City of Houston v. Clark

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: O'Neill
• Citation: City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314, 2006 WL 1791698 (Tex. 2006)
• Decision Date: 30 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-0930.,04-0930.
• Parties: THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. Donald CLARK, Respondent.

197 S.W.3d 314

THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. Donald CLARK, Respondent.

No. 04-0930.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 16, 2005.

Decided June 30, 2006.

Timothy J. Higley, Constance K. Acosta, Anthony W. Hall Jr., Arturo G. Michel, David W. Holman, for petitioner.

E. Troy Blakeney, Richard C. Mumey, Vincent L. Marable III, for respondent.

Steven Goode, Joshua S. Cantrell, Brad Neighbor, for amicus curiae.

Justice O'NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, known as the Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Act, authorizes municipalities to appeal adverse decisions of independent hearing examiners. We hold that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment of dismissal and remand the case to that court for consideration of the City of Houston's appeal.

I. Background

Donald Clark, a senior fire alarm dispatcher for the Houston Fire Department, was suspended for fifteen days without pay for violating basic dispatch protocols. His error caused unnecessary delay in dispatching an emergency vehicle in response to the shooting of a Houston police officer. At the time Clark's suspension was imposed, Houston Fire Chief Lester Tyra was himself serving a seven-day suspension because of an investigation into Clark's placement at the emergency dispatch center. As a result, Clark's suspension was handed down by the acting fire chief. Clark elected to appeal his suspension to an independent hearing examiner, as was his right under the Local Government Code. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.1016(a).

At the parties' request, the independent hearing examiner simultaneously considered the merits of Clark's appeal and his motion to dismiss, which asserted that the Code only authorized the fire chief, not the acting fire chief, to suspend fire department personnel. The independent hearing examiner denied Clark's appeal on the merits, finding that the fire department's decision to suspend him was justified. But the examiner granted Clark's motion to dismiss,¹ concluding that Section 143.117(a) of the Code empowered only the fire chief to temporarily suspend fire department personnel.²

The City appealed the independent hearing examiner's decision to the district court, asserting that the examiner had exceeded his jurisdiction and incorrectly applied the law in granting Clark's motion to dismiss. It also sought a declaratory judgment that an acting fire chief may issue a temporary suspension under Chapter 143 of the Code. Clark filed a summary-judgment motion arguing that the district court's decision in another case, City of Houston v. Rivera, No. 90-045333 (190th Dist. Ct, Harris County, Tex. Feb. 12, 1992), collaterally estopped the City from asserting that an acting fire chief has the authority to suspend a fire fighter. The City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting seven grounds in support.³ The trial court granted Clark's summary-judgment motion and denied the City's. The court of appeals, finding the factual differences between the circumstances of this case and Rivera sufficient to prevent collateral estoppel from barring the City's claim, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further review. City of Houston v. Clark, No. 01-01-00828-CV, 2002 WL 31771188, at *2, 2002 Tex.App. LEXIS 8854, at *9-10 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.12, 2002, no pet.).

On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment in Clark's favor, this time noting that the reference to "department head" in Section 143.117(a) did not include an acting fire chief who was neither appointed by the Mayor nor confirmed by the City Council, and therefore, the acting fire chief was not empowered to suspend members of the fire department. The trial court's order reversed Clark's suspension and reinstated his wages and lost time.

The City appealed the trial court's decision, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that Section 143.1016(j) of the Code did not afford the City a right to appeal an independent hearing examiner's decision. 142 S.W.2d at 353-54. The court of appeals concluded that the absence of an explicit reference to a municipality's right to appeal a hearing examiner's decision, contrasted with numerous references throughout Chapter 143 to the appellate rights of fire fighters and police officers, could only mean that "no such right or procedures were intended or exist." 142 S.W.3d at 353, 354, n. 3. The court of appeals expressly disagreed with other Texas appellate decisions holding that cities could appeal an adverse independent hearing examiner's decision under Chapter 143. Compare id., with City of Garland v. Byrd, 97 S.W.3d 601, 607-08 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (holding that there are no limitations on who may appeal a hearing examiner's decision); Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616-18 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (holding that the city had a right to judicial review under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine if a hearing examiner exceeded his authority, but not reaching whether there was a right to an appeal under Section 143.1016(j)); Nuchia v. Tippy, 973 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex.App.— Tyler 1998, no pet.) (holding that a municipality may appeal an independent hearing examiner's decision to a trial court under Section 143.1016(j)); City of San Antonio v. Longoria, No. 04-04-00063-CV, 2004 WL 2098074 (Tex.App.—San Antonio Sept.22, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) (reaching the merits of an appeal by the City of a hearing examiner's decision); but see City of Waco v. Kelley, 2004 WL 2481383 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004) (holding that the City of Waco had no right to appeal an independent hearing examiner's decision), rev'd, 197 S.W.3d 324, 2006 WL 1793302 (Tex.2006) (per curiam). We granted the City's petition for review to resolve this split of authority over municipalities' appellate rights under Section 143.1016(j) of the Local Government Code.⁴

II. The Parties' Arguments

The City contends the court of appeals erred in foreclosing any recourse by cities to appeal an independent hearing examiner's decision in district court. The City asserts that the decision leaves it without any remedy, even if the examiner's decision is arbitrary or capricious, or if such a decision is procured unlawfully or by fraud. According to the City, construing the statutory scheme to foreclose any right of appeal would indicate an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex.1997) (designating eight factors to consider in determining whether a delegation of legislative power is constitutional, including whether a private examiner's decision is subject to meaningful review); see also Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex.1998) (holding that the Legislature can delegate authority to private entities if there is protection against the arbitrary exercise of power). The City further claims the hearing examiner in this case exceeded his jurisdiction by, in effect, issuing a declaratory judgment that an acting fire chief must be appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council in order to suspend fire department personnel under Section 143.117 of the Code.

Clark responds that the City has no right to appeal an independent hearing examiner's decision under Section 143.1016(j). Clark notes that while cities might have recourse to district court to vindicate constitutional rights, the City raises no such rights in this case. Alternatively, Clark argues that, even if the City is determined to have a right to appeal under Section 143.1016(j), such an appeal is limited to the grounds that the arbitration panel was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order was procured by fraud, collusion or other unlawful means. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.1016(j). Clark contends the City's challenge to the examiner's decision in this case implicates none of these narrow grounds.

III. Discussion

Section 143.1016 of the Local Government Code establishes procedures governing the review of certain disciplinary actions against fire fighters and police officers. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.1016. That provision affords an aggrieved officer the choice of appealing an adverse disciplinary action to an independent third party hearing examiner rather than to the Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Commission. Id. § 143.1016(a). In exchange, the aggrieved officer accepts a significantly circumscribed right to appeal the examiner's decision, as described in Section 143.1016(c):

The hearing examiner's decision is final and binding on all parties. If the fire fighter or police officer decides to appeal to an independent third party hearing examiner, the person automatically waives all rights to appeal to a district court except as provided by subsection (j).

Id. § 143.1016(c). Subsection (j) states in pertinent part:

A district court may hear an appeal of a hearing examiner's award only on the grounds that the arbitration panel was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order was procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means.

Id. § 143.1016(j).⁵

In this case, we must decide whether Section 143.1016(j) affords the City a right of appeal from an independent hearing examiner's decision, or whether the Legislature intended the limited appeal in subjection (j) to apply exclusively to fire fighters and police officers.

A

In interpreting Section 143.1016(j), our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003). In discerning that intent, we begin with the "`plain and common meaning of the statute's words.'" Id. (quoting State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.2002...