City of Hartford v. Town of Suffield

• Decision Date: 12 December 1950
• Citation: 137 Conn. 341,77 A.2d 760
• Parties: CITY OF HARTFORD v. TOWN OF SUFFIELD. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 760

77 A.2d 760

137 Conn. 341

CITY OF HARTFORD v. TOWN OF SUFFIELD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 12, 1950.

Frank A. Murphy, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Hartford (Samuel Gould, Corporation Counsel, Hartford, on the brief), for the appellant (plaintiff).

Henry P. Bakewell, Hartford (Hugh M. Alcorn, Jr., Hartford, on the brief), for the appellee (defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff's appeal from a judgment for the defendant after its demurrer to the complaint was sustained presents a single question of interpretation of § 247f of the 1941 Supplement to the General Statutes. The gist of the complaint as amended is that a pauper belonging to and settled in Suffield has lived in Hartford since 1931 and has not been other than a pauper for any four consecutive years during that period; that Hartford has furnished him necessary support; that on December 22, 1933, Hartford gave written notice to Suffield that he was chargeable to it; that Hartford has duly presented to Suffield itemized statements of the expenses incurred for his support since December 7, 1933; and that it has not been reimbursed for expenses totaling $655.33 for the period from May 1, 1942, to September 30, 1943. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it appeared therefrom that the pauper 'had resided outside of * * * Suffield for a period of more than four consecutive years prior to May 1, 1942 * * * and thereby lost his settlement in said Suffield.' The plaintiff claims damages. Its further claim for a declaratory judgment has been abandoned.

Section 247f, upon which the demurrer is predicated, reads: 'Any person, having a settlement in any town in this state, who shall have resided outside of said town for a period of four consecutive years, shall be deemed to have lost his settlement therein.' This statute took effect July 1, 1941. General Statutes, Rev.1930, § 6569. The plaintiff argues that it is prospective only in its operation and so is no bar to its claim. The defendant contends that the correct interpretation is that such a term of four years' outside residence terminates the pauper's former settlement whether this term occurred before or after the effective date of the act. It should be noted that the only question involved in the instant case concerns payments claimed to be due for support furnished the pauper subsequent to that date. 'A statute is to be so construed as to carry out the intent of the Legislature, this to be ascertained from the act itself, if the language is plain, otherwise by considering it in the light of all its provisions, the object sought to be accomplished, pre-existing legislation upon the same subject, and other relevant circumstances.' City of Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 605, 141 A. 891, 894.

There is persuasive reason for holding that the language of the act is sufficiently plain of itself to disclose the legislative intent. Words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. General Statutes, § 8890. While the statute is prospective in its effect, in that persons shall be deemed from its operative date to have lost their settlement, nevertheless within its terms the criteria upon which this effect is based might well arise either before or after that date. This results from the use of the words 'shall have resided.' We have held that the future perfect tense of a verb constitutes a convenient from of expression for giving an all-inclusive past and future application to a phrase. 'The words 'shall have levied' are susceptible of both past and future application; they furnish a convenient form for legislative use when it is desired to give all-inclusive force to a single expression. Therefore as they may mean future, or past and future, it becomes a question of legislative intent in each statute.' Norris v. Sullivan, 47 Conn. 474, 476; see People ex rel. Eckerson v. Board of Education, 126 App.Div. 414, 417, 110 N.Y.S. 769; Douglas v. James, 66 Vt. 21, 24, 28 A. 319. As was said by the Missouri court, 'Its [the statute's] use of the future form of the verb, 'commence,' as developed in the phrase 'shall have been commenced,' in correct usage in the discourse of good writers and speakers, includes the past as well as the future.' Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R. Co., 219 Mo. 524, 535, 118 S.W. 40, 44. Although the phrase used by itself might mean future or past and future, the different tenses used in § 247f in the respective phrases 'shall have resided' and 'shall be deemed' indicate, as a matter of grammar, an intention to make the former phrase all-inclusive.

That this was the legislature's intent is corroborated by the fact that it was its purpose thereby to change the previously existing status of paupers, as is indicated by the course of legislation which it had adopted in the enactment of other statutes. As the New York court observed concerning a statute of like nature, 'It does away with the legal fiction of a residence presumed to continue long after it has in fact ceased, and thus simplifies the law.' People ex rel. May v. Maynard, 160 N.Y. 453, 460, 55 N.E. 9, 10. Section 1636 of the General Statutes, Rev.1918, had provided that, when any person legally settled in a town should gain a legal settlement in another state and...