CRADLE, J.
The plaintiff, the city of Hartford (city), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award finding that it violated its collective bargaining agreement (agreement) with the defendant, the Hartford Police Union (union). On appeal, the city claims that the court erred in concluding that the arbitration panel (panel) did not exceed its authority in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4) in (1) finding that the city violated the agreement and (2) ordering retroactive pay as a remedy, in addition to the overtime pay already received for that same time period. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the city's claims on appeal. As of March 3, 2017, there were five police captains employed by the Hartford Police Department. Beginning on that date those police captains began serially retiring over the course of approximately fifteen months, until the last of the five retired on June 15, 2018. All five of the captain positions remained vacant until September 23, 2018, when they all were filled simultaneously.
On November 15, 2018, the union filed a grievance alleging that, as of March 4, 2017, when the first of the five captains retired, the number of captains fell below the mandated number of captains required by Appendix I of the agreement, which provides in relevant part: "[F]ive (5) Police Captains shall be appointed prior to August 15, 1994 and the positions authorized for Lieutenant shall be filled prior to January 1, 1995. These positions shall not be decreased to allow for the assigning of Deputy Chief." The union also cited Appendix B of the agreement, which pertains to the compensation of members of the collective bargaining unit.
On April 17, 2019, the parties submitted the following agreed upon issue for arbitration: "Did the city of Hartford violate Appendix I or Appendix B of the [agreement] when the number of captains fell below five (5) effective March 4, 2017? If so, what shall the remedy be?" The union claimed that the city violated the agreement by allowing the number of police captains to decrease below five at any given time, and it sought back pay and benefits for the employees who were subsequently promoted to captain effective March 3, 2017. The city argued that the agreement did not require that the number of police captains must be strictly maintained at five and that the agreement did not provide for an award of back pay.
On December 5, 2019, the panel issued its award, finding that the city violated the agreement by leaving the captain vacancies open until September, 2018, and awarding the employees who were appointed on September 23, 2018, "an amount that represents the difference between their individual rates of pay on March 3, 2017, and the rate of pay they received when appointed captain for the period from March 3, 2017 to September 23, 2018, not including any overtime worked."
On January 3, 2020, the city filed an application to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) on the ground that the panel exceeded its powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made.
By way of a written memorandum of decision filed on August 7, 2020, the court denied the city's application to vacate the arbitration award. In rejecting the city's argument that the panel exceeded its powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not made when it found that the city had violated the agreement, the court reasoned: "According to Appendix I of the [agreement], in 1994, five of six police captain positions were required to be filled and were not to be reduced for the appointment of a deputy chief. Although this language does not specifically state that these five positions may not be decreased for any other reason, or must be maintained, or that ... any such vacancies must be filled immediately, the decision of the panel certainly does not manifest an egregious or patently irrational application of the law.
"Although the court disagrees that the plain meaning of the contract language prohibits the delay of vacancy appointments amongst the ranks of Hartford police captains, it is not an unreasonable interpretation of the contract, taken as a whole. ... Although the parties have different interpretations of the language of Appendix I, and although its language may be seen as ambiguous, the court will not fault the panel for failing to seek extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties in this matter involving arbitration." (Citation omitted.)
As to the city's claim regarding the remedy awarded by the panel, the court explained: "The same analysis holds true for the remedy imposed by the panel. The [agreement] provides no remedy for a violation of the contract, as determined by the panel. Although retroactive pay does not appear to be provided for any purpose in Appendix B, it is not prohibited. Although the panel's decision reflects anguish over the elusiveness of an accurate and appropriate measure of damages for a perceived violation of the [agreement], imposing no remedy for a violation of the [agreement] would provide no real consequence or incentive to ensure future compliance.
"Without a remedy, the city would be free to avoid its responsibilities under the contract, as determined by the panel. Under the facts presented, the city was not required to pay police captains wages to five individuals for approximately three, four, fifteen, seventeen and eighteen months, apparently saving the city just less than a year's worth of wages, on average, for five highly compensated professionals. Instead, pursuant to the decision of the panel, five lieutenants must be retroactively paid the difference between lieutenants’ and police captains’ salaries for a period of approximately eighteen months. It is unknown whether these payments represent an accurate and actual loss to each of these individuals, had they been selected to fill individual vacancies as they occurred; however, it is neither irrational to provide a measured remedy for a violation of the [agreement], nor is the panel's award unduly punitive in light of the city's apparent savings, resulting from its failure to timely fill these higher salaried positions. Aside from these practical considerations, importantly, the remedy is not inconsistent with any specific prohibition on arbitration within the [agreement] in this unrestricted submission to arbitration." On the basis of the foregoing, the court denied the city's application to vacate the arbitration award. This appeal followed.
"On appeal, the city claims that the trial court incorrectly denied its application to vacate the award pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the panel exceeded [its] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." The city challenges the court's denial to vacate the arbitration award both as to the violation of the agreement and the remedy.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "The propriety of arbitration awards often turns on the unique standard of review and legal principles applied to decisions rendered in this forum. [Thus, judicial] review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. ... Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. ... Parties to an arbitration may make a restricted or an unrestricted submission." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. New Milford Education Assn. , 331 Conn. 524, 531, 205 A.3d 552 (2019).
Here, the court correctly concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that the submission to the panel was unrestricted.1 "[U]nder an unrestricted submission, the [panel's] decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the [panel] nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact. ... Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, however, a reviewing court will vacate an award when an [arbitration panel] has exceeded the power granted to [it] by the parties’ submission. ... [A] claim that [an arbitration panel has] exceeded [its] powers may be established under § 52-418 in either one of two ways: (1) the award fails to conform to the submission, or, in other words, falls outside the scope of the submission; or (2) the [panel] manifestly disregarded the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 531–32, 205 A.3d 552.
"In considering whether the [panel] exceeded [its] powers on that basis, a reviewing court's inquiry is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission. ... [A] court cannot base the decision [regarding whether the panel has exceeded its authority] on whether the court would have ordered the same relief, or whether or not the [panel] correctly interpreted the contract. The court must instead focus on whether the [panel] had authority to reach a certain issue, not whether that issue was correctly decided. ... Because the [panel] is required to consider the submission in light of the parties’ agreement, the [panel's] award ... must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the [panel's] own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the [panel] is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within...
