City of Hialeah Gardens v. MIAMI-DADE FOUNDATION, INC.

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WELLS.
• Citation: City of Hialeah Gardens v. MIAMI-DADE FOUNDATION, INC., 857 So.2d 202 (Fla. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 23 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3D03-1056.,3D03-1056.
• Parties: CITY OF HIALEAH GARDENS, Petitioner, v. MIAMI-DADE CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC., and Luis Machado, Respondents.

857 So.2d 202

CITY OF HIALEAH GARDENS, Petitioner, v. MIAMI-DADE CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC., and Luis Machado, Respondents.

No. 3D03-1056.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 23, 2003.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied October 17, 2003.

Citrin & Walker and J. Frost Walker, III, Coral Gables, for petitioner.

Tannebaum, Plans & Weiss and Daniel A. Weiss, for respondents.

Before FLETCHER, and WELLS, and NESBITT, Senior Judge.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied October 17, 2003.

WELLS, Judge.

The City of Hialeah Gardens petitions for certiorari review of a decision of the circuit court, appellate division, quashing the City's denial of an application for a special exception use resolution. We grant the petition and quash the circuit court's decision.

Luis Machado and the Miami-Dade Charter Foundation, Inc. (collectively "Machado") sought a permit from the City of Hialeah Gardens for a "special exception use" resolution permitting the construction and operation of a charter elementary school on approximately 2.1 acres of property fronting Northwest 103rd Street, a main highway artery and extension of West 49th Street in neighboring Hialeah. Under the City's code, the use of this property for a school, due to its location in a BU zone, is authorized upon adoption of a resolution granting a special exception use, which must be found by the City Council to comply with the following requirements:

(1) The use is a permitted special use as set forth in the special exception uses for that district.

(2) The use is so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety, welfare and convenience will be protected.

(3) The use will not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the neighborhood where it is to be located.

(4) The use will be compatible with adjoining developments and the proposed character of the district where it is to be located.

(5) Adequate landscaping and screening is provided as required in this chapter, or as otherwise required.

(6) Adequate off-street parking and loading is provided. Ingress and egress is designed so as to cause minimum interference with traffic on abutting streets and the use has adequate frontage on a public or approved private street.

(7) The use conforms with all applicable regulations governing the district where located, except as may otherwise be determined for planned unit developments.

§ 78-132, City of Hialeah Gardens Code.

In the course of the three public hearings held on the matter, Machado presented two site plans and introduced both lay and expert testimony in support of the request. The City's professional staff explained why they could not support the placement of an elementary school on what was characterized as one of the busiest, most congested roadways in Miami-Dade County. Ultimately, the City rejected Machado's application.

The City's decision was overturned by the circuit court, appellate division, primarily for two reasons: first, because the City's testimony addressing "the traffic risks associated with placing a school on a well traveled thoroughfare" was "not based on specific expert competent evidence," and second, because the testimony of staff members, while "cast[ing] doubt" on the evidence presented by Machado, did not overcome Machado's evidence.

Our scope of review of the circuit court's decision is limited to determining whether the circuit court applied the correct law or legal standard, that is, whether it departed from the essential requirements of the law. See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So.2d 598, 608-09 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). We agree with the City that the circuit court applied the wrong law or incorrect legal standard, first, by rejecting the City's decision as not being "based on specific expert competent evidence," and second, by re-weighing the evidence, and in the process, ignoring the evidence supporting the City's decision. See Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626; see also Dusseau v. Metro. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 794 So.2d 1270, 1275 (Fla.2001); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089, 1093 (Fla.2000). We therefore exercise our certiorari jurisdiction because the circuit court violated clearly established principles of law resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice. See Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682-83 (Fla.2000).

A.

Once a special exception applicant demonstrates consistency with a zoning authority's land use plan and meets code criteria, the decision-making body may deny the request only where "the party opposing the application (i.e., either the agency itself or a third party) ... show[s] by competent substantial evidence that the proposed exception does not meet the published criteria." Fla. Power & Light Co., 761 So.2d at 1092; see Irvine v. Duval County Planning Comm'n, 495 So.2d 167 (Fla.1986); Jesus Fellowship, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 752 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). In this context, competent evidence is evidence sufficiently relevant and material to the ultimate determination "that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached." DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912, 916 (Fla.1957). Substantial evidence is evidence that provides a factual basis from which a fact at issue may reasonably be inferred. Id.; Blumenthal, 675 So.2d at 608; see also Pollard v. Palm Beach County, 560 So.2d 1358, 1359-60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("evidence relied upon to sustain the ultimate finding should be sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. To this extent the `substantial' evidence should also be `competent.'").

Under this standard, generalized statements in opposition to a land use proposal, even those from an expert, should be disregarded. See Div. of Admin. v. Samter, 393 So.2d 1142, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ("[n]o weight may be accorded an expert opinion which is totally conclusory in nature and is unsupported by any discernible, factually-based chain of underlying reasoning"). However, contrary to the circuit court's decision, relevant fact-based statements, whether expert or not, are to be considered. See Blumenthal, 675 So.2d at 607 ("[u]nder the correct legal standard, citizen testimony in a zoning matter is perfectly permissible and constitutes substantial competent evidence, so long as it is fact-based"); see also Metro. Dade County v. Sportacres Dev. Group, 698 So.2d 281, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(holding that materials in the record in conjunction with neighbors' testimony could constitute competent substantial evidence). Here, the Chief of Police, the Director of Public Works, and the Chief Zoning Official, gave specific fact-based reasons for their recommendations that the application be rejected.¹ Their observations were relevant, material, and fact-based and not merely, "generalized statement[s] of opposition." Blumenthal, 675 So.2d at 607; see Jesus Fellowship, 752 So.2d at 709; Miami-Dade County v. Walberg, 739 So.2d 115, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(citing Blumenthal, 675 So.2d at 607). In sum, these witnesses were "no group of `Apopka Witnesses,' i.e., local residents who simply wished the facility to be established elsewhere" but were experts providing fact-based, relevant and material evidence. Blumenthal, 675 So.2d at 608,quoting City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); see also Allapattah Cmty. Ass'n v. Miami, 379 So.2d 387, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(citing to "expert opinion" of planning department).

Inherent in the circuit court's conclusion that the City's denial had to be based on "specific expert competent testimony," is the incorrect assumption that the expert testimony of those opposing Machado's application had to be distilled from the experts' own studies or reports. This is incorrect. The fact that these professionals did not submit, as the circuit court noted, their own "countervailing" charts, statistical studies or other materials did not diminish the sufficiency of their testimony.

The "facts" upon which such testimony rests may derive from relevant portions of the record or from other relevant factual information detailed in the application itself. See Sportacres Dev. Group, 698 So.2d at 282 (holding that "the County Commission had access to a record which contained maps, reports and other information which, in conjunction with the testimony of the neighbors, if believed by the Commission, constituted competent substantial evidence").

Here, the testifying staff members utilized their professional experiences and personal observations, as well as Machado's application, site plan, and traffic study, as the basis for their testimony. These record materials, along with the staff presentations, combined to provide evidence "sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached." DeGroot, 95 So.2d at 916. Ignoring this standard constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law.

B.

A circuit court may not re-weigh the evidence. In reviewing local administrative action, circuit courts are constrained to determine only whether the agency's determination is supported by competent substantial evidence. A circuit court may not re-weigh the evidence to substitute its judgment for that of the agency by determining whether the evidence shows that the application was deficient:

At the circuit court level, a solitary judge quashed the Commission decision, ruling as follows: "The [homeowners] failed to show by competent substantial evidence that such use [was inconsistent with the Dania Code]" (emphasis added). This ruling was improper. Under Vaillant, the circuit court was constrained to determine simply whether the Commission's decision was

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