City of Jackson v. House

• Decision Date: 15 November 1926
• Docket Number: 25874
• Citation: City of Jackson v. House, 110 So. 231, 145 Miss. 135 (Miss. 1926)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF JACKSON v. EDWARDS HOUSE. [*]

110 So. 231

145 Miss. 135

CITY OF JACKSON v. EDWARDS HOUSE. ^[*]

No. 25874

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 15, 1926

Division A

. (Division A.)

1 TAXATION.

If Laws of 1922, chapter 259, were construed as authorizing county or municipality to grant tax exemption to particular hotels and not to all other hotels of character therein described, it would be in violation of Constitution, sections 112 and 192.

2 TAXATION.

Tax exemption by city to particular hotel held not authorized under Laws 1922, chapter 259, enacted pursuant to Constitution, section 192, contemplating general exemption embracing all property of particular class.

HON. W H. POTTER, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county, HON. W. H. POTTER, Judge.

Assessment proceedings by the city of Jackson against the Edwards House. From a judgment on appeal annulling the assessment, the city appeals. Reversed and judgment rendered.

Judgment reversed.

Morse & Scott, for appellant.

I. The exemption as given is unconstitutional. Municipal ordinances being established by the exercise of a delegated function of legislature, subordinate to the general government of the state, are obviously subject to many restrictions and limitations which confine them to a comparatively narrow field; all persons who deal with a municipality are presumed to know the powers thereof. See Edwards Hotel & City Ry. Co. v. City of Jackson, 96 Miss. 547, 57 So. 802; Steiten Roth v. City of Jackson, 99 Miss. 354; Crittenden v. Town of Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723; Edwards House Co. v. City of Jackson, 103 So. 428; section 5813, Hemingway's Code; sections 90, 182, 192, Constitution of 1890.

The proper procedure to grant an exemption should have been for the municipality to pass an ordinance to conform to chapter 259 Laws of 1922, so as to make it a general law in a municipality. The Hotel Company should have then made its application and the exemption should have then been given.

This was a special exemption to the Hotel Company by a resolution which was in the nature of an agreement between two parties. The resolution is nothing more than a written motion that they be allowed this exemption and the authorities of the city of Jackson were acquiescent in said motion.

II. The exemption as given is not in compliance with the law. Sections 5813 and 5844, Hemingway's Code, provide that the questions of exemption from taxation must be by ordinance; while the constitution itself says that all exemptions must be by general laws. Necessarily city ordinances must conform to constitutional requirements.

A municipal ordinance is a general law of a permanent nature enacted by the governing council of a municipal corporation. There are certain formalities such as a successive number of readings on different dates, etc. A resolution is an informal enactment of a temporary nature providing for the disposition of a particular piece of administrative business of a municipal corporation and it is not a law. There is in substance no difference in a resolution and a motion. 19 R. C. L. 895 under section 194 of Municipal Corporation. See also 28 Cyc. 347.

III. Under the terms of the resolution the real and personal property would not be exempt. This exemption is linked up with the contract about Esau Street and the contract and opinion of the court in cases styled Edwards Hotel Co. v. City of Jackson, 103 So. 428, 132 Miss. 710. The city of Jackson would have no authority to engraft on to the exemption statute the question as to whether a certain contract was valid or invalid. The rule with reference to exemptions is a strict construction; every doubt is resolved against the exemption and in favor of the taxing powers.

The hotel was built and in operation before the exemption ever attached and under the rule announced in Adams v. Lamb-Fish Lbr. Co., 103 Miss. 491; and Robertson v. Southern Paper Co., 119 Miss. 113, this exemption would be void. But construing the case according to the great case of Adams v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co., 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937, we are confronted with a compelling interpretation of exemption statutes. Applying these rules to the instant case, we find that the appellee has failed to establish the exemption as claimed.

IV. At the time the exemption would take effect the tax lien had attached. The resolution passed in February, 1924, states that the building has been constructed so as to comply with chapter 259, Laws of 1922, and completed as therein required, no exemption had attached to the hotel company as the supreme court had not passed upon all parts of the contract.

The rule as laid down in Adams v. Lamb-Fish Lbr. Co., supra, and Robertson v. Southern Paper Co., supra, would be applicable and the ratification of said exemption would not be of any benefit to the appellee herein.

Green, Green & Potter, for appellee.

The enactment of the legislature granting this exemption is found in chapter 259, Laws of 1922. It is therefore manifest that section 90 is not a construction of the power of municipalities, but only a construction of the power of the legislature. From a mere reading of chapter 259, Laws of 1922, it is manifest that insofar as the legislature is concerned, the act is a general law for the reason that it provides that municipal authorities may in their discretion grant an exemption from municipal taxes for all permanent hotels constructed of new material and erected prior to January 1, 1924.

The same reasoning applies to section 182 and section 192 of the constitution, for this is a general law giving the authorities of the municipalities at their discretion the power to exempt from municipal taxes all hotels coming within the class therein specified.

II. It is now contended that because the city granted this exemption by way of resolution and not by way of ordinance that the exemption is invalid, and in support of its contention, the city cites the court to sections 5813 and 5844, Hemingway's Code.

If the municipal authorities had been acting under the provision of the code above quoted, there would be something in counsel's contention, and possibly the ordinance would not be valid; but the city of Jackson in granting this exemption was not operating under these code sections. It derived its authority from and was operating under 259, Laws of 1922, which grants the power to the municipality to grant the exemptions without in anywise specifying the manner in which the authority would be exercised.

The act is complete within itself and leaves it to the discretion of the municipal authorities whether the grant of power therein contained shall be enacted and if enacted, the manner of enactment. This being true, the rule is that where the statute or charter of the corporation is silent, as to the manner in which the municipal corporation shall act, a resolution is just as effective as is an ordinance. 19 R. C. L. 895; Atchison Board of Ed. v. DeKay, 148 U.S. 591, 13 S.Ct. 706, 37 L.Ed. 573; Crawfordsville v. Bradin, 14 L. R. A. 268-73. See, also, Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 1317, and note; Martin v. Oskaloosa, 126 Ia. 680, 102 N.W. 529, 3 Ann. Cas. 651 and note; Johnson v. Somerville, 195 Mass. 370, 81 N.E. 268, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 715.

III. Counsel contends that the first resolution granting the exemption is invalid because it was conditioned upon the supreme court holding invalid a certain contract entered into between the Edwards Hotel Company and the city of Jackson, whereupon the city obtained Esau Street.

The contract therein mentioned is the contract that was before this court in Edwards Hotel Co. v. City of Jackson, 96 So. 170. From a reading of that contract the motive that induced the placing of this clause in the contract is apparent. Under the contract the city agreed to pay to the Edwards Hotel for twenty years a sum equal to the municipal taxes against the hotel; and while counsel contends that because this condition was placed in the resolution, the resolution fails, because the statute does not authorize exemptions conditioned on the act of the third party, yet he cites no authority to support his contention in the premises.

IV. It is next contended by the appellant that the statute is not broad enough to cover the land upon which the hotel is situated. The rule is laid clown in 12 Am. and Eng. Ency page 341. See, also, County v. Brotherhood of Gethsemene, 38...