City of Greenwood v. MARTIN MARIETTA MATL.

• Decision Date: 25 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. WD 70495.,WD 70495.
• Citation: 311 S.W.3d 258
• Parties: CITY OF GREENWOOD, Missouri, Respondent, v. MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC., and Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

311 S.W.3d 258

CITY OF GREENWOOD, Missouri, Respondent, v. MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC., and Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, Appellants.

No. WD 70495.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

February 9, 2010.

As Modified March 30, 2010.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 30, 2010.

Application for Transfer Denied May 25, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Mary D. Winter, and Anthony L. DeWitt, Jefferson City, MO, Brian J. Madden, R.B. Miller, III, and R. Kent Sellers, Kansas City, MO, H. Waynes Phears, Atlanta, GA, for Appellants.

Steven E. Mauer and Heather S. Esau Zerger, Kansas City, MO, Brian C. walsh, St. Louis, Mo, for Respondent.

Before Division III: JAMES EDWARD WELSH, Presiding Judge, and MARK D. PFEIFFER and KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judges.

KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri ("trial court"), granting a permanent injunction to the City of Greenwood, Missouri ("Greenwood"), prohibiting trucks transporting rock from a quarry run by Appellants Martin Marietta Materials and Hunt Martin Materials (collectively, "Quarry")¹ from using a particular road route through Greenwood to Missouri Highway 150. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background²

Greenwood is a fourth-class city of approximately 4,000 residents located in southern Jackson County, Missouri. Quarry has been in operation just south of Greenwood for more than fifty years. There are two routes available for trucks transporting rock from Quarry to Highway 150, the main east-west route in the area. The route in dispute in this case runs from 150 Highway south along Second Avenue and a few other side streets to Quarry. This route, known as the Second-Avenue route, is a narrow country road that passes through a residential area and a commercial area on the eastern edge of Greenwood. Prior to June of 2006, Greenwood designated Second Avenue as its only permitted truck route.

In June of 2006, due to concern over high-volume truck traffic, Greenwood enacted an ordinance that limited the weight of trucks that could use Second Avenue. On January 26, 2007, the ordinance was declared to be inconsistent with Missouri law and thus invalid by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ("federal court").³ Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. City of Greenwood, No. 06-0697-CV-W-DW, 2007 WL 5193731 (W.D.Mo. Jan.26, 2007).

In February of 2007, Greenwood passed another ordinance that prohibited all commercial vehicles from using Greenwood streets unless a street had been designated a "Commercial Use Route" ("new ordinance"). At that point, no Greenwood street was designated as a Commercial Use Route. Quarry brought an action in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the new ordinance alleging that Greenwood, in enacting the ordinance, breached a 1991 contract between Quarry and Greenwood and violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Greenwood brought its own action in the Circuit Court of Jackson County for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the new ordinance was valid under Missouri law. Quarry removed Greenwood's state case to federal court, but it was remanded because the federal court found that, while asserting a defense to a federal action in a parallel state court case normally supports removal, a simple declaratory judgment action brought by a state entity to uphold the state constitutionality of its actions is not within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal court. Thus, based on the limited relief sought in the initial petition, this case was remanded to the state court. City of Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 2007 WL 1859192 (W.D.Mo. June 26, 2007).

Greenwood subsequently amended its state court pleading to add two counts for public nuisance (based on the high volume of truck traffic on Second Avenue); a count for trespass; and a count for negligence (based on Quarry's prior attempts to repair Second Avenue). Greenwood's petition asked for money damages and punitive damages in addition to the declaratory judgment sought in count I. Nowhere in the petition did Greenwood request injunctive relief. Greenwood also did not allege irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedies. The petition did include a general prayer for such other relief as the court deemed just and proper.

On June 26, 2007, the federal court granted Quarry a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new ordinance on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Quarry trucks began using Second Avenue again on July 1, 2007.

On March 5, 2008, a jury trial commenced in state court on Greenwood's negligent repair, nuisance, and trespass claims. On March 14, 2008, the jury returned verdicts for Greenwood for $1.9 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages on the claims of negligent repair and public nuisance. The jury found for Quarry on the trespass claim. The trial court entered judgment on counts II through V on March 17, 2008, in accordance with the jury verdicts. Quarry filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, which were denied in two documents also denominated as judgments on May 6, 2008. On May 16, 2008, Quarry filed a notice of appeal of the May 6 judgment.

Meanwhile, on April 1, 2008, Greenwood filed a motion for a permanent injunction in the state case, asking the trial court to prohibit Quarry truck traffic on Second Avenue.

On June 13, 2008, count I (seeking declaratory judgment) was tried to the court, and on June 16, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment declaring that Greenwood's revised quarry ordinance was valid under Missouri law. On June 30, 2008, Quarry filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's declaratory judgment on count I and all four documents the trial court had denominated as judgments.⁴

A hearing on Greenwood's motion for injunctive relief was initially set for July 11, 2008. Before the hearing, Greenwood sought clarification from the federal court of whether the previously granted federal preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the new ordinance prohibited Greenwood from seeking a state court injunction regarding the same ordinance. The federal court refused to grant Greenwood an "advisory opinion" on whether proceeding with the state court injunction action would place Greenwood in contempt of the previous federal order.

In its order, the federal court indicated that it was "disturbed by the state of affairs in this dispute and increasingly frustrated by the conduct of Greenwood." Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. City of Greenwood, No. 06-0697-CV-W-DW, 2008 WL 2700062, at *1 (W.D.Mo. July 10, 2008). Responding to Greenwood's assertion that there was a "rift" between the federal and state court, the federal court held Greenwood responsible for "splitting this cause of action and arguing inconsistent positions before each court." Id. The federal court strongly intimated that had Greenwood's injunctive claim been pleaded earlier, the case would have proceeded differently.

Although this court had an opportunity to consolidate these cases when the state court action was removed, remand was required based on the record before it at the time of removal. The Court is of the opinion that if all issues and claims had been honestly presented during the early phases of this dispute, either here or in state court, the present predicament would have been avoided.

Id. The July 11 hearing in state court was continued.

On September 3, 2008, while the appeal of the state court action was pending in this court, the trial court held a status conference. At that time, Greenwood still wanted the trial court to rule on its motion for injunctive relief filed April 1, 2008. Quarry argued at the status conference that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to offer any further relief, as judgment had been entered on each count in the amended petition and the matter was pending on appeal. In response to Quarry's concerns, the trial court recommended that Greenwood file a new petition seeking injunctive relief. Greenwood did so on September 4, 2008. On the same day, the federal court entered a permanent injunction barring Greenwood from taking any action that prohibits all through truck traffic through the city. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. City of Greenwood, No. 06-697-CV-W-DW, 2008 WL 4832638, at *8 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 4, 2008).

On September 23, 2008, Quarry removed the newly filed state injunctive action to federal court. The next day, Greenwood voluntarily dismissed that action and filed a notice of hearing on its April 1, 2008 motion for injunctive relief under the number of the state-court case pending appeal. The state trial court held a hearing on Greenwood's motion for injunction on November 12, 2008. Quarry again objected to the trial court's jurisdiction to decide the matter since the case was pending on appeal. On November 17, 2008, 154 days after entering judgment on the last pleaded count in Greenwood's petition, the trial court entered judgment giving Greenwood an injunction prohibiting quarry trucks, and only quarry trucks, from using Second Avenue. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

An action seeking injunction is an action in equity. The standard of review in a court-tried equity action is the same as for any court-tried case; the trial court's judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

To the extent that a trial court's grant of injunctive relief involves weighing the evidence presented, determining the credibility of witnesses, and formulating an injunction of the appropriate scope, ...