City filed a form 54 with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Fund countered with a form 55 which denied the City's allegation Gilstrap's injuries and expenses were substantially increased by a preexisting impairment and simultaneously moved any hearing on the matter be delayed until Gilstrap received a Final Award or agreement for his disability.
On June 17, 1997, the Single Commissioner denied the Fund's motion to delay a determination. The Commissioner's Order concluded: 1) substantially all of Gilstrap's disability was caused by the fall rather than his preexisting condition; 2) Gilstrap is a paraplegic as a result of the fall and cannot suffer greater disability under S.C.Code Ann. Section 42-9-10 (1985) than that caused by the paraplegia; 3) the City did not meet the knowledge requirement of S.C.Code Ann. Section 42-9-400(c) (1985) regarding Gilstrap's left knee; and 4) there is no evidence Gilstrap incurred greater medical expenses due to his preexisting condition.
The Single Commissioner's findings and conclusions were affirmed in toto by the Full Appellate Panel on February 10, 1998. The circuit court also affirmed the Order of the Full Commission on July 27, 1998.
On appeal, the City argues it is entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund. The legislative purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to "encourage the employment of disabled or handicapped persons without penalizing an employer with greater liability if the employee is injured because of his preexisting condition." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. South...
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...of fact made by the Appellate Panel if they are supported by substantial evidence); City of Greenville v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 339 S.C. 141, 146-47, 528 S.E.2d 91, 93-94 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding the refusal of City's request for compensation from the Fund was proper when (1) the employe......
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...of fact made by the Appellate Panel if they are supported by substantial evidence); City of Greenville v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 339 S.C. 141, 146-47, 528 S.E.2d 91, 93-94 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding the refusal of City's request for compensation from the Fund was proper when (1) the employe......
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...or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 339 S.C. 141 incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." The trial court declined the re......
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...of fact made by the Appellate Panel if they are supported by substantial evidence); City of Greenville v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 339 S.C. 141, 146-47, 528 S.E.2d 91, 93-94 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding the refusal of City's request for compensation from the Fund was proper when (1) the employe......
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