City of Hammond v. Plys, 45A05-0712-CV-746.

• Citation: 893 N.E.2d 1
• Case Date: June 24, 2008
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

893 N.E.2d 1 CITY OF HAMMOND, Hammond Civic Center, and Hammond Parks Board, Appellants-Defendants,
v.
Martha PLYS, Appellee-Plaintiff. No. 45A05-0712-CV-746. Court of Appeals of Indiana. June 24, 2008. Publication Ordered July 17, 2008.

[893 N.E.2d 2]

Paul A. Rake, John M. McCrum, Megan C. Brennan, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Michael D. Babcock, Layer Tanzillo Stassin & Babcock, P.C., Dyer, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

The City of Hammond, the Hammond Civic Center, and the Hammond Parks Board (collectively, "the Hammond defendants") appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.

Issue

The Hammond defendants raise one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly concluded that the release signed by Martha Plys is not specific enough to exempt them from liability for negligence.

Facts

Plys joined the Hammond Fitness Center in January of 2003. The Hammond Fitness Center is located in the Hammond Civic Center, which is owned by the Hammond Parks Board. The Hammond Parks and Recreation Department runs the fitness center. On January 21, 2003, Plys signed a release regarding her participation at the fitness center:

I, MARTHA PLYS, accept full responsibility and assume the risk for my use of any and all apparatus, appliance, facility privilege or service, of any nature, which is owned or operated by the Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, Indiana. While engaging in any contact, game, function, exercise, competition, or any other activity operating, organized, arranged, or sponsored by the Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, either on or off their premises, I shall do so at my own risk, and hold the Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, Indiana, its employees, representatives and agents, forever harmless from any and all loss, claim, injury, damage, or liability sustained or incurred by me resulting therefrom. I specifically agree to indemnify and hold harmless Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, Indiana as to any loss, cost, claim, injury, damage or liability, sustained or incurred by using the facilities or equipment of the Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, Indiana which is caused by an act or omission, whether negligent, intentional or otherwise, of an employee, representative, or agent of the Hammond Parks and Recreation Department, the Hammond Civic Center, or the City of Hammond, Indiana. Reading of the above rules and my signature

893 N.E.2d 3

below constitutes my full acceptance of this waiver.

App. p. 25.

On April 4, 2003, Plys slipped on a pool ladder and injured her foot. She brought a negligence action against the Hammond defendants on February 25, 2005. The Hammond defendants moved for summary judgment on May 17, 2006, arguing that Plys waived any claims against them by signing the release. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion. It found that "the express waiver involved in this matter fails to specifically state that the Plaintiff is waiving the specific negligence of Defendants" and "does not relieve the Defendants from liability." Id. at 11. The Hammond defendants moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal on February 12, 2007.¹ The trial court granted the motion to certify and we accepted jurisdiction.

Analysis

We apply the same standard as the trial court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Cleary v. Manning, 884 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). The moving party must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Cleary, 884 N.E.2d at 337. In order to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted, we must address whether the signed release exempted the Hammond defendants from liability for negligence. The interpretation of a written contract, including a release, is a question of law, and we will conduct a de novo review the trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. Avant v. Community Hosp., 826 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

When reviewing a contract, we examine the language used to express the parties' rights and duties to determine their intent. Id. Words are given their usual meaning unless it is clear from the context that another meaning was intended. Id. "Words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, and sections of a contract cannot be read out of context. If possible, the entire contract must be read together and given meaning." Id.

"[A]n exculpatory clause must both specifically and explicitly refer to the negligence of the party seeking release from liability." Powell v. Amer. Health Fitness Center of Fort Wayne, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). But, this court has held that "an exculpatory clause need not include the word...