City of Janesville v. Heiser

Decision Date06 February 1933
PartiesCITY OF JANESVILLE v. HEISER.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Rock County; George Grimm, Circuit Judge.

Theodore Heiser was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor fit for beverage purposes in violation of an ordinance of the City of Janesville, and he appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

The appellant, hereafter called the defendant, was, on the 5th day of August, 1931, found guilty of having on the 13th day of April, 1931, violated section 3 of Ordinance No. 186 of the general ordinances of the city of Janesville entitled “An ordinance to revise, consolidate and codify the General Ordinances of the City of Janesville,” in that he, the said Theodore Heiser, did on the date aforesaid at said city at the premises occupied by him at 103 East State street unlawfully and illegally possess intoxicating liquor fit for beverage purposes. Complaint was first made to the municipal court of Janesville. Upon trial had in said court the defendant was found guilty as charged in the complaint and it was adjudged that he pay a fine and also be imprisoned in the county jail of Rock county. The defendant thereupon appealed to the circuit court for Rock county. Trial was there had before the court without a jury (trial by jury having been waived). The circuit court found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint and adjudged that he pay a fine of $600 and be imprisoned in the county jail of Rock county for not to exceed two months, and that in case of default in the payment of the fine he should be further imprisoned in said jail for not to exceed three months. From that judgment, the defendant appealed.

Dan W. McCluskey, of Janesville, for appellant.

Robert J. Cunningham, City Atty., of Janesville, for respondent.

NELSON, J.

The complaint charges that the defendant unlawfully and illegally possessed intoxicating liquor fit for beverage purposes in violation of section 3 of ordinance 186 of the general ordinances of the city of Janesville, which is as follows: “After this ordinance becomes effective the possession of intoxicating liquor, as herein defined, by any person, other than in his private dwelling used exclusively as such, or except as authorized by the ‘National Prohibition Act, is hereby prohibited. The possession of intoxicating liquor by any person not legally permitted under the National Prohibition Act to possess liquor shall be prima facie evidence of its unlawful possession.”

That section prohibits the possession of intoxicating liquor by any person other than in his private dwelling used exclusively as such. The first question before us is whether the evidence properly adduced upon the trial is sufficient to sustain the finding and judgment of the trial court.

Prior to the making of the complaint herein a complaint for a search warrant was made to the judge of the municipal court of the city of Janesville by the chief of police. The complaint for a search warrant recites that it is made upon “information and belief.” However, it appears from the record made by the judge at the time the complaint for a search warrant was made that the chief of police and also another witness appeared before the magistrate, were sworn and examined. The witness testified that he had theretofore and within thirty-six hours purchased from the defendant, in the premises sought to be searched, a pint of moonshine liquor. The testimony was taken in shorthand, was thereafter transcribed and filed. The liquor purchased was exhibited to the magistrate and opinion testimony as to its nature given. A search warrant was issued pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of said Ordinance No. 186. A search of defendant's premises followed and a considerable quantity of liquor described as gin, alcohol, and home-brew was seized. Upon the opening of the trial in the municipal court the defendant made timely motion to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant, on the ground that the search was illegal and in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. That motion was overruled and the evidence received.

[1] Upon appeal to the circuit court and at the opening of the trial, counsel for the defendant in response to the following question asked by the court, “What are the facts in dispute in this case?” stated: “I am willing to stipulate that Mr. Heiser is the owner of this liquor; I am willing to admit that it contained more than one-half of one per cent and that he was in possession of the property at the time of the raid and of the liquor and that the copy of the city ordinance is a true copy of the city ordinance passed by the city of Janesville.”

The court thereupon stated: “It is conceded by the defense that the raid was made; that he owned the home in which the raid was made and was also in possession of both the home and the liquor taken on the raid.”

Defendant's attorney replied: “That is conceded.”

Defendant's attorney thereupon made a motion to suppress the evidence already stipulated in the case on the ground that the search warrant was illegally issued, and for the return of the property. The court thereupon stated: “I won't pass on the last motion. The first motion of course is unnecessary because the stipulation covers those facts.”

It seems clear to us that after it was stipulated and conceded that the defendant owned the liquor, that it contained more than one-half of 1 per cent. and that he was in possession of it in his home at the time the raid was made, the question as to whether the search was illegal because of the invalidity of section 7 of said ordinance which purports to authorize the issuing of a search warrant, or because the search warrant was improperly and illegally issued, became quite immaterial.

[2] The complaint charged the unlawful and illegal possession of intoxicating liquor. The stipulation hereinbefore referred to plainly conceded that the defendant was the owner of the liquor (evidently referring to the liquor seized and then in court); that it contained more than one-half of 1 per cent. (evidently of alcohol); that he was in...

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4 cases
  • Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Committee on Water Pollution
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1951
    ... ... Page 427 ... under sec. 144.56, Stats., in an order dated June 26, 1950. The city of Madison, Dane county, and H. O. Lord, a taxpayer of the city of Madison, were permitted to ... City of Janesville v. Heiser, 1933, 210 Wis. 526, ... Page 438 ... 246 N.W. 701; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, ... ...
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    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • October 13, 1942
    ...of this chapter [ch. 62] all the powers that the Legislature could by any possibility confer upon it.” See also Janesville v. Heiser, 1933, 210 Wis. 526, 246 N.W. 701. However, that does not mean that the legislature has conferred power on cities to do things which the legislature itself ca......
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    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1947
    ...of a statute passed under the home rule amendment. These are Hack v. Mineral Point, 203 Wis. 215, 233 N.W. 82, and Janesville v. Heiser, 210 Wis. 526, 246 N.W. 701. After a careful reconsideration, we are of the view that the doctrine of these cases cannot be maintained and that the power c......
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