City of Guntersville v. Bishop

• Decision Date: 02 May 1997
• Citation: 728 So.2d 605
• Parties: CITY OF GUNTERSVILLE and the Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund v. Maylond T. BISHOP.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

728 So.2d 605

CITY OF GUNTERSVILLE and the Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund v. Maylond T. BISHOP.

2951497.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 2, 1997.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1997.

Tom Burgess and Murray H. Gibson, Jr., of Burgess & Hale, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellants.

R. Wayne Wolfe and Shannon M. Smith of Wolfe, Jones & Boswell, Huntsville, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Maylond T. Bishop, a paraplegic workers' compensation claimant, requested reimbursement for the purchase price of a Chevrolet van, from the City of Guntersville and the Municipal Compensation Fund (collectively referred to hereinafter as "the City"). The City filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the Marshall County Circuit Court, seeking a determination that it is not obligated to reimburse Bishop for the purchase price of the van. The parties filed a joint stipulation of facts and, after considering briefs and arguments, the trial court issued a final judgment that stated:

"Able counsel for both sides have briefed the issue involved in the cross motions for Summary Judgment. In essence: is a lift equipped van `other apparatus' and `reasonably necessary' for a worker who has lost complete use of his legs under [§ 25-5-77, Ala.Code 1975]? No controlling Alabama law is cited. The court could wish the legislature would definitively decide the issue. The court must do the best it can and hope that the parties will submit the matter to higher tribunals to fully settle the matter. While the question may not arise often, its resolution deeply impacts on the life of the injured worker and could make a substantial dent in the bottom line for the employer. The court feels that the better rule is to require the employer to pay the costs of a lift equipped van, in excess of the cost of a vehicle which would be purchased and used by one occupying the station in life the worker now occupies, given his income as a disabled person. Such a result, however, requires this court to perform a legislative function and create rules from thin air to arrive at a dollar figure it deems just. Such a ruling being improper, this court FINDS, HOLDS and ORDERS that under the stipulations reached in this case, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant/worker is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The court finds that such lift equipped van, in this case, is a reasonably necessary apparatus and that the plaintiff/employer is responsible for its cost."

The City appeals, raising two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in holding that a van or other motor vehicle constitutes a "medical apparatus" within the meaning of § 25-5-77(a), Ala.Code 1975; and (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that the purchase of a van was a reasonably necessary medical expense.

On July 16, 1993, Bishop was shot in the back by an assailant during the course of his employment as a police officer with the City of Guntersville. The wound rendered Bishop a paraplegic. The trial court entered judgment on June 16, 1995, finding Bishop totally and permanently disabled and awarding him lifetime workers' compensation benefits in the amount of $328.87 per week. The City was ordered to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by Bishop relating to his injury.

In March 1995, Bishop purchased a 1994 Chevrolet van for $24,500. The City paid for a wheelchair lift to be installed in the van, but it refused to reimburse Bishop for the purchase price of the van, claiming it was not a medical expense covered by the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act.

Bishop tendered letters from two physicians specializing in rehabilitative medicine to support his request for reimbursement of the purchase price of the van. Dr. Laura Kezar stated that she was treating Bishop for chronic pain syndrome because of his spinal cord injury. She further stated that his injuries had been complicated by the development of severe overuse syndromes involving the bilateral upper extremities. She also stated that Bishop had recently undergone carpal tunnel release at the right wrist, and that it is "medically necessary that Bishop obtain a van with a wheelchair lift in order to restore his mobility to the highest possible level of independent functioning." Dr. C.T. Huang stated that "as a result of this permanent injury, the patient needs a van for transportation."

We note that the trial court decided this case based on documentary evidence and stipulations by the parties; therefore, we review the trial court's judgment without any presumption of correctness. Crowley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 53 (Ala.1991); see also Craig Constr. Co. v. Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752 (Ala.1990)

.

Because the basic facts are undisputed, our review of this case focuses on whether the correct legal conclusions have been drawn from the evidence. That determination depends upon the proper construction of § 25-5-77(a).

"The court's fundamental duty in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislative intent by examining the language used in the statute, as well as the policy to be promoted and the ends sought by the application of the statute. Ex parte Holladay, 466 So.2d 956 (Ala.1985). The court must interpret provisions of the workers' compensation statute liberally to accomplish its `beneficent purposes, and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the [worker].' American Tennis Courts, Inc. v. Hinton, 378 So.2d 235, 237 (Ala.Civ.App.),cert. den.,378 So.2d 239 (Ala.1979)."

Ross v. Ellard Const. Co., 686 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).

Section 25-5-77(a) states, in pertinent part:

"In addition to the compensation provided in this article and Article 4 of this chapter, the employer, where applicable, shall pay the actual cost of the repair, refitting, or replacement of artificial members damaged as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and the employer, except as otherwise provided in this amendatory act, shall pay an amount not to exceed the prevailing rate or maximum schedule of fees as established herein of reasonably necessary medical and surgical treatment and attention, physical rehabilitation, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, crutches, artificial members, and other apparatus as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment."

(Emphasis added.)

I. The Van as an "Other Apparatus"

The City's first argument is that the trial court incorrectly characterized Bishop's van as an "other apparatus" under § 25-5-77(a), and that the trial court's determination that a van is a medical apparatus or a form of medical treatment reaches beyond the beneficent purpose of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act.

The scope of a claimant's right to future medical expenses pursuant to § 25-5-77(a) is an issue of first impression for this court. Our research has revealed that most of our sister states have a provision for future medical expenses included in their workers' compensation statutes. These statutes vary widely, and none is identical to § 25-5-77. However, the majority of states with statutes similar to Alabama's have held that a van is a "medical apparatus" when it has been determined to be reasonably and medically necessary. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.13(1) (West 1991); Ariz. Rev. Stats. Ann. § 23-1062(A) (1974); W.Va.Code § 23-4-3(a) (1966); Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-15(1) (1972); Iowa Code Ann. § 85.27 (1997). We consider the decisions of these states for guidance.

Arizona's workers' compensation statute is similar to Alabama's in regard to future medical expenses. Section 23-1062(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes states as follows:

"`Promptly, upon notice to the employer, every injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment, nursing, medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, including artificial members, reasonably required at the time of the injury, and during the period of disability. Such benefits shall be termed "medical, surgical and hospital benefits."' (Emphasis added)."

Quoted in Terry Grantham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Ariz. 180, 183, 741 P.2d 313, 316 (Ariz.Ct.App.1987).

Bishop relies on Grantham, supra, in support of his contention that a van can be construed as an "other apparatus." In Grantham, the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Florida Court in Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980):

"`Where an industrial injury necessitated the modification or substitution of an automobile in order to accommodate a wheelchair or artificial member and to restore in part a claimant's former ambulatory ability, such costs may be awarded as "other apparatus." Walt Disney World v. Morgan, I.R.C. Order 2-3818 (May 22, 1979). (Emphasis added).'"

Grantham, 154 Ariz. at 183, 741 P.2d at 316.

The Grantham Court explained its reliance on cases construing Florida's workers' compensation statutes by stating that the analogous Florida statute, which had been interpreted to allow motor vehicles to be treated as a medical necessity, was no broader than Arizona's statute. Further, the Grantham Court expressly rejected as unpersuasive a line of New York cases relied upon by the City in this case that had held that a motor vehicle is not a medical apparatus under the workers' compensation law (e.g., Kranis v. Trunz, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 765, 458 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1982)

; Decroix v. N. Sumergrade & Sons, 20 A.D.2d 735, 246 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1964)).

We also note that the Workers' Compensation Act of West Virginia is similar to the Alabama Act. In Crouch v. West Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'r, 184 W.Va. 730, 403 S.E.2d 747 (1991), the West Virginia Supreme Court interpreted the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act:

"[T]he fact that an automobile is not specifically named in W.Va.Code § 23-4-3(a) does not necessarily preclude its authorization. We

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