City of Indianapolis v. Martin
| Decision Date | 05 November 1909 |
| Docket Number | 6,807 |
| Citation | 89 N.E. 599,45 Ind.App. 256 |
| Parties | CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. MARTIN |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied January 28, 1910.
From Superior Court of Marion County (70,605); James M. Leathers Judge.
Action by Paul F. Martin against the City of Indianapolis. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
F. E Matson and C. D. Bowen, for appellant.
Charles O. Roemler and Harry O. Chamberlain, for appelle.
This is an action by appellee to recover salary for 1903, 1904 and 1905 for services as physician for a hospital for contagious diseases maintained by the city of Indianapolis. Judgment was rendered for $ 1,017.81. The claim is based upon an ordinance of July 7, 1873, which provides that the management of said institution shall be vested in the board of directors of the city hospital, who shall place the hospital in the charge of a skilful and competent physician, being the same as that by them chosen as superintendent of the city hospital, and that such physician shall receive for his services, as physician of such hospital for contagious diseases, a salary of $ 500 per annum, to be paid as the salaries of other city officers are paid.
The appellee brings himself within the provision of this ordinance. Appellant, however, claims that the ordinance was repealed by the fee and salary ordinance of 1904, in which the hospital for contagious diseases was not mentioned. State, ex rel., v. Dudley (1853), 1 Ohio St. 437. See, also, Chamberlain v. City of Evansville (1881), 77 Ind. 542, 544; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Peck (1909), 172 Ind. 562, 88 N.E. 939. The latter ordinance is shown by its title to relate to certain offices. Its subject-matter is not the same as the ordinance of 1873, and they are therefore not inconsistent, and must both be regarded as in effect. Carver v. Smith (1883), 90 Ind. 222, 226, 46 Am. Rep. 210; Robinson v. Rippey (1887), 111 Ind. 112, 116, 12 N.E. 141.
The point most urgently pressed by the city is based upon a provision of the city charter then in force, in terms as follows: "No executive department, officer or employe thereof, shall have the power to bind such city to any contract, agreement, or in any other way to any extent beyond the amount of money at the time already appropriated by ordinance for the purpose of such department, and all contracts and agreements, express or implied, and all obligations of any and every sort, beyond such existing appropriations, are declared to be absolutely void." Acts 1903, p. 356. It
is claimed that the evidence fails to show an appropriation for the years named, and that whatever unexpended appropriation was made has been covered back into the treasury. The policy of restrictive laws of the nature of this one is well known. It is the basis of the county reform law (§§ 5932, 5933 Burns 1908, Acts 1899, p. 343, §§ 15, 16), and is designed to protect the public from improvident contracts and expenditures. Turner v. Board, etc. (1902), 158 Ind. 166, 63 N.E. 210; Board, etc., v. Mowbray (1903), 160 Ind. 10, 66 N.E. 46; Board, etc., v. Pollard (1899), 153 Ind. 371, 55 N.E. 87; State, ex rel., v. Parks (1907), 169 Ind. 93, 81 N.E. 76; State, ex rel., v. Board, etc. (1905), 165 Ind. 262, 74 N.E. 1091; Board, etc., v. Hunter (1903), 161 Ind. 478, 68 N.E. 1022; Gish v. Board, etc. (1903), 31 Ind.App. 485, 68 N.E. 318; Board, etc., v. Babcock (1904), 33 Ind.App. 349, 71 N.E. 518; Talbott v. Board, etc. (1908), 42 Ind.App. 198, 85 N.E. 376.
The ordinance under consideration is not inclusive, as are the statutes considered in the cases just cited. The restriction is expressly limited to the making of contracts, express or implied. The...
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