City of Indianapolis v. Satz
| Decision Date | 21 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 678S116,678S116 |
| Citation | 377 N.E.2d 623,268 Ind. 581 |
| Parties | CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS and Robert L. Snow, Appellants, v. Arnold SATZ, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Robert Snow, an off-duty policeman with the Indianapolis Police Department, arrested plaintiff Satz who was subsequently charged with being disorderly and with interfering or taunting a police officer. Subsequently Satz executed a release discharging the City from any and all liability arising from the incident. The release recited that the City denied liability and was dropping the above charges in return for the release by way of compromise. Satz later filed a complaint against Snow, the City of Indianapolis and one, Leonard Koplow, the owner of the store which at the time employed Snow as a security guard. The City moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the statutory notice had not been given, which motion was overruled. The jury returned a verdict for Koplow but against Snow and the City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that there was substantial compliance with the City notice requirements. City of Indianapolis v. Satz (1977), Ind.App., 361 N.E.2d 1227. The court also affirmed the judgment with respect to the errors raised by appellant Snow. However, Snow has not petitioned this Court to transfer his cause and therefore those issues are not before us.
Similar arguments were presented to this Court recently in the case of Geyer v. City of Logansport (1977), Ind., 370 N.E.2d 333. There we held that the City notice statute then in force, IC § 18-2-2-1 (Burns' 1974) (now found in IC § 34-4-16.5-7 (Burns' Supp.1977)), "places an affirmative duty upon the plaintiff to deliver a writing to the city manifesting the nature of the claim." 370 N.E.2d at 336. Although the plaintiff in Geyer had not satisfied the statutory mandate, we noted that in some instances the requirement may be met by substantial compliance. Such was the situation in Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis (1970), 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225, where the plaintiff, although he had not delivered a notice of claim to the proper city officials specified under the statute, had nevertheless within the 60-day limit sent two letters to the city legal department detailing the accident and its surrounding circumstances. Consequently, this Court held that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirement inasmuch as the purpose of the statute, that is to apprise the City of the incident so it may investigate circumstances and determine its possible liability, had been satisfied.
In the case at bar there are three facts upon which substantial compliance with the notice statute is premised. First, the Court of Appeals based its decision in part on the fact that City investigated Satz's complaints. However, the Court of Appeals cases cited by that court have been overruled on transfer. See City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron (1977), Ind., 370 N.E.2d 338; Geyer v. City of Logansport (1977), Ind., 370 N.E.2d 333. A mere investigation by the City into an incident has now been held not to constitute substantial compliance. Geyer v. City of Logansport, supra.
Second, the Court of Appeals based its finding of substantial compliance also upon the release which was signed only 25 days after the incident. We need not decide whether such release would otherwise constitute substantial compliance with the statute for we find that it did not involve the proper city officials. The statute requires the notice to be served on the mayor or the clerk of the City. In Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis,supra, we extended this to include the city legal department, premising our decision on the fact that the city legal department is the mayor's agent and therefore should be a proper agent for accepting service of a notice of claim. In the case at bar...
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