City of Hammond v. Biedron
| Decision Date | 27 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A05-9405-CV-181,45A05-9405-CV-181 |
| Citation | 652 N.E.2d 110 |
| Parties | CITY OF HAMMOND, Appellant-Defendant, v. Betty J. BIEDRON, As Administratrix of the Estate of Fred Biedron, Appellee-Plaintiff, George C. Meyer & Company, Margaret A. Meyer, Hammond Lead Products, Inc., Halstab Division of Hammond Lead Products, Inc., Ferro Corporation, Keil Chemical Division of Ferro Corporation, and Centimark Corporation, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Fred Biedron, a firefighter for the City of Hammond, was killed in the line of duty. The administratrix of his estate sued the City for negligence. The City responded by filing a motion for summary judgment contending that the administratrix's sole remedy was an action brought under the provisions of the Employer's Liability Act, Ind.Code § 22-3-9-1 to -11. The trial court denied the motion and the City now brings this interlocutory appeal arguing the trial court erred in so doing.
We affirm.
On December 16, 1991, Fred Biedron was accidentally killed while fighting a fire in the course of his employment with the City of Hammond. Because of Biedron's status as a firefighter and his membership in the Hammond Fire Department Pension Fund, Biedron's estate was precluded from pursuing a remedy under the provisions of Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act. See Ind.Code § 22-3-2-2(c). Therefore, acting as administratrix of her husband's estate, Betty Biedron filed a complaint against the City based on various allegations of negligence. The complaint also named as defendants several other parties not involved in this appeal. The City answered the complaint and thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that any recovery on the complaint may not exceed $10,000.00 pursuant to provisions of the Employer's Liability Act. 1 The trial court denied the motion and this interlocutory appeal ensued.
The City contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. In support of its contention City compares the Employer's Liability Act (ELA) with the Worker's Compensation Act (WCA) and concludes the ELA is the administratrix's sole remedy. Specifically City argues that the underlying purposes of the ELA and the WCA are the same, namely eliminating common law obstacles to recovery by employees for work-related injuries and providing a corresponding limitation on damages for the benefit of employers. Thus, the argument continues, when an injury is found to be covered by the WCA, that statute provides the exclusive remedy and any recovery at common law is barred. In like fashion, the City maintains, the ELA should provide the sole remedy for injuries falling within its provisions. That is particularly true in this case, the City claims, because firefighters are excluded from the WCA only if they are members of a pension fund, and therefore pension fund benefits are provided in lieu of worker's compensation benefits. Betty Biedron has already received benefits from the pension fund and other sources in excess of the amount she would have received under the WCA. Thus, the City argues, any further recovery should be limited by the provisions of the ELA.
The Employer's Liability Act was enacted in 1911 prior to passage of Indiana's worker's compensation laws. Like the Worker's Compensation Act passed in 1929, 2 the ELA was intended to alleviate the harshness of the common law in actions against employers for damages stemming from industrial accidents. City of Hammond v. Rossi (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 105, 108, trans. denied. The common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule had been formidable obstacles to recovery in such cases. Id. While the WCA eliminates the defenses altogether by allowing compensation to any employee whose injury arose out of and in the course of employment, I.C. § 22-3-2-2, the ELA merely restricts their use and provides for recovery upon a showing of negligence. I.C. § 22-3-9-1 to -3; Ben F. Small, Workmen's Compensation Law of Indiana § 2.4, at 25. In contrast to the statutory compensation set forth in the WCA, the ELA provides that damages recoverable...
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Lockhart v. Examone World Wide, Inc.
...Employer's Liability Act (“ IELA ”). Ind.Code § 22–3–9–1. Therefore, the IELA does not apply to this case, City of Hammond v. Biedron, 652 N.E.2d 110, 112–13 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), and the Court will address Ms. Lockhart's claims against her employer under Indiana common law.C. Vicarious Liabil......