City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority
Decision Date | 03 October 1979 |
Docket Number | No. B-8084,B-8084 |
Citation | 589 S.W.2d 671,23 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 7 |
Parties | The CITY OF HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. CLEAR CREEK BASIN AUTHORITY, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Robert M. Collie, Jr., City Atty., Fulbright & Jaworski, David J. Beck, Houston, for petitioner.
Kronzer, Abraham & Watkins, Robert E. Ballard, Houston, for respondent.
Respondent Clear Creek Basin Authority, a statutory governmental entity existing under article 8280-311 (1965), sued the City of Houston for injunctive relief and statutory penalties, alleging the unlawful discharge of waste waters by treatment plants operated by the City in violation of chapter 26 of the Texas Water Code. 1 The trial court granted summary judgment for the City of Houston, but the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded. 573 S.W.2d 839.
Two questions are presented: (1) whether the respondent, Clear Creek Basin Authority, properly presented its objections to the summary judgment under rule 166-A(c) which provides that only "expressly presented" issues may be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal; and (2) whether the respondent Clear Creek, plaintiff below, has standing to sue under the provisions of the Texas Water Code § 26.001 et seq., which prohibits the unauthorized discharge of polluting waste waters, for discharges occurring upstream and Outside its territorial boundaries. Because the answer to both questions is "no," we reverse the court of civil appeals and affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial court.
Clear Creek's suit alleges numerous violations of waste control orders of the Texas Water Quality Board and a common law nuisance as a result of the discharge of sewage into waters which ultimately flow into Galveston Bay. The Attorney General of Texas, on behalf of the Texas Water Quality Control Board and the State of Texas, intervened as a necessary party-plaintiff pursuant to the requirement of the Texas Water Code.
Clear Creek alleged in its first amended original petition that the City of Houston had committed numerous violations at 31 different locations. Defendant City admitted that four of these plants discharging effluent are situated within the territorial boundaries of Clear Creek Basin Authority set forth in section 2 of Article 8280-311, Supra, and that these four plants exceeded the terms of the City's permit from the Water Quality Control Board during the periods of 1974 and 1976. The remaining plants were located upstream and outside of Clear Creek's territorial jurisdiction.
The City of Houston filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging three grounds:
1. The matters upon which Clear Creek bases its claims for relief fall within the primary jurisdiction of the Texas Water Quality Board; Clear Creek has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and that neither the Texas Water Quality Board nor the Texas Department of Water Resources has authorized the bringing of this action;
2. As a matter of law, Clear Creek cannot obtain relief for violations of the Texas Water Code which occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Authority; and
3. The action represents an attempt by Clear Creek to perform a function or service which the City of Houston is authorized to perform without the written consent of the governing body of the City of Houston, all in violation of Article 8280-311, sec. 5.
Clear Creek filed this response to the motion:
I.
The only issue before this Court is a question of law: can a downstream victim of pollution sue an upstream polluter?
II.
The City has admitted that its sewer plants exceed the parameters of its permits on a regular basis. See Answers to Admissions and Interrogatories.
III.
The City's effluent is flushed into Clear Lake on a daily basis and causes pollution there. See deposition testimony of Sidney H. Tanner and Affidavits on file.
There is no Verbatim record of the hearing on the motion, but the trial court's judgment recites that at the hearing, Clear Creek withdrew its common law cause of action in open court and announced its desire to proceed only on the basis of its claims under chapter 26 of the Texas Water Code. It further recites that the City of Houston withdrew paragraphs 1 and 3 of its motion for summary judgment and desired to proceed to hearing only on paragraph 2 challenging Clear Creek's right to sue for violations outside its jurisdictional boundaries. In this context, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. 2
In the meantime, and apart from the summary judgment proceeding, the City of Houston and the state Attorney General worked out a settlement agreement between them to which Clear Creek was not a party. The settlement agreement was incorporated in the trial court's final judgment but was made expressly contingent upon the judgment that Clear Creek take nothing being upheld on appeal. The settlement provided for an agreed injunction judgment obligating the City to construct and place into operation some $500,000,000 worth of additional waste water treatment plants, sludge disposal plants, and sewage diversion lines with a reporting schedule to the Texas Department of Water Resources and to the trial court.
The court of civil appeals, in reversing and remanding the cause for trial, held that a fact issue existed as to the alleged violations occurring Within Clear Creek's territorial boundaries. The court reasoned that even if the admitted fact of those violations was not presented to the trial court at the hearing on summary judgment, this part of Clear Creek's cause of action was not waived because there was no written agreement of waiver filed under rule 11. The court said that the City had not carried its burden and was not entitled to a summary judgment despite Clear Creek's failure to specify the reasons why the motion should not be granted.
Petitioner City of Houston asserts nine points of error. The first alleged error is that the judgment of the court of civil appeals is erroneous for the reason that it is contrary to the requirement of rule 166-A, that "(i)ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response, shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal." The remaining points claim that Clear Creek waived and abandoned any fact issue and that it is estopped from asserting any complaints of violations occurring within the geographical boundaries of the Clear Creek Basin Authority.
The first question is whether the 1978 amendment to rule 166-A(c), providing that issues not expressly presented to the trial court may not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal, precludes the court of civil appeals from reversing the summary judgment when the non-movant agreed to the submission to the trial court of a single issue of law. We hold that because the parties agreed on the submission of only one issue to the trial court and its ruling on that issue constituted the basis of the granting of the motion for summary judgment, Clear Creek is precluded from later urging on appeal the issue not presented, i. e., the violations of the four plants located within Clear Creek's boundaries.
A history of the summary judgment rule, rule 166-A, reflects that the high hopes of increasing judicial efficiency advanced by the proponents of the rule did not materialize. While no summary judgment rule was included in the initial promulgation of the rules of civil procedure in 1940, after considerable urging by legal scholars and commentators and by the Texas Civil Judicial Council, rule 166-A was adopted by this court, effective March 1, 1950. Pittsford and Russell, Summary Judgment in Texas: A Selective Survey, 14 Hous.L.Rev. 854 (1977). Despite predictions of success by its supporters, the rule has been fraught with misunderstanding. One prominent writer observed in 1961 that a poll of district judges throughout the state reflected many were skeptical about the efficacy of the rule because of frequent reversals by appellate courts. McDonald, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment, 15 Sw.L.J. 365, 373-4 (1961). In 1977, a survey concluded that fewer than two percent of the civil cases disposed of in Texas in the six preceding years were decided by summary judgment. See Pittsford and Russell, Supra at 854. Another survey of the cases decided by this court between 1968 and 1976 reflected that when a summary judgment was granted in the trial court, seventy percent of those cases were reversed and remanded for trial. Sheehan, Summary Judgment: Let the Movant Beware, 8 St. Mary's L.J. 253, 254 (1976).
Attempts within the bar to clarify summary judgment practice began to gain momentum in the early 1970's. After several unsuccessful attempts at revision, the Committee on the Administration of Justice of the State Bar of Texas voted in March of 1976 to recommend changes in rule 166-A that would require the non-movant to provide some assistance to the trial judge in narrowing the issues to be decided. That proposal was then considered by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee in March of 1977, and after several changes, was recommended to this court for adoption. The proposal recommended significant change in section (c), primarily by requiring the non-movant to "define specifically in writing" the controverted issues and defects in the movant's proof that would defeat the motion. The recorded minutes of the Advisory Committee reflect a prevailing sentiment to change the rule, to make summary judgments a more useful procedure in judicial administration, to require non-movant to specify his opposition to the motion, and to prevent the non-movant from "laying behind the log" within his objections until appeal. 3
A comparison of section (c) of the rule as it existed before January 1, 1978, and as amended demonstrates the significance of the change in the mechanics of the summary judgment procedure. The new rule adopts the objectives of the Advisory Committee, but goes even further...
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