City of Guthrie v. Fraternal Order of Police

Decision Date25 January 2017
Docket NumberCase Number: 114698
Parties The CITY OF GUTHRIE, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE #105, Defendant/Appellee, and Mark Bruning, Intervenor/Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Tony G. Puckett, MCAFEE & TAFT, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant

Jarrod A. Leaman, JAMES R. MOORE & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee

R. Scott Adams, ADAMS & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Intervenor/Appellee

DEBORAH B. BARNES, JUDGE:

¶ 1 Plaintiff/Appellant The City of Guthrie, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, (the City) appeals from an order of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment by Intervenor/Appellee Mark Bruning (Bruning) to enforce an arbitration award on his behalf and that of the Defendant/Appellee Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #105 (Lodge 105), and denying the City's counter motion to vacate the "remedy portion of the award" because, for various reasons, the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). We conclude the trial court's decision should be affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Bruning was a police officer for the Guthrie Police Department. The circumstances giving rise to the arbitration occurred at a concert held in Guthrie during which Bruning arrested his then girlfriend's ex-husband for public intoxication. Bruning arrested the man despite an Incident Action Plan (IAP) issued by the Chief of Police directing officers to make arrests only as a last resort. A holding pen and other options short of arrest were available to officers. Written complaints about Bruning's actions were made to the police department and an internal investigation was conducted by the Chief of Police pursuant to the terms of the CBA. The Chief of Police then forwarded the results to a Disciplinary Hearing Panel consisting of, among others, the Human Resources Director. After a hearing in which witnesses testified, the Hearing Panel unanimously determined Bruning should be discharged for various violations of Guthrie Police Department policy and recommended termination. That determination was forwarded to the City Manager who upheld the recommendation. Bruning was terminated from employment with the City.

¶ 3 Lodge 105 filed a grievance over Bruning's discharge and, pursuant to the CBA, requested arbitration. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs.

¶ 4 The arbitrator found that "[g]iven the nature of the charges and the severity of the penalty imposed," the City had the burden "to prove by clear and convincing evidence the decision to terminate [Bruning's] employment was for just cause." Referencing the CBA's definition of just cause and that just cause was to be in accord with City of Law ton v. International Union of Police Associations, Local 24 , 2000 OK CIV APP 2 , 996 P.2d 954 , cert. denied (Mathis), the arbitrator determined: "To this arbitrator, the rule in Mathis simply states the widely accepted principle that just cause requires discipline be issued in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious." After setting forth the facts pertaining to Bruning's alleged misconduct and the facts pertaining to the conduct of the investigation and the decision-making process leading to the decision to terminate Bruning, the arbitrator determined as follows:

The City established by clear and convincing evidence that [Bruning's] conduct warranted punishment, up to and including termination. However, [I find] both parties are at fault in this matter, [Bruning] for exercising poor judgment and abuse of power, and the City Manager and Human Resources Director for being influenced by allegations without any verification. The result was an unfounded and unacceptable bias against [Bruning] during the investigation and decision making process. The City Manager and the Human Resources Director acted in a way that was arbitrary and capricious, therefore the Disciplinary Hearing Panel's finding that there was just cause for the decision to terminate [Bruning's] employment cannot stand.

The arbitrator further found severe discipline was warranted by Bruning's conduct and instructed the City to place Bruning on suspension for six months without pay and to thereafter reinstate him to his rank of Lieutenant.

¶ 5 The City filed a petition to vacate the arbitrator's decision in the trial court. Thereafter, the parties filed various pleadings and motions, including motions and counter motions for summary judgment. After considering the parties' motions, responses, and replies and supporting briefs and oral argument, the trial court denied the City's counter motion for summary judgment, granted Bruning's motion for summary judgment, and ordered enforcement of the arbitration award. The City appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 "The fundamental purpose of arbitration is to preclude court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has been provided for contractually." Voss v. City of Okla. City , 1980 OK 148 , ¶ 5, 618 P.2d 925 . The standard applicable to review of an arbitrator's award is well established in Oklahoma.

Once it is established that there is a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause broad enough to include the dispute, the role of this Court is strictly limited to determining whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement. Affording great deference to the decision of the arbitrator, we will not review the factual or legal findings of the arbitrator nor consider the merits of the award. ... Hence, this Court may only consider whether the arbitrator's decision "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."

City of Yukon v. Internat'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055 , 1990 OK 48 , ¶ 8, 792 P.2d 1176 (citations omitted).

¶ 7 Statutory construction presents a question of law, State v. Tate , 2012 OK 31 , ¶ 7, 276 P.3d 1017 , and, consequently, requires a de novo review standard, id. ; Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth. , 1993 OK 85 , ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081 .

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The City raises six issues on appeal all of which assert the district court erred in failing to vacate the remedy portion of the arbitrator's award.1 Lodge 105 and Bruning argue the arbitrator interpreted the CBA, as he is authorized to do under the CBA, and found no just cause for termination; consequently, they argue the trial court did not err in enforcing the arbitration award. We have grouped the City's propositions into three issues.

I. Just Cause for Termination

¶ 9 The City's arguments concerning the remedy portion of the arbitrator's award draws its support from prior decisions of this Court. In City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 93 , 2016 OK CIV APP 4 , 365 P.3d 82 , cert. denied , another division of this Court explained:

An arbitrator's decision or "award does not draw its essence from the CBA when it" does any of the following:
1. conflicts with express terms of the collective bargaining agreement;
2. imposes additional requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement;
3. is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of the agreement; or
4. is based on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement.

Id. ¶ 9 (citing Fraternal Order of Police v. Perkins, Lodge 142 , 2006 OK CIV APP 122 , ¶ 4, 146 P.3d 829 , cert. denied ). We conclude the arbitrator's decision in this case was within his authority under the CBA.

¶ 10 As correctly stated by the City, "[t]he arbitrator frame[d] the issue to be: Was the termination of [Bruning's] employment for just cause? If not, what is the appropriate remedy?" The issue framed by the arbitrator in this case is essentially the same as the issue framed in Lodge 93 in which the Court held the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement. There the Court concluded the arbitrator found the city demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it had just cause to terminate the grievant thereby answering the first question in the affirmative; however, the arbitrator went beyond the scope of his authority under the CBA because the arbitrator then addressed the second question and applied a different remedy. 2016 OK CIV APP 4 , 21, 365 P.3d 82. The Court concluded: "The arbitrator's decision, applying concepts of fairness and equity, does not draw its essence from the CBA." Id.

¶ 11 In that case, the arbitrator found there was just cause for discipline for two of the seven reasons asserted by the city for discipline, but because the arbitrator did not find just cause for the other five reasons, the arbitrator determined the discipline imposed by the city was too severe. Id . ¶ 3. The Lodge 93 Court rejected the argument that the arbitrator "interpreted a difference between just cause to discharge and just cause for lesser discipline," and that the arbitrator "properly exercised his authority by interpreting and applying the contractual ‘just cause’ provision to resolve the dispute submitted to him by the parties." Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 12 Relying on a federal appellate case,2 the Lodge 93 Court affirmed the trial court's order vacating the arbitration award reasoning as follows:

[T]he arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from the CBA. As the City of Tulsa argues, the arbitrator went outside the CBA in finding "the Chief had just cause, but then lessened [grievant's] punishment for two reasons: because of good performance evaluations and because City did not sufficiently prove its other allegations." The City of Tulsa contends "[t]his is where the [a]rbitrator went outside the CBA, as the trial court found." The City further argued, "The CBA does not provide that an officer committing just cause for termination can be excused if she does not commit other violations to
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT