City of Highwood v. Wightman

• Decision Date: 22 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-405,78-405
• Parties: , 28 Ill.Dec. 421 CITY OF HIGHWOOD, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James D. WIGHTMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 588

390 N.E.2d 588

71 Ill.App.3d 935, 28 Ill.Dec. 421

CITY OF HIGHWOOD, an Illinois Municipal Corporation Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James D. WIGHTMAN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 78-405.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

May 22, 1979.

Wallace B. Dunn, Steven J. Handler, Highwood, for plaintiff-appellant.

Peter J. Collins, Waukegan, for defendant-appellee.

GUILD, Presiding Justice:

This case is an aftermath of the case of Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 419, 16 Ill.Dec. 653, 375 N.E.2d 526, rev'd 1978, 72 Ill.2d 131, 19 Ill.Dec. 626, 379 N.E.2d 290.

The defendant herein was charged with a violation of chapter 77-0-11, section 3-11(10) of the Ordinances of the City of Highwood, which reads as follows:

"(a) A person commits gambling when he:

(10) Knowingly transmits information as to wagers or betting odds, by telephone, telegraph, radio, semaphore or similar means; or knowingly installs or maintains equipment for the transmission or receipt of such information."

It is agreed that this section of the Ordinance is substantially identical to a provision of the Illinois State gambling statute, Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, chapter 38, section 28-1(a)(10).

On May 16, 1978 police officer Frank F. Reinier observed the defendant, James D. Wightman, using a telephone to transmit information and orders as to bets to be placed at a racetrack. A complaint was issued charging the defendant with gambling in violation of the city ordinance and he was brought to trial. At that trial, as is disclosed by the verified bystander's report filed in this appeal, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. It found that the appellate court decision in Finish Line, supra, was controlling in this instance and,

" * * * held that a messenger service could transmit orders as to bets to be placed at the racetrack over the telephone and therefore directed a verdict in favor of defendant * * * "

The City appeals from that order.

In this appeal the City contends that the appellate decision in Finish Line did not give the defendant, as an employee of Front Runner Messenger Service, Inc., the authority to transmit wager information or information as to wagers over the telephone, in violation of the City ordinance. Secondly, it contends that where a decision of the appellate court is subsequently and quickly reversed by the Supreme Court, a trial court order based upon it must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. In view of our decision herein we need not, and do not, consider the latter issue.

The first contention presented is that the interpretation of the trial court as to the appellate decision in Finish Line was incorrect. We agree. In an examination of that case we find no holding by the appellate court that "a messenger service could transmit orders as to bets to be placed at the racetrack over the telephone . . ." In addition, it was testified to, apparently without contradiction, that defendant Wightman, as an employee of the Front Runner Messenger...