City of Hartford v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Decision Date: 25 November 1986
• Citation: 201 Conn. 421,518 A.2d 49
• Parties: CITY OF HARTFORD et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 49

518 A.2d 49

201 Conn. 421

CITY OF HARTFORD et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 2, 1986.

Decided Nov. 25, 1986.

Lisa Silvestri, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Richard H. Goldstein, Corp. Counsel, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Constance L. Chambers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, Hartford, for the appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, DANNEHY, CALLAHAN and COVELLO, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, the city of Hartford and its police department, have a statutory right to refuse to disclose records of a police department internal investigation into the defendant Gilbert L. Clarke's complaints of police misconduct. Clarke requested from the police department, but did not receive, copies of records relevant to the investigation in question. Through his attorney, the defendant Irving H. Rosenthal Clarke complained to the Freedom of Information Commission (the commission), seeking disclosure of the records under General Statutes § 1-21i(b). After a hearing, the commission ordered the plaintiffs to furnish copies of the records to Clarke. Pursuant to General Statutes § 1-21i(d), the plaintiffs appealed the commission's order to the superior court. That court, Barry, J., rendered a judgment dismissing the appeal. We find no error in the plaintiffs' appeal of that judgment.

The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. On June 12, 1981, Hartford police arrested and detained the defendant Clarke. Clarke subsequently filed complaints with the Hartford police department's internal affairs division alleging that he had been subjected to police brutality and deprived of his civil rights by nine officers involved in his arrest, processing and detention. On November 3, 1981, Hartford Police Chief George W. Sicaras notified Clarke by letter that the police department's internal affairs division had investigated his complaint. Sicaras' letter informed Clarke that eight of the nine officers had been exonerated of all charges, and that the ninth officer had been referred to the department advocate for further investigation.

On November 14, the defendant Rosenthal wrote to Chief Sicaras, on Clarke's behalf, seeking: copies of written reports of the internal affairs investigation; the review of the investigation by the involved officers' commanding officers and the police department's investigative review board; and the referral of the officer who had not been exonerated. On December 2, 1981, having received no response to his letter, Rosenthal filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission seeking to compel production of the requested material. A hearing was held in February, 1982 after which, in accordance with commission procedures, both parties had the opportunity to submit written briefs. In July, 1982, the commission ordered the plaintiffs to furnish the requested documents. The Superior Court thereafter dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal of the commission's order in September, 1984.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim that the lower court erred in determining that: (1) General Statutes §§ 31-128a(2) and 31-128f, which limit an employer's right to disclose information in personnel files, do not apply to municipal employees; and (2) the investigative records are not exempt from public disclosure under General Statutes § 1-19(b)(2), which exempts certain personnel files from the ambit of the Freedom of Information Act, General Statutes § 1-15 et seq. The plaintiffs also claim that this court must automatically sustain their appeal because the commission failed to hear and render a decision upon the defendant Clarke's complaint within the time limits imposed by General Statutes § 1-21i(b). ¹ We consider this latter claim first.

I

The plaintiffs' jurisdictional claim arises out of the juxtaposition of recent case law and even more recent legislation concerning the procedural constraints on administrative proceedings before the Freedom of Information Commission. In Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 199 Conn. 451, 452-53, 507 A.2d 1385 (1986), and Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 503-506, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986), we held that the time constraints imposed by § 1-21i(b) on commission action are mandatory. Consequently, we concluded that the commission's failure to hear and decide cases within those time limits nullified any subsequent action that the commission had taken. Following these decisions, in May, 1986, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted Public Acts 1986, No. 86-408 (hereinafter No. 86-408), which repealed § 1-21i(b). Section 2(a) of No. 86-408 validated those actions of the commission that did not comply with the time limits of § 1-21i(b) but had not been fully adjudicated by the new act's effective date. ² The plaintiffs do not dispute that the legislature intended No. 86-408, § 2(a), to operate retroactively, nor that the commission's action in this case is covered by the language of the statute. Rather, they urge this court to hold that No. 86-408, § 2(a), is void as an impermissible abrogation of their vested rights. ³

The legislature has the power to cure, by retroactive enactment, a party's failure to comply with a procedural statutory requirement, provided that two conditions have been met. First, the legislative enactment must address a procedural requirement that the legislature had the right to alter prospectively. Second, the enactment's retroactive application must not operate in a manner that would unjustly abrogate vested rights. Enfield Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Bissell, 184 Conn. 569, 572, 440 A.2d 220 (1981); Connecticut State Employees Assn., Inc. v. Connecticut Personnel Policy Board, 165 Conn. 448, 454, 334 A.2d 909 (1973); Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 186-87, 198 A. 746 (1938); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.1986) § 41.05.

The record in this case discloses no evidence that any vested rights of the plaintiffs were impaired by the enactment of No. 86-408, § 2(a). We are not confronted with a situation in which, but for the retroactive legislation, the defendants would be irrevocably barred from obtaining the relief that they seek. The case thus is distinguishable from Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 355 A.2d 1 (1974), on which the plaintiffs rely. In Hillier, the legislature, via special act, validated the plaintiff's failure to comply with a statutory time limitation for furnishing notice of injury to the defendant before commencing suit. The very existence of the plaintiff's right of action depended on her compliance with the notice provision. Furthermore, her late filing of notice prejudiced the defendant's ability to investigate the circumstances of the alleged injury and prepare a defense. Id., at 107, 355 A.2d 1. Accordingly, we held that the retroactive legislation abrogated the defendant's vested rights, in violation of article first, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution and § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. ⁴ Id., at 109-10, 355 A.2d 1. In the case before us, unlike Hillier, the act of the legislature merely excuses the commission's failure to comply with procedural requirements that do not directly affect the substantive rights of the parties. Were we to adopt the plaintiffs' position and sustain the appeal, the defendant Clarke would be free to file a second complaint with the commission and, assuming the commission again found in his favor, would be entitled to the same relief as he had been granted previously. Under these circumstances, we conclude that No. 86-408, § 2(a) neither abrogates the plaintiffs' vested rights, nor deprives them of a legally cognizable property interest. ⁵

II

We turn now to the plaintiffs' claim that the documents included in the commission's disclosure order are absolutely privileged from disclosure by General Statutes § 31-128f, ⁶ a key provision of the Personnel Files Act, General Statutes § 31-128a et seq. With limited exceptions not applicable here, General Statutes § 31-128f prohibits an "employer" from disclosing "individually identifiable information contained in the personnel file or medical records of any employee...." "Employer" is defined in General Statutes § 31-128a(2) to include "an individual, corporation, partnership or unincorporated association." The defendants do not contest the plaintiffs' characterization of the documents in question as personnel files, but rather claim that the plaintiffs are not "employers" within the scope of § 31-128f. We agree.

The plaintiffs contend that they fall within the definition of "employer" in § 31-128a(2) because that definition includes corporations, and the city of Hartford is a municipal corporation. Citing examples of other state statutes dealing with corporations, in which the legislature has specifically defined the types of corporations covered, ⁷ the plaintiffs argue that if the legislature had intended to exclude municipal corporations from the ambit of § 31-128a(2), it would have done so expressly. We find this argument unpersuasive.

We note that, if § 31-128a(2) were construed to include municipal corporations within its scope, General Statutes § 31-128f would overlap and conflict with General Statutes § 1-19, ⁸ the centerpiece of the Freedom of Information Act, which makes disclosure of public records the statutory norm. ⁹ While § 1-19(a) does provide an exception to disclosure where "otherwise provided by ... state statute," General Statutes § 1-19(b)(2) provides a separate exemption for "personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy." Because the enactment of § 1-19 predates the enactment of the ...