City of Hannibal v. Winchester
Decision Date | 14 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 50068,50068 |
Citation | 391 S.W.2d 279 |
Parties | CITY OF HANNIBAL, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Ben N. WINCHESTER and Ruth Winchester, his wife, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Dennis R. Davidson, City Counselor, Ely & Hibbard, Ben Ely, Hannibal, for appellant.
William B. Spaun, Hannibal, for respondents.
This case involves the validity of proceedings by the City of Hannibal, a charter city, to annex territory. A petition for declaratory judgment under the Sawyers Act, Section 71.015, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., 1 was filed as a class suit against the interested owners in the adjacent territory. No objection is made here to the use of a class action. The petition contains the allegations appropriate to a Sawyers Act case, namely, that the proposed annexation was reasonable and necessary to the proper development of the city, that the city had the ability to furnish normal municipal services to the area within a reasonable time, and other factual statements deemed pertinent. The City Council had adopted appropriate resolutions concerning the annexation, including one eliminating from the suit a part of the area originally proposed for annexation, because of an agreement with certain property owners resulting in a partial annexation. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the second amended petition on the following grounds, among others: that the said petition stated no cause of action; that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties; that Sec. 71.015 does not apply to constitutional charter cities and that the statute is unconstitutional as so applied, because it is in conflict with Art. 6, Secs. 19 and 20 of the Missouri Constitution, V.A.M.S.; that plaintiff must proceed under Section 82.090, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., because its corporate limits were defined and set out in its charter, and that the present proceedings are repugnant to that statute; that the boundaries of plaintiff can only be extended by charter amendment, and that the present proceedings would deprive defendants of their property without due process. The Honorable James D. Clemens was assigned to hear the case, in lieu of the regular judge. The Court sustained the motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter; it relied upon the cases of McConnell v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 518, and State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762. This appeal followed immediately.
In effect, the trial court held that a constitutional charter city may only annex territory or alter its corporate limits by a charter amendment as provided in Sec. 20 of Art. 6 of our Constitution which it regarded as a self-enforcing provision, and that the Sawyers Act was inapplicable and, indeed, invalid as to constitutional charter cities. Section 19 of Art. 6 permits any city of more than 10,000 inhabitants to frame and adopt a charter for its government 'consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state * * * '; it provides very specifically the method for doing so, requiring a vote of the electors. Section 20 of Art. 6 provides the method for the amendment of any such city charter; the basic requirement of that section is the vote of a majority of the electors which shall follow the adoption of an ordinance proposing the amendment, the submission of the proposal by a commission, or the presentation of a petition of at least 10% of the qualified electors.
The points upon which appellant city relies here are substantially these: that the charter of the City of Hannibal expressly provides that it may extend its corporate limits by ordinance 'pursuant to the applicable laws,' and that it was within the powers of the Charter Commission and the voters, under the Constitution and legislative acts, to insert that provision in the charter; that this is a matter germane to the government of the city; that on such matters affecting the 'form of organization' of a city, the Constitution has granted to the Charter Commission and the electors full legislative power coordinate with that of the legislature; that the provision of a 'workable method' for annexation is vital, not only to cities but also to the interest of the inhabitants of the territory to be annexed and to the state; and, finally, that under the charter provisions of plaintiff the Sawyers Act is applicable and a declaratory judgment suit proper.
Our Court has held rather recently on two different occasions that the exclusive method by which Kansas City may annex territory is by a charter amendment. State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, Banc, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762; McConnell v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 518. In Taylor, the primary question was which of two municipalities had first instituted valid annexation proceedings. It was held that the enactment of an ordinance by Kansas City providing for the annexation by means of a charter amendment under Sec. 20, Art. 6, gave that municipality priority, and that its proceedings by that method were not only proper but exclusive; also that the provisions of Sec. 20 are broad enough to include annexation proceedings even though they are not expressly mentioned as such. After discussing prior cases, the Court said: The Charter of Kansas City expressly provided that annexation should be accomplished by charter amendment. That is urged here as a vital distinction.
In McConnell v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 518, a taxpayer sought to enjoin the submission of an annexation ordinance to the voters as a charter amendment, on the ground that the city must proceed by declaratory judgment under the Sawyers Act. The Court held that the statute was inapplicable because it was in conflict with the provisions of Sec. 20 of Art. 6 regulating the time of the submission of an annexation proposal to the voters as a charter amendment. The Court said there in part, loc. cit. 520, 521, 522:
In McConnell, the Court apparently assumed that the word 'resolution,' as used in the Sawyers Act, was the equivalent of an annexation 'ordinance.' We make no such assumption. Rather, it appears to us that the resolution might well be a ministerial direction to the city's legal officers to institute and prosecute a declaratory judgment suit. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Sec. 15.02. Considered in that light, an ordinance of annexation under Sec. 20, and the vote thereon, might be deferred until after the declaratory judgment had been obtained, thus conforming the timing of those two procedures. However, as pointed out in McConnell, there are two other methods provided in Sec. 20 for instituting charter amendments (and annexations, as we hold); one, the submission by a charter commission, and the other, by a petition of not less than ten per cent of the registered electors. In either of such instances, the legislative body shall at once provide by ordinance that such amendment be submitted to a vote of the electors 'at the next election held...
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